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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study explores the accuracy and valuation implications of the application of a 
comprehensive list of equity multiples in the takeover context. Motivating the study 
is the prevalent use of equity multiples in practice, the observed long-run 
underperformance of acquirers following takeovers, and the scarcity of multiples-
based research in the merger and acquisition setting. In exploring the application of 
equity multiples in this context three research questions are addressed: (1) how 
accurate are equity multiples (RQ1); which equity multiples are more accurate in 
valuing the firm (RQ2); and which equity multiples are associated with greater 
misvaluation of the firm (RQ3). 
 
Following a comprehensive review of the extant multiples-based literature it is 
hypothesised that the accuracy of multiples in estimating stock market prices in the 
takeover context will rank as follows (from best to worst): (1) forecasted earnings 
multiples, (2) multiples closer to bottom line earnings, (3) multiples based on Net 
Cash Flow from Operations (NCFO) and trading revenue. The relative inaccuracies 
in multiples are expected to flow through to equity misvaluation (as measured by the 
ratio of estimated market capitalisation to residual income value, or P/V). 
Accordingly, it is hypothesised that greater overvaluation will be exhibited for 
multiples based on Trading Revenue, NCFO, Book Value (BV) and earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) versus multiples based on 
bottom line earnings; and that multiples based on Intrinsic Value will display the 
least overvaluation.  
 
The hypotheses are tested using a sample of 147 acquirers and 129 targets involved 
in Australian takeover transactions announced between 1990 and 2005. The results 
show that first, the majority of computed multiples examined exhibit valuation errors 
within 30 percent of stock market values. Second, and consistent with expectations, 
the results provide support for the superiority of multiples based on forecasted 
earnings in valuing targets and acquirers engaged in takeover transactions. Although 
a gradual improvement in estimating stock market values is not entirely evident 
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when moving down the Income Statement, historical earnings multiples perform 
better than multiples based on Trading Revenue or NCFO. Third, while multiples 
based on forecasted earnings have the highest valuation accuracy they, along with 
Trading Revenue multiples for targets, produce the most overvalued valuations for 
acquirers and targets. Consistent with predictions, greater overvaluation is exhibited 
for multiples based on Trading Revenue for targets, and NCFO and EBITDA for 
both acquirers and targets. Finally, as expected, multiples based Intrinsic Value 
(along with BV) are associated with the least overvaluation. 
 
Given the widespread usage of valuation multiples in takeover contexts these 
findings offer a unique insight into their relative effectiveness. Importantly, the 
findings add to the growing body of valuation accuracy literature, especially within 
Australia, and should assist market participants to better understand the relative 
accuracy and misvaluation consequences of various equity multiples used in takeover 
documentation and assist them in subsequent investment decision making.  
 
KEYWORDS: Takeovers, mergers and acquisitions, multiples, takeover 
misvaluation, acquirer and target valuation, valuation accuracy, residual income 
valuation. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Study Overview 
For over a century investors, managers and academics have sought to determine 
whether takeovers generate shareholder wealth. This question also has had renewed 
meaning due to the ongoing uncertainty in global financial markets, and 
unprecedented heights of global merger and acquisition deal value coupled with 
prominent takeover failures in the lead up to the global financial crisis. These market 
conditions motivate continued effort to identify factors that contribute to wealth 
creation or destruction as a result of mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Takeover literature suggests one important contributing factor to wealth destruction 
is misvaluation of the target and/or acquirer. Multiples are frequently employed in 
the valuations decisions in takeover contexts. Thus, incorrect application of multiples 
is likely to be a contributing factor in misvaluation outcomes.   
 
As there is little known research the objective of this thesis is to examine the 
application, accuracy and valuation implications of common multiples used in the 
takeover context. By considering multiples in this context, the study combines two 
important streams of research: the valuation accuracy of multiples and the 
misvaluation of firms prior to a takeover. Specifically, this study seeks to investigate 
the performance of various multiples used in valuing target and acquirer firms.  
 
1.2 Background to Multiples 
Multiples are used in practice to value a particular company based on the comparable 
value of similar firms. The conceptual strengths of multiples include their simplicity 
of application as well as understandability. Multiples generally reflect the current 
disposition of the market, and are available in the financial press. Lastly, multiples 
are a communication tool of sell-side analysts and allow fundamental screening. 
However multiples are not without their weaknesses. Their simplicity is due to the 
intrinsic assumptions made. Thus, by their nature multiples are limited due to their 
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short-sightedness, and are affected by market bubbles (and conversely, recessions). 
Multiples are also susceptible to a manager’s accounting method choices and 
earnings management activities. Multiples based on earnings and cash flow are the 
most commonly used, with some multiples alternately using book value (BV) or 
revenue. 
 
Mathematically, the value of a firm could be estimated by multiplying a value driver 
(such as Net Profit before abnormal items) by a corresponding multiple, where the 
multiple is derived from the ratio of market capitalisation to that value driver for a 
group of comparable firms. This is demonstrated in an example below and in Table 
1.1. 
 
On 8 March 2005 BHP Billiton announced a U.S.$7.27 billion (A$9.17 billion) 
friendly takeover bid of WMC Resources (Australian Financial Review, 2005). For 
illustrative purposes to show how to value a company with multiples, 10 Australian 
listed companies with the closest market capitalisation (end of the month, at least 30 
days prior to the takeover announcement) and from the same industry (Materials) to 
WMC Resources are shown below. Their Net Profit before abnormal items from the 
most recent financial statements as well as their respective market capitalisation are 
also included. 
 
Using multiples, the value of WMC Resources could be calculated by multiplying its 
Net Profit before abnormal items (A$736 million) by the median multiple of the 
comparable firms (20.99). This gives WMC Resources an estimated market value of 
A$15.45 billion (excluding a takeover premium). Alternatively, using every 
Australian listed company within the same industry (excluding WMC Resources and 
BHP Billiton) would give a median multiple of 15.12 for the 119 remaining firms. 
This would therefore give an estimated market value of WMC Resources of A$11.13 
billion (also excluding a takeover premium). This example highlights both the 
simplicity of an application of a multiples-based valuation method and the 
differences that can result from the choice of comparative companies.   
 
 
 
 
3 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1 
Example of an Application of Multiples in an Takeover Setting 
Panel A 
ASX 
Code 
Company 
Name 
Net Profit 
before abnormals
1
 
Market Capitalisation
2
 
 
Multiple 
WMR WMC 
Resources 
$736.000 $8,380.842 11.39 
Panel B 
AWC Alumina 
Limited 
$307.300 $7,070.101 23.01 
BSL BlueScope Steel 
Limited 
$601.800 $6,939.786 11.53 
PDG Placer Dome 
Inc. 
$362.440 $9,905.750 27.33 
AMC Amcor Limited $454.800 $6,246.397 13.73 
RIN Rinker Group 
Limited 
$428.300 $10,541.802 24.61 
NCM Newcrest 
Mining Limited 
$118.801 $5,625.639 47.35 
ORI Orica Limited $351.300 $5,267.362 14.99 
BLD Boral Limited $370.500 $4,180.545 11.28 
JHX James Hardie 
Industries N.V. 
$166.999 $3,168.752 18.97 
CNA Coal & Allied 
Industries 
Limited 
$111.434 $3,008.819 27.00 
      Median 20.99 
Notes 
1
 Net Profit before abnormal items for each company is collected from the most recent 
annual financial statements within the last 18 months. 
2
 To reduce any possible pre-run up of share price that the firm may have, market 
capitalisation is calculated as using the share price close at the end of the month, at least 30 
days prior to the takeover announcement. 
All amounts are in $A million dollars. 
 
1.3 Motivation 
The main motivations for this study include the prominent nature of takeovers 
(including their size in dollars); the persistent though disputed long-run 
underperformance of the acquirer after mergers and acquisitions; the widespread use 
of multiples in valuation practice; the various choices and resultant impacts in and on 
multiples; the lack of research in multiples used for takeover valuations; and the 
institutional differences that exist across countries, predominantly U.S., and Australia 
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that may contribute to differences in valuation approaches and post acquisition 
performance. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions involve the exchange of millions or even billions of dollars 
worth of value. In 2006, total global merger and acquisition deal values reached an 
unprecedented amount of U.S. $3.79 trillion (KPMG and Kaplan, 2007). During the 
same period, Australia experienced mergers and acquisitions totalling A$67 billion, 
with deals of A$133 billion the following year (2007) (KPMG, 2008). Such activities 
also have consequences to other interested parties, such as employees, suppliers, 
customers, regulators, creditors and shareholders. More recently, global merger and 
acquisition deals for 2010 totalled U.S.$2.18 trillion (Mergermarket, 2011). 
 
It is puzzling why so many mergers and acquisitions occur when academic research 
finds combined entities underperform for up to five years following a takeover (for 
example, see Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Brown, Dong, & Gallery, 2005; 
Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). Apart from possible measurement issues, many 
reasons have been suggested for this long-run underperformance, including 
overconfidence of managers (over extrapolation or managerial hubris) (Rau & 
Vermaelen 1998; Roll 1986); method of payment (Travlos, 1987); and management 
and market fixation on earnings-per-share (EPS) myopia (Lys & Vincent, 1995).  
 
Takeover waves generally occur during times of soaring (hot) equity markets and 
times of rapid credit expansion (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Several studies 
have documented the misvaluation of firms at the time of the takeover, including 
Brown et al. (2005) and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006), with 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) finding more acquisitions occur 
when an industry is overvalued, with the majority of these acquisitions undertaken by 
acquirers with the highest overvaluation. This is consistent with both Schleifer and 
Vishney (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) models of mergers and 
acquisitions where acquirers of overvalued firms take advantage of windows of 
opportunities presented by market inefficiencies.  
 
There are numerous ways to value a company, including discounted cash flow 
models, residual income models, and valuations based on comparable companies and 
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transactions. Valuations based on multiples are used quite frequently in practice, 
especially in analysts’ reports, Australian independent expert reports, and investment 
bankers’ U.S. fairness opinions. Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) reveal that 99 
percent of top analysts use a multiple for firm valuation in their analyst reports. In his 
survey of European institutional equity analysts Fernandez (2001) finds that price-to-
earnings (P/E) and enterprise value to earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortisation (EV/EBITDA) multiples are more commonly used than more complex 
and theoretically sound valuation tools such as the discounted cash flow method and 
the residual income model. Similarly, Demirakos, Strong and Walker (2004) study 
the valuation methodologies contained in 104 analysts’ reports for international 
investment bankers for 26 large U.K. listed companies drawn from selected 
industries and find that 88 percent of reports surveyed contained some reference to a 
multiple of earnings. Barker (1999) and Bradshaw (2002) also find similar results for 
the general use of P/E multiples in practice. In the takeover context, Damodaran 
(2002) comments that approximately 90 percent of equity research valuations and 50 
percent of acquisition valuations are based on multiples.  
 
Valuations using multiples, as in any valuation method, involve choosing from a 
menu of alternatives. Specifically, what is being valued (Finnerty & Emery, 2004; 
Kaplan & Ruback, 1995), the choice of value driver (Liu, Nissim, & Thomas, 2002; 
Schreiner & Spremann, 2007), using trailing or forward values (Kim & Ritter, 1999, 
Lie & Lie, 2002), and the selection of the set of comparable firms (Alford, 1992; 
Bhojraj & Lee, 2002) are amongst the choices to be made in valuing companies 
involved in mergers and acquisitions. All have influence on the valuation accuracy of 
a particular multiple. Additionally, both Schreiner and Spremann (2007) and 
Henschke and Homburg (2009) observe the valuation accuracy of multiples declined 
in years leading up to and including 2000, and subsequently improved, both 
associated with the dot-com boom and bust.  
 
Very few published (U.S.) studies have investigated the valuation accuracy of 
multiples in takeovers (Finnerty & Emery, 2004; Kaplan & Ruback, 1995). These 
U.S. studies may or may not apply to a non-U.S. context, namely Australia.  
Institutional differences, notably the relative size of U.S. companies to those of their 
Australian counterparts, suggest that research in the Australian market may be 
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warranted. In terms of market capitalisation, many U.S. studies have involved only 
medium to large sized firms (for example Liu et al. 2002; Schreiner & Spremann, 
2007). Australia by its very nature is much smaller in terms of market capitalisation. 
There are also accounting differences that may cause differences in valuation 
accuracy in comparison to the U.S., with Australia having adopted international 
accounting standards in contrast to the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). Furthermore, there have traditionally been differences in the 
treatment of significant or unusual items. These differences in accounting and market 
size warrant study into a market outside the U.S. Therefore, given the widespread use 
of multiples in the valuation practice, this warrants further research into the valuation 
accuracy of such measures, and their association with long-run underperformance in 
the Australian context. 
 
In summary, there are many motivations for this study, including the prominent 
nature of takeovers (including their size in dollars); the persistent though disputed 
long-run underperformance of the acquirer after mergers and acquisitions; the 
widespread use of multiples in valuation practice, and the varied choices and 
resultant impacts in and on such multiples; the lack of research in multiples used for 
takeover valuations; and the institutional differences between other countries’ 
studies, predominantly the U.S. and Australia. 
 
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Given the prevalent use of multiples in practice, and the limitations in existing 
literature, this study examines the following research questions: 
1. How accurate are various multiple-based valuation methods in valuing firms 
involved in mergers and acquisitions? 
2. Which of the various multiple-based valuation methods are more accurate in 
valuing target and acquirer firms involved in takeovers? 
3. Which of the various multiple-based valuation methods is associated with 
greater misvaluation (as measured by higher estimations of Price-to-Intrinsic 
Value)? 
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Based on the prior literature on multiples in various contexts and merger and 
acquisition research, testable hypotheses are developed to address RQ2 and RQ3. In 
terms of valuation accuracy, these hypotheses predicted that value drivers based on 
forecasted earnings will have lower valuation errors than those based on historical 
value drivers (H1a); that value drivers closer to bottom line earnings (Net income) 
have lower valuation errors than those closer to the Trading Revenue income 
statement line (H1b); and that value drivers based on earnings (excluding Trading 
Revenue) have lower valuation errors than those based on net cash flow from 
operations (NCFO) (H1c). In terms of misvaluation, these hypotheses predicted that 
estimations of P/V ratios using forecasted earnings multiples are closer to P/V ratios 
based on actual market capitalisation (H2a); that estimations of P/V ratios based on 
bottom line earnings (net income) are lower than those based on Trading Revenue, 
NCFO, BV and EBITDA multiples (H2b); and that estimations of P/V ratios based 
on Intrinsic Value multiples are lower than those based on earnings or cash flow 
based multiples.  
 
1.5 Research Design 
This study examines 147 acquirers and 129 targets involved in takeovers 
announcements from 1 January 1990 to 31 December 2005. Valuation analysis is 
used to investigate how accurate various multiple-based valuation methods are in 
valuing firms involved in mergers and acquisitions, as well as to determine which of 
the various multiple-based valuation methods are the most accurate. This is then 
followed by calculating a P/V ratio, where price is estimated using the various value 
drivers, and Intrinsic Value calculated from a residual income model. P/V ratios are 
then used to ascertain which multiple-based valuation methods are associated with 
greater misvaluation, with higher P/V ratios suggesting greater over-valuation. 
 
1.6 Main Results 
The major findings in this thesis are: first, the majority of computed multiples 
examined exhibit valuation errors within 30 percent of stock market values. Second, 
and consistent with expectations, from a valuation accuracy point of view the results 
provide support for the superiority of multiples based on forecasted earnings in 
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valuing targets and acquirers engaged in takeover transactions. Although a gradual 
improvement in estimating stock market values is not entirely evident when moving 
down the Income Statement, historical earnings multiples perform better than 
multiples based on Trading Revenue or NCFO. Third, while multiples based on 
forecasted earnings have the highest valuation accuracy they, along with Trading 
Revenue multiples for targets, produce the most overvalued valuations for acquirers 
and targets. Consistent with predictions, greater overvaluation is exhibited for 
multiples based on Trading Revenue for targets, and NCFO and EBITDA for both 
acquirers and targets. Finally, as expected, multiples based Intrinsic Value (along 
with BV) are associated with the least overvaluation. 
These findings are predominantly robust to the alternative conditions examined in the 
sensitivity analysis, namely: increasing of the sample size by removing the 
requirement for analysts’ forecasts; reducing the sample size by investigating 
acquirers and targets where both meet the requirements to have sufficient 
information and comparable firms; and using one, two and three ahead stock market 
values as a benchmark for valuation analysis. Nevertheless, three notable insights 
from the sensitivity analyses were observed. First, target firms’ valuation accuracy 
decreases with the inclusion of firms that are not followed by analyst forecasts 
(generally smaller and less profitable firms); Second, the valuation accuracy of an 
acquirer multiple diminishes over time when using one, two and three year ahead 
market capitalisation as a benchmark. Specifically, the supremacy of forecasted 
earnings multiples diminishes significantly when using two year ahead market 
capitalisation as a benchmark, with the EBT multiple displaying the same amount of 
valuation accuracy. This result suggests the predictive power of forecasted earnings 
is most prevalent for current and one year ahead stock market capitalisation. 
Similarly, the range of valuation accuracy between the multiples declines as the 
benchmark projects into the future. Third, the stock market price at the time of the 
takeover announcement has higher valuation accuracy against one, two and three 
year ahead market capitalisation than all multiples examined, including forecasted 
earnings.   
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1.7 Contribution 
This study contributes to prior literature and will be helpful for those using valuation 
multiples in practice. First, it is the first known study to examine the valuation 
accuracy of a range of multiples for a much studied subset of companies; those 
involved in mergers and acquisitions. Second, this study provides the link between 
two bodies of literature, namely valuation accuracy of certain multiples and their 
relation to company misvaluation. Lastly, the study’s findings have ramifications for 
the users of multiples in practice. These users include not only investment bankers 
who use these multiples in independent expert reports, but also the shareholders and 
managers of both acquirers and targets, and hence firms’ employees, customers, 
creditors and regulators. 
 
1.8 Structure of Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the body of literature for both 
the long-run underperformance of bidders subsequent to a takeover announcement, 
and the valuation accuracy of various multiples. Chapter 3 provides the rational 
between the link between valuation accuracy and misvaluation (as measured by P/V 
ratio), as well as outlining the research questions and hypotheses for this study. 
Chapter 4 describes the research design involved in testing the research questions 
and hypotheses. Chapter 5 enumerates the results to the research questions and 
hypotheses, with Chapter 6 providing further insights through sensitivity analysis. 
This study then concludes in Chapter 7 with a discussion of the main findings, 
contributions and implications of the study’s findings.  
10 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Overview 
As outlined in Chapter 1 and in the context of mergers and acquisitions, the three 
research questions addressed by this study are: (1) how accurate are equity multiples; 
(2) which equity multiples are more accurate in valuing firms; and (3) which equity 
multiples are associated with greater misvaluation. This chapter reviews the prior 
literature related to these three questions. First, establishing the merger and 
acquisition context, this study examines the acquirers’ long-run underperformance 
literature, summarising the various hypotheses for this anomaly including 
misvaluation. Second, as multiples are prevalent in valuing firms, this study reviews 
the valuation accuracy of multiples literature. The chapter concludes by highlighting 
gaps in the valuation accuracy literature.   
 
2.2 Research on Long-run Underperformance Following Takeovers  
2.2.1 Long-run Underperformance of Acquirers 
In this section, major studies into the long-run underperformers of acquirers, both 
within the U.S., other countries, and then specifically Australia are reviewed.  
Studies examining the effect of takeover characteristics on long-run 
underperformance will then be discussed. An event study approach is the most 
common method employed in these studies to assess the long-term shareholder 
wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions. This approach involves calculating 
abnormal returns: the difference between realised returns, and an expected or 
benchmark return based on a market index, or a comparable firm not involved in a 
takeover.  
 
U.S. and International Studies 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) review the literature of the long-run performance of 
acquirers following a takeover, and find that acquirers experience statistically 
insignificant positive abnormal returns after a tender offer, compared to acquirers 
that systematically underperform following a merger. However studies around this 
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time and afterwards find mixed results for the long-run underperformance of 
acquirers. For example, Langetieg (1978), Bradley and Jarrell (1988) and Franks, 
Harris and Titman (1991) do not find significant underperformance of acquirers in 
the two to three years following the acquisition. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001), also find acquirers experience lower absolute 
value long-run returns which are statistically insignificant.  
 
In contrast, Asquith (1983) and Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) document 
significant negative returns experienced by acquirers for a couple of years following 
a merger. Specifically, Agrawal et al. (1992) examine the long-run underperformance 
of acquiring firms of 765 mergers offers between 1955 and 1987 in the U.S., where 
the acquirer was listed on the NYSE, and the target was listed on either the NYSE or 
AMEX. They find that acquiring firms’ shareholders experience a statistically 
significant loss of approximately 10 percent over the five years after the acquisition. 
They confirm that the negative abnormal returns are not due to firm size or beta 
estimation problems. Agrawal et al. (1992) also examine 227 tender offers within the 
same timeframe separately, and find cumulative average abnormal returns that are 
small and not significant from zero (2.2 percent). Similarly, Loderer and Martin 
(1992) find acquiring firms in the U.S. experience negative returns for three years 
following an acquisition. However, the negative returns do not extend to the fourth 
year following the acquisition. Interestingly, Loderer and Martin (1992) find the 
negative long-run returns experienced by acquirers after an acquisition gradually 
diminishes during the 1960s and 1970s, and find no evidence of it during the 1980s. 
 
More recently, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) review 42 studies (both U.S. and 
international) examining the long-term wealth effects subsequent to a merger and 
acquisition announcement over the last century. Contained within these studies there 
exists a substantial decline in the acquiring firms’ share prices over the first five 
years after a takeover. They suggest this may be due to anticipated gains from 
takeovers being on average non-existent or overstated. In his review of the long-run 
performance of acquirers, Bruner (2002) also finds 11 of the 16 studies reviewed 
reported significantly negative long-run returns. Both Bruner (2002) and Martynova 
and Renneboog (2008) contrast these acquirer findings with a review of the studies 
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that find that target shareholders experience returns that are both material and 
positive around the takeover announcement.  
 
Australian Studies 
Within an Australian context, in their study of 731 successful bids for ASX listed 
firms between January 1974 and June 1996, Brown and da Silva Rosa (1997) find the 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the long-run ([+6, +36] months) is not 
significantly different from zero after controlling for firm size and sample survival 
(acquirers’ long-run returns are positively biased by survivorship and negatively 
biased by firm size). However, the authors noted that when long-run returns are 
calculated on a “rebalancing” basis, these firms experience significantly negative 
returns. Thus, the method employed to calculate abnormal returns appears to 
influence both the sign and significance of abnormal returns experienced by 
successful acquiring firms’ shareholders.  
 
Brown, Dong and Gallery (2005) study 225 Australian takeover observations 
(including both mergers and tender offers) between 1990 and 2001. They find the 
mean (median) long-run market adjusted return (one-, two-, and three-year long-run 
periods) for nearly all acquirers are negative (-0.95 (-0.002), -0.315 (-0.128), and -
0.457 (-0.222) respectively). Brown et al. (2005) then consider the relationship 
between pre-acquisition market misvaluation of both the acquiring and target firms 
and the post acquisition performance of the combined entity. Brown et al. (2005) use 
both a value-to-price (V/P) and book-to-price (B/P) as measures of misvaluation, 
employing a residual income model to determine fundamental value (V). They find 
long-run returns are over one- two- and three-year periods following the 
announcement are positively related to the acquirers’ V/P.   
 
Takeover characteristics on long-run underperformance 
A number of studies have investigated the impact of takeover characteristics on long-
run underperformance of acquirers. Characteristics frequently found to be associated 
with long-term abnormal returns include means of payment, bid status (friendly 
versus hostile), and the type of target firm.  
 
13 
Mergers and acquisition that are fully financed by equity (that is, consideration in the 
form of shares) have significantly negative long-term returns, in contrast to all cash 
bids which yield positive returns (Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Mitchell & Stafford, 
2000; Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003; Travlos, 1987). Specifically, Loughran and Vijh 
(1997) examine the relationship between post-acquisition returns and the mode of 
acquisition and form of payment for 947 U.S. acquisitions during 1970 to 1989. They 
find on average that over five years following an acquisition, firms that use shares as 
the method of payment for mergers experience significant negative returns of -25.0 
percent, in contrast to cash tender offers that earn significant positive returns of 61.7 
percent. Similarly, over one-, two-, and three-year long-run periods Brown et al. 
(2005) find that takeovers with shares as the form of consideration underperform 
those where cash is the means of consideration.  
 
Mixed findings are evident for contested and non-contested bids.  Franks et al. 
(1991) find friendly bids significantly underperform hostile bids in the U.K. over a 
three-year period after the bid announcement, though both types produce 
significantly positive results. In contrast, Cosh and Guest (2001) find negative long-
term abnormal returns over a four-year period when they examine U.K. firms, 
however these returns are only significant for hostile bids.  
 
Bradley and Sundaram’s (2004) study compares U.S. public (2,305 acquisitions) and 
private targets (10,117 acquisitions) from 1990-2000. They find the two-year post-
announcement returns in takeovers involving public targets are insignificantly 
different from zero, in contrast to the significantly negative returns when the target is 
private.  
 
Within a different context, Croci (2007) studies 136 block purchases made by 
corporate raiders (typically minority shareholders expecting to force changes in the 
target firm’s corporate policies) in Europe from 1991-2001. Croci observes these 
acquisitions experienced regular losses in the three years after the bid. 
 
Thus, many studies find a substantial decline in the acquiring firms’ share prices over 
the first five years after a takeover, both in the U.S., other countries, and Australia. 
Certain takeover characteristics, including means of payment, reception of target 
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board and whether it is a merger or acquisition, have been found to impact on the 
long-run underperformance of the acquirer’s share price. 
 
2.2.2 Possible Reasons for Long-run Underperformance 
Many reasons have been given for the long-run underperformance of acquirers, 
including performance extrapolation (or managerial hubris); method of payment and 
misvaluation; and management and market fixation on EPS. 
 
Performance Extrapolation 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) examine the long-run underperformance of acquiring 
firms in the U.S. for 3,169 mergers and 348 tender offers between 1980 and 1991, 
adjusting for both firm size and book-to-market ratio. They find acquirers in mergers 
underperform (by -4 percent) while acquirers in tender offers outperform in the three 
years following the acquisition (by 9 percent), with both results being statistically 
significant. They further find the long-run underperformance of mergers is mainly 
caused by poor post-acquisition performance of low book-to-market “glamour” 
firms. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest investors and management overestimate 
(“over-extrapolate”) the acquiring firm’s ability to manage an acquisition. This is 
consistent with Roll (1986), who argues that managerial hubris negatively influences 
the acquisition decision.  
 
According to this hubris argument, if an acquiring firm has high past share price 
performance, and previous high growth in earnings and cash flows, these tend to 
strengthen management’s belief in its own actions. Furthermore, where managers 
have a proven track record (as evidenced by their past good performance), other 
stakeholders in these firms, such as the board of directors and large shareholder, will 
be more likely to give management a favourable judgement in the absence of full 
information, and approve the acquiring firm’s acquisition plans. In contrast, firms 
with high book-to-market ratios (described by Rau & Vermaelen (1998) as value 
firms) are likely to have experienced poor past performance, and thus managers, 
directors and large shareholders will be more cautious before approving acquisitions 
that may threaten the survival of the acquiring firm. Thus, due to the increased 
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scrutiny and lower managerial hubris, it is argued these acquisitions should create 
shareholder value rather than destroy value. 
 
Thus, the performance extrapolation hypothesis assumes when a bid is announced 
market participants may tend to overestimate the possible merger gains. Gradual 
reassessing of the quality of the acquirer by the market occurs as more information 
concerning the performance of the acquisition becomes clearer. Accordingly, around 
the announcement date of the acquisition “glamour” (low book-to-market) firms may 
realise higher abnormal returns than “value” (high book-to-market) firms; however 
in the long-run this performance by the two types of firms will reverse. Thus, for 
“glamour” firms the hypothesis implies that on average takeover activity destroys 
value, or at least it fails to meet the original expectations.  
 
Consistent with the extrapolation hypothesis, Lang, Stulz and Walking (1991) and 
Servaes (1991) find a significant negative correlation between short-term 
announcement returns and Tobin’s Q, the latter being negatively correlated with the 
book-to-market ratio. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) survey 106 U.S. publicly 
traded companies involved in large acquisitions between 1989 and 1992. They find a 
positive correlation between acquisition premiums and three other variables: 
measures of recent organisational performance, the relative pay to the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and other executives in a company, and praise for the CEO 
in recent media. These findings help strengthen evidence for the assumption in the 
performance extrapolation hypothesis that managerial behaviour in acquisitions is 
influenced by past success. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) also find the larger the 
acquisition premium, the greater the long-run underperformance following the 
acquisition.  
 
Method of payment 
The means of payment hypothesis is based on acquiring firms’ managers being better 
informed on the long-term prospects of the market (Travlos, 1987). Acquiring firms 
are more likely to use stock as the method payment when their firm is overvalued, 
and cash when it is undervalued. Thus, this hypothesis predicts that on average, 
acquirers using stock as the method of payment will experience negative abnormal 
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long-run returns, while those firms paying cash will experience positive long-run 
abnormal returns.  
 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) find evidence of the means of payment hypothesis, 
reporting significant negative abnormal returns for acquirers using stock as the 
means of payment for acquisitions, and significant positive abnormal returns for 
acquirers using cash as the means of payment in the five years subsequent to the 
acquisition. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) also find evidence of the method of payment 
hypothesis even after controlling for size and market-to-book ratio, finding positive 
abnormal returns for acquirers in tender offers, which are generally financed with 
cash, and negative returns in mergers which are normally financed by stock. 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest the market does 
not react correctly to the news of a merger, creating mispricing at the time of 
acquisition announcement. The market’s correction for this mispricing manifests 
itself in differences in the long-run abnormal returns following mergers and 
acquisitions.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose a model of mergers and acquisitions that 
incorporates the relative valuations of the acquiring and target firms, the horizons of 
their respective managers, as well as the market’s perception of the synergies from 
the combination. This model also links the performance extrapolation hypothesis and 
the method of payment hypothesis. They hypothesise acquirers will use stock as the 
method of payment, particularly when their stock is more overvalued relative to the 
less overvalued target, whereas undervalued acquirers will use cash to acquire targets 
that are more undervalued than themselves.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose the stock payment method behaviour is an 
attempt by the bidder to minimise their firm’s expected negative long-run returns as a 
result of future stock prices falling to more fundamental values. Thus, acquirers of 
overvalued firms take advantage of windows of opportunities presented by 
temporary market inefficiencies. This model also predicts as a result that long-run 
acquirer returns where stock is the method of payment should be more negative than 
when cash is used as the method of payment. However, the model assumes target 
managers will maximise their own short-term private benefits, by the target 
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manager’s willingness to accept less than the long-term worth of the target firm in 
order to “sell out” of it. 
 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) propose a model with similar predictions to 
that of Shleifer and Vishny (2003), however they make different assumptions 
regarding the target managers’ maximisation of wealth who will rationally accept 
overvalued equity as consideration in a takeover. Target managers are proposed to 
accept stock as consideration due to overpricing in soaring (hot) equity markets
1
 
leading them to overvalue potential takeover synergies. These uncertainties regarding 
the takeover gains or synergies are correlated with the overall uncertainty prevalent 
in the market, with target managers being unable to readily identify misvaluations at 
both a firm and market level. As a result, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) 
propose the number of misvalued bids is expected to increase during periods of 
booming financial markets. Similar to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2004) also suggest that stock acquisitions are driven by 
overvaluation, with cash acquisitions driven by undervaluation or synergies. 
 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) test the model proposed by 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) for over 4,000 U.S. mergers and acquisitions 
completed between 1978 and 2001. They segregate market to book ratio into three 
parts: firm-specific error, time series sector error, and long-run market to book error. 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) find a positive relationship between firm-specific error 
and the probability that a firm will undertake an acquisition (particularly an all-
equity takeover). They suggest that these results provide evidence that deviations 
from fundamental value drive takeovers.  
 
Rhodes-Kropf et al.  (2005)  further find more acquisitions occur when an industry is 
overvalued, with the majority of these acquisitions undertaken by acquirers with the 
highest overvaluation. Consistent with method of payment hypothesis their evidence 
supports the view that misvaluation is an important determinant for choosing shares 
as the means of consideration, with the authors observing that those acquirers who 
offer shares as the form of consideration are more overvalued than their cash-
                                                 
1
 Soaring (hot) equity markets and times of rapid credit expansion generally coincide with growing 
takeover activity, and are referred to as takeover waves (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). 
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offering counterparts. Overvaluation appears to drive the decision of target managers 
to accept shares as the form of consideration, in line with the assumptions made in 
the Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) model. 
 
Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006) apply the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
model to U.S. takeovers announced between 1978 and 2000 using two proxies to 
measure the pre-bid misvaluation of the bidder and target: book-to-price (B/P) and 
residual income value-to-price (V/P). They find acquirer misvaluation affects the 
method of payment chosen by the bidder, as well as the bidder’s announcement 
period. Their findings also demonstrate misvaluation (as measured by V/P) has 
explanatory power in addition to B/P for the post-acquisition returns to bidders. 
 
For Australian firms Brown et al. (2005) find acquirer misvaluation (as measured by 
the pre-bid ratio of residual income, V/P) is systematically related to the method of 
payment for the target, with overvalued (undervalued) acquirers more likely to use 
stock (cash) as consideration for the target. Brown et al. also find that overvalued 
acquirers experience both worse short-run and long-run performance compared to 
their undervalued acquirer counterparts.  
 
Earnings-per-share (EPS) myopia 
The EPS myopia hypothesis, holding all other things constant, predicts that mergers 
that have a positive impact on EPS will underperform in the long-run. This 
hypothesis assumes that both the market and the acquiring firm’s management are 
constantly concerned with the firm’s EPS. A bidding that uses shares to pay for a 
merger in which the target has a lower price earnings ratio than that of the bidder 
may result in inflating the EPS of the bidder. Under this hypothesis, managers are 
more likely to justify an acquisition if it is accompanied by an increase in EPS. 
Brealey and Myers (1996) comment on the general belief that firms should not 
acquire other firms that have higher price earnings ratios than themselves. As a 
result, managers may be willing to pay a higher price (possibly resulting in 
overpayment) for a target if it is accompanied by an increase in EPS.  
 
There is some evidence to support this hypothesis. Lys and Vincent (1995) study 
AT&T’s acquisition of NCR in 1991, and find that AT&T was willing to pay up to 
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U.S.$500 million extra in order to boost their EPS by 17 percent through an 
accounting change, with no changes to cash flows. Consistent with this finding 
Barber, Palmer and Wallace (1995) observe that friendly acquisitions were 
concentrated amongst targets with low price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios and high return 
on equity.  
 
Measurement and Research Design Issues 
Event studies examining the long-run performance of bidders are subject to several 
shortcomings. First, it is more difficult to isolate the takeover effect over longer 
periods of time, as returns are affected by other strategic and operational decisions, 
or changes in financial policy. Second, measurement or statistical problems 
frequently affect the benchmark performance of studies (Barber & Lyon, 1997). If 
these negative abnormal results are a consequence of research design problems, 
stakeholders are more likely to make misleading conclusions about the valuation of 
mergers and acquisitions.   
 
In discussing the effect of mergers and acquisitions on the long-term share price, 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) find the magnitude of the merger and acquisition 
effect is largely dependent on the estimation method used to predict the benchmark 
return. Studies that have used the market model (for example, Franks & Harris, 1989; 
Malatesta, 1983) tend to observe significantly negative cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs) over three years following the merger and acquisition 
announcement. This contrasts with studies (for example, Chatterjee, 2000) using 
other estimation techniques, such as the market adjusted model (MAM), capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM), or a beta-decile matching portfolio, where the authors find 
inconsistent results about the post-merger long-run CAARs. 
 
In their investigation of benchmark returns, Barber and Lyon (1997) find matching a 
firm based on size and market to book ratio with the bidding and target firms prior to 
takeover performs better as a benchmark return than the market model. Studies 
which have then applied Barber and Lyon’s methodology still find merged firms 
(excluding those involved in tender offers) experience negative post-acquisition 
CAARs (for example, Agrawal & Jaffe, 2003). 
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2.2.3 Evaluation of Underperformance Reasons and Valuation Implications 
As discussed above, many reasons have been given for the long-run 
underperformance of acquirers, including: performance extrapolation (including 
managerial hubris), method of payment, market fixation of EPS, and measurement 
and research design issues, or a combination of any or all of these reasons. 
 
Concerning mispricing and each of the hypotheses, the method of payment 
hypothesis suggests that acquiring firms are aware of the firm being misvalued 
before the acquisition, while under the extrapolation hypothesis and the EPS myopia 
hypothesis, the acquirer is unaware of the misvaluation immediately after the 
announcement of the acquisition. The performance extrapolation hypothesis assumes 
the misvaluation occurs because the market and corporate decision makers are 
preoccupied mainly with past performance, while under the EPS myopia hypothesis 
the misvaluation occurs due to the market and managers being too concerned with 
earnings-per-share.  
 
Despite the extensive literature on the possible causes for long-run underperformance 
of acquirers, very few studies have directly considered and linked this pre-
announcement date mispricing/misvaluation to valuation method employed. As 
accounting-based multiples are commonly employed in corporate valuations in the 
takeover context, the remainder of the literature review examines the studies on the 
valuation accuracy of valuation methods using multiples. 
 
2.3 Valuation Accuracy of Multiples 
This section of the literature review will firstly examine the valuation accuracy of 
common multiple models. A review of the literature on the valuation accuracy of 
major value drivers will then be presented. Lastly, factors influencing the valuation 
accuracy will be discussed. 
 
2.3.1 Transaction Valuations Methods using Multiples 
Kaplan and Ruback (1995) compare the valuation accuracy of the discounted cash 
flow (DCF) method and three methods of comparable-based valuation: the 
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comparable company method, the comparable transaction method and the 
comparable industry transaction method. Using 51 highly leveraged transactions 
completed between 1983 and 1989 they conclude DCF valuations estimate 
transaction values relatively well, with a strong relation between these two methods. 
It is interesting to note that Kaplan and Ruback find a multiple using enterprise value 
to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EV/EBITDA) has 
similar valuation accuracy to the DCF model.  
 
Specifically, Kaplan and Ruback (1995) find the comparable industry transactions 
method is the most accurate measure for estimating transaction values, with a median 
(mean) valuation error of -0.1 (-0.7) percent. This method also had the highest 
percentage of absolute valuation errors (57.9 percent) less than or equal to 15 
percent. However, it also has the highest standard deviation which Kaplan and 
Ruback attribute to industry/transaction matching difficulty. Comparable transactions 
is the second most accurate of the three methods, with a median (mean) valuation 
error of 5.3 (0.3) percent. Lastly, Kaplan and Ruback find using the comparable 
company method substantially underestimates the value of transactions, with a 
median estimator error of -18.1 percent. 
 
In an extension of Kaplan and Ruback (1995)’s method and using the same sample, 
Finnerty and Emery (2004) adjust the comparable company method of valuation for 
the value of corporate control. Kaplan and Ruback’s company method of valuation 
was based on share prices, determined by market trades, and as such did not include 
any value for change in control. Finnerty and Emery (2004) use two methods for 
adjusting the comparable company method of valuation: the first using a median 
industry control premium; the second using a practitioner’s “rule of thumb” 25 
percent control premium. When using a control premium of 25 percent for their 
comparable company valuation method, the median (mean) valuation error decreases 
from -18.1 (-16.6) percent (in Kaplan & Ruback, 1995) to 5.1 (5.7) percent, with the 
percentage of transactions in which absolute value of the valuation errors is less than 
or equal to 15 percent increasing from 37.3 to 45.1 percent.  
 
Thus, Finnerty and Emery (2004) conclude the adjusted comparable company 
valuation method is superior to Kaplan and Ruback’s (1995) method, as among other 
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things, the latter method will consistently underestimate the value of a transaction 
due to the failure to adjust market prices for change in control. Notably, Finnerty and 
Emery find that their comparable company method (adjusted for an industry control 
premium) leads to acquisition value estimates (for Kaplan and Ruback’s 51 
leveraged transactions) that are close to those obtained using comparable transactions 
and comparable industry transactions.   
 
 
In a different context, Gilson, Hotchkiss and Ruback (2000) examine the value of 63 
publicly traded US firms that have reorganised after bankruptcy using three 
measures: market value, implied value of the cash flow forecasts in the firms’ 
reorganisation plans (DCF), and comparable companies. They find both the DCF and 
multiples-based models have the same degree of valuation accuracy, with both model 
types generally providing unbiased estimates of value. They also find a very wide 
dispersion of valuation errors for both model types, ranging from 20 to 250 percent. 
 
Within an initial public offer (IPO) context, Berkman, Bradbury and Ferguson (2000) 
use the same methodology as Kaplan and Ruback (1995) for 45 IPOs in New 
Zealand listed between 1989 and 1995. Of the alternative valuation models 
investigated, they find comparable transaction P/E multiples provide the lowest 
median absolute errors (19.7 percent), suggesting characteristics specific to IPOs are 
captured by transaction multiples. In a more recent study, How, Lam and Yeo (2007) 
investigate 275 industrial IPOs listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
between January 1993 and June 2000 and find a strong association between P/E and 
price-to-book value (P/B) multiples based on management forecasts provided in 
prospectuses, and the average P/E and P/B multiples of two comparable firms, when 
matched on industry, growth and size.  
 
2.3.2 Accuracy of Multiples Based on Various Value Drivers 
As the multiple valuation method is significantly affected by the choice of value 
driver, a growing number of studies have investigated the valuation accuracy of 
various value drivers, mainly for estimating stock price (or market capitalisation) of a 
firm, with a majority of studies based on U.S. data. 
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Baker and Ruback (1999) investigate the econometric issues associated with 
different ways of calculating industry multiples, and compare the relative 
performance of multiples based on revenue, EBITDA and EBIT for U.S. S & P 500 
companies in 1995. Using the harmonic mean, Baker and Ruback (1999) find 
industry adjusted EBITDA to be the single best value driver for the industries they 
examine, as opposed to EBIT and revenue value drivers. They also find evidence of 
industry specific earnings multiples, which they believe is due to the differences in 
underlying value drivers across various industries. 
 
Kim and Ritter (1999) investigate the use of multiples in valuing 190 U.S. domestic 
initial public offerings from 1992 to 1993. Based on forecast error they find that 
forecasted P/E multiples are more accurate than multiples based on trailing BV, 
earnings, cash flow and sales. More specifically, they find the EPS forecast for next 
year has higher valuation accuracy than the current year EPS forecast.  
 
Cheng and McNamara (2000) extend the valuation accuracy literature by 
investigating the valuation accuracy of a two-factor multiple (P/E- price to book 
value (P/B), both equally weighted). In their study of 30,310 observations over 20 
years (1973 to 1992) for U.S. firms, they find the combined multiple P/E and P/B has 
a higher valuation accuracy than the single factor P/E or P/B multiples individually. 
This implies that earnings do not perfectly substitute for BV and vice versa, and 
hence both variables are value relevant. Using a similar sample of U.S. companies 
(28,318 observations between 1980 and 1992), Beatty, Riffe and Thompson (1999) 
investigate different methodologies to combine P/E and P/B multiples. They find 
calculating industry specific weights for P/E and P/B multiples is superior to using 
equal weights.  
 
In one of the most comprehensive studies on valuation accuracy, Liu, Nissim and 
Thomas (2002) study the valuation accuracy of an extensive list of value drivers for 
26,613 U.S. firm years between 1982 and 1999. These value drivers include accrual 
flows, BV, cash flows, forward looking information, Intrinsic Value measures and 
sum of forward earnings. In contrast to Cheng and McNamara (2000) and Beatty et 
al. (1999), they find the combination of two or more multiples have valuation 
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accuracy only slightly better than multiples using forward earnings. Liu et al. (2002) 
find that forward EPS measures have the lowest dispersion of pricing errors (and 
hence highest valuation accuracy) compared to current earnings multiples, which in 
turn have higher valuation accuracy than multiples based on cash flow, BV, and 
sales. Liu et al. (2002) also find the dispersion of pricing errors for forward EPS 
measures decreases as the forecast period lengthens (from one to three year ahead 
EPS forecasts) and if earnings forecasted over different periods are aggregated. In 
terms of absolute performance, forward earnings measures explain actual stock 
prices reasonably well for a majority of firms. For two year out forecasted earnings, 
approximately half of the firms have absolute pricing errors less than 16 percent. 
Multiples based on historical drivers, such as earnings and cash flows have larger 
dispersions of valuation errors than forecasted earnings, with sales multiples having a 
substantially large dispersion. Consistent with Alford (1992), Liu et al. (2002) find 
evidence for the superiority of equity value multiples over entity value (market value 
of debt and equity) multiples, however they provide no explanation for such results. 
 
It is interesting to note Liu et al. (2002) find that Intrinsic Value drivers based on the 
residual income model perform noticeably worse (that is, have larger valuation 
errors) in comparison to value drivers based on forecast earnings, which the authors 
ascribe to the measurement error associated with the additional estimates required, 
especially terminal values. This is despite the fact that Intrinsic Value drivers use 
more information than what is contained in forecast earnings, and are founded on 
valuation theory. Bradshaw (2000, 2002) also document similar results. Bradshaw 
finds variation in analysts’ target prices and recommendations are explained more by 
valuations based on forward P/E forecast growth in EPS (PEG ratio) than more 
complex Intrinsic Value models. 
 
There are a number of key implications from research by Liu et al. (2002). First, 
“accruals improve the valuation properties of cash flows” (Liu et al., 2002, p.137). 
Second, the value relevance of revenues/sales is limited until matched with expenses 
(which is subsequently documented in Schreiner & Spremann, 2007). Third, a 
considerable amount of value-relevant information is contained in forward earnings 
as opposed to historical data, prompting Liu et al. to suggest analysts’ forecasted 
earnings should be used where they are available.  
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In a more recent study Liu, Nissim and Thomas (2007) compare the valuation 
accuracy of earnings multiples with the valuation accuracy of multiples based on 
operating cash flow and dividends (both measures of cash flow) for a large sample of 
companies gathered from 10 national markets. They find that earnings generally have 
higher valuation accuracy than operating cash flows and dividends regardless of 
whether forecasts or historical numbers are used. Their results are consistent across 
individual industries, as well as when all industries are combined. They also find that 
earnings outperform operating cash flows in terms of valuation accuracy in the 10 
non-U.S. countries investigated. 
  
Lie and Lie (2002) investigate the valuation accuracy of 10 traditional multiples for 
all active companies in the Compustat North American database for the fiscal year 
1998, with forecasts based on the 1999 fiscal year. Similar to Liu et al. (2002) they 
find forward-looking P/E multiples have the highest valuation accuracy compared to 
other multiples studies. However in contrast to Liu et al. (2002), Lie and Lie (2002) 
find multiples based on BVs perform better than those based on historical earnings. It 
is also interesting to note they find EBITDA has higher valuation accuracy than 
EBIT, a finding also documented by Baker and Ruback (1999). Lie and Lie (2002) 
also observe that the valuation accuracy varies greatly according to the degree of 
intangible assets. Their results suggest that firms with high proportions of reported 
intangible assets may be more accurately valued by operating performance multiples 
such as earnings or operating cash flows.   
 
In a non-U.S. study, Schreiner and Spremann (2007) compare the valuation accuracy 
of different multiples types in European equity markets based on the Dow Jones 
STOXX 600, covering 17 developing countries in Western Europe over a 10-year 
period (1996 to 2005). Consistent with the prior U.S. findings, they observe that 
market valuations are approximated appropriately by the multiples-based valuation 
methods, with 18 out of 27 investigated equity value multiples having median 
absolute valuation errors below 30 percent. A third of the equity value multiples 
examined also had a valuation error less than or equal to 15 percent. 
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Schreiner and Spremann (2007) generally find that multiples based on value drivers 
closer to bottom line earnings of the income statement perform better than those 
multiples based on value drivers closer to Sales/Revenue. Consistent with Liu et al. 
(2002), they find forward looking multiple outperforms the equivalent historical 
accrual flow multiple (especially the two-year forward-looking P/E multiple). 
Interestingly, Schreiner and Spremann (2007) find support for the valuation accuracy 
of knowledge-related multiples (earnings plus amortisation of intangible assets 
and/or research and development expenditure). They suggest this is due to sales, 
gross income and EBIT(DA) by their very nature not adequately reflecting expected 
profitability. Like Liu et al. (2002), Schreiner and Spremann find that multiples 
based on earnings outperform both multiples based on BV and those based on cash 
flow – a finding contradictory to a common belief that cash flow measures are 
superior to accrual flow measures in representing future payoffs.  
 
There are a number of interesting differences in their findings for the European study 
relative to the U.S studies. First, the P/E multiple performs worse than the P/EBT 
(earnings before tax), a finding Schreiner and Spremann ascribe to the different 
corporate tax rates limiting the comparability across countries. Second, based on an 
out of sample test of U.S. data, they find the median absolute valuation error across 
the entire range of equity value multiples used in their study is 10.0 percent lower 
compared to their European sample. The fraction of valuation errors below 15 
percent is also 8.9 percent higher. Schreiner and Spremann believe two reasons for 
this performance advantage are (1) differences in accounting and tax regulation 
across countries in Europe; and (2) equity and market orientated financial systems 
(for example, U.S.) have greater demand for published value relevant accounting 
information than debt and bank orientated systems (for example, France and 
Germany) as banks typically have access to firm information. 
 
Both the trailing P/B and forward and trailing P/E multiples are the main reason for 
relative performance advantage of the U.S. sample over the European sample in 
Schreiner and Spremann’s study. They conclude from this result that market price 
levels of U.S. stocks are impacted by the popularity of the P/B and P/E multiple 
among U.S. firms. They also conclude analysts’ earnings forecasts produced for U.S. 
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stocks show a higher reflection of Intrinsic Value generation than their European 
counterparts.  
 
Finally, Schreiner and Spremann observe that knowledge-related, forward-looking 
multiples, and entity value multiples perform better than equity value multiples in the 
U.S. market in contrast to the European market. 
 
Both Liu et al. (2002) and Schreiner and Spremann (2007) show the valuation 
accuracy of multiples appear fairly consistent over time with the possible exception 
of the dot-com boom period. Schreiner and Spremann (2007) observe that valuation 
accuracy declined in the years leading up to and including 1999 and 2000, and 
subsequently improved, especially in 2001.
2
  One relevant limitation identified in 
both studies is the inability to generalise the findings to many companies with low to 
medium market capitalisation. These firms are typically not covered by analysts (as 
recorded by I/B/E/S), and hence were excluded from analysis. Thus, both authors 
recognise that their exclusion may limit the generalisation of results to only larger 
firms.  
 
Motivated by this potential size bias, Deng, Easton and Yeo (2009) investigate a 
sample of 69,678 firm years between 1963 and 2006, inclusive of loss-making and 
non-analysts followed firms. They find that firms from the same industry grouping 
have lower absolute median pricing errors for BV and Sales multiples than those 
based on Net Income and EBITDA. They attribute this finding to only a small 
proportion of observations having negative BV, as opposed to a significant number 
of firms that report negative EBITDA and/or earnings.  
 
                                                 
2
 Liu, Nissim and Thomas (2002) also find the relative performance over time remains reasonably 
stable across industries, suggesting different industries are not associated with different ideal 
multiples. 
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2.3.3 Factors Explaining the Variation in Accuracy of Multiple-Based 
Valuation Methods 
A number of other factors are also known to impact on the valuation accuracy of 
multiples-based valuation methods. These include the choice of the set of 
comparable firms, the harmonic mean, and an intercept when calculating multiples. 
 
Choice of Comparable Firm 
A comparable firm is defined by Damodaran (2002) as one which has similar growth 
potential, cash flow and risk to the firm being valued. In their study of comparable 
firms, Boatsman and Baskin (1981) compare two types of comparable firms from the 
same industry. They find a comparable firm that has the most similar 10-year 
average rate of earnings growth has lower valuation errors than a randomly selected 
comparable firm. However, Boatsman and Baskin do not perform any formal tests of 
differences in valuation accuracy; they only select 80 firms from a single year, 1976; 
and only select one matched comparable firm. Later studies challenge such an 
approach. Both Alford (1992) and Roosenboom (2007) note that pricing/valuation 
prediction has a larger standard error when selecting one comparable firm in 
comparison to selecting several equally comparable firms. 
 
LeClair (1990), in his study of 1,165 firms with positive earnings in 1984, 
investigates the P/E method with comparable firms selected by industry as well as 
with three measures of earnings: earnings in the current period, average earnings 
over two years, and earnings attributed to tangible and intangible assets. He finds 
average earnings performs best out of the three earnings measures. However, no tests 
are conducted for significant differences in accuracy across the three earnings 
measures.  
 
Alford (1992) investigates the accuracy of the P/E valuation method through 
different methods of selecting comparable firms, namely membership in an industry, 
firm size (a proxy for risk), and return on equity (a proxy for growth). From these 
measures he finds an effective criterion is through selecting comparable firms based 
on industry membership, or a combination of size and return on equity. These latter 
two variables help explain the cross sectional differences in P/E multiples, with 
membership in industry capturing much of the same information, even after 
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controlling for earnings growth, size (risk) and leverage (level of debt). Thus, he 
finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis in literature that industry explains 
much of the cross-sectional variation in P/E multiples.  
 
When investigating the level of industry fineness, Alford (1992) finds that the 
valuation accuracy of the P/E multiple improves as the definition of industry is 
narrowed from a 0-digit (equivalent to using all comparable firms in the 
market/sample) to a 3-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. He also 
finds no increases in valuation accuracy moving from a 3-digit to 4-digit SIC code. 
In addition, most of the improvements in accuracy occur when moving from all firms 
in the market to using a 1-digit SIC code, with subsequent increases in valuation 
accuracy occurring at a diminishing rate.
3
  
 
The average median absolute valuation error (scaled by price) over the three years 
examined by Alford (1992) is 0.245 for an entire sample based on comparables 
selected within the same industry as the one being valued. By dividing his sample 
into quintiles based on size (total assets), valuation accuracy is more accurate for 
larger firms as compared to smaller firms. Consistently across the quintiles, when 
comparable firms are selected based on industry membership, valuation errors are 
lower than when the whole market is selected as the comparative.
4
 Alford also finds 
the increase in accuracy of selecting comparable firms by industry or a combination 
of risk and earnings growth is greater for larger firms. When the sample is split into 
quintiles based on Total Assets, Alford (1992) finds an absolute valuation error of 
0.342 for the smallest quintile, and 0.168 for the largest quintile, both once again 
with comparables selected on the basis of industry membership. 
 
As mentioned in Liu et al. (2002), Tasker (1998) investigates across-industry patterns 
in the selection of comparable firms by analysts and investment bankers in 
acquisition transactions. Based on the belief that different multiples are more 
appropriate in different industries, Tasker finds the consistent use of industry specific 
multiples in practice.  
                                                 
3
 This finding is consistent with the subsequent findings of Liu et al. (2002): an industry selection 
criterion leads to lower pricing errors than using all firms each year as comparable firms. 
4
 In Alford’s (1992) study lower valuation errors are also evident when the comparable selection basis 
is both total assets and return on equity rather than industry membership. 
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In contrast to the prior studies, Bhojraj and Lee (2002) investigate the selection of 
comparable firms based on underlying economic variables, rather than industry 
membership. As part of their study, they develop a multiple regression model to 
predict a “warranted multiple” for each firm based on valuation theory. Comparables 
are then selected which have the closest “warranted multiple” to the company being 
valued. They find the use of the “warranted multiple” is superior to selecting firms 
based on 2-digit SIC codes. Bhojraj, Lee and Ng (2003), using an international 
context, find similar results for the warranted multiple approach. Similarly, Henschke 
and Homburg (2009) use multiple regression to control for differences in financial 
ratios to select comparable firms, and find that valuation accuracy improves over 
industry selected comparable firms for forecasted earnings, historical earnings and 
BV multiples. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The body of literature on valuation accuracy of multiples, though still in its infancy 
compared with the takeover literature, is emerging. Studies have investigated the 
accuracy of such multiple models against the discounted cash flow measure, 
including Kaplan and Ruback (1995), Finnerty and Emery (2004), and Gilson et al. 
(2000). A growing literature is also examining the valuation accuracy of various 
multiples in the U.S., including Liu et al. (2002), Lie and Lie (2002), as well as in 
Europe (Schreiner & Spremann, 2007). The literature for Australian firms is still 
emerging. Lastly, a body of literature has developed investigating the question of 
which firms should be used as comparables when valuing a company, with Alford 
(1992) as well as Liu et al. (2002) documenting the benefit of selecting comparables 
on the basis of industry. (A summary of the key studies is presented in Table 2.1.) 
 
Implications from research into valuation accuracy include that the valuation 
properties of cash flows are improved by the inclusion of accruals (Liu et al., 2002). 
Both Liu et al. (2002) and Schreiner and Spremann (2007) document the limited 
value relevance of revenues/sales until they are matched with expenses, hence 
providing a possible reason why revenues/sales have higher valuation errors. Several 
studies (including Kim & Ritter, 1999; Lie & Lie, 2002; Liu et al., 2002; Schreiner & 
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Spremann, 2007) document the incremental value-relevant information (and lower 
forecast errors) in forward earnings as opposed to historical data. Accordingly, Liu et 
al. (2002) suggest forecasted earnings should be used where available.  
 
Notably, the literature review reveals few studies that have employed multiples for 
firms involved in transactions. Kaplan and Ruback (1995) and the subsequent 
extension by Finnerty and Emery (2004) examined a specific type of takeovers – 
highly leveraged transactions, as well as investigating one type of value driver – 
EBITDA. These studies focused mainly on the valuation of the target firms in 
takeovers.  
 
This thesis seeks to fill a gap within both the valuation accuracy of multiples 
literature (RQ1 and RQ2), as well as linking the valuation accuracy of multiples to 
estimations in a takeover context using the price-to-intrinsic value (P/V) proxy 
(RQ3). It seeks to fill the gap by first not limiting transactions to those involved in 
highly leveraged buyouts, and will use various value drivers in valuing both targets 
as well as acquirers. The need for valuing acquirers is warranted with the number of 
takeover transactions that use equity or a combination of equity and cash as the 
means of payment. There is also, to the author’s knowledge, very limited valuation 
accuracy research conducted within an Australian setting. This setting differs in 
terms of size compared to other international markets, thus making it an ideal 
environment to investigate valuation issues in a smaller market. Second, no study has 
investigated the link between valuation accuracy of multiples and the subsequent 
calculation of P/V estimations based on multiples used to estimate market 
capitalisation (P).  
 
The following chapter develops the theoretical framework and hypotheses designed 
to address the research questions and the related research gap.   
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Table 2.1 
Summary of the Key Multiples-based Valuation Studies 
Author/s Journal 
and Year 
Title Sample 
Period 
Findings 
Alford Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
(1992) 
The Effect of the 
Set of 
Comparable 
Firms on the 
Accuracy of the 
Price-Earnings 
Valuation 
Method 
1978, 
1982, 
1986 
Effective criterion 
for selecting 
comparable firms is 
based on industry 
membership, or a 
combination of size 
and return on 
equity. 
Kaplan and Ruback Journal of 
Finance 
(1995) 
The Valuation of 
Cash Flow 
Forecasts: An 
Empirical 
Analysis 
1983-
1989 
DCF perform as 
well as comparable 
companies and 
transactions. 
Liu, Nissim and 
Thomas 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
(2002) 
Equity Valuation 
Using Multiples 
1982-
1999 
Forecasted earnings 
outperforms 
comprehensive list 
of value drivers. 
Lie and Lie Financial 
Analysts 
Journal 
(2002) 
Multiples Used 
to Estimate 
Corporate Value 
1998/1999 BV multiples 
outperform trailing 
earnings multiples. 
Schreiner and 
Spremann 
SSRN 
Working 
Paper 
(2007) 
Multiples and 
Their Valuation 
Accuracy in 
European Equity 
Markets 
1996-
2005 
Explores European 
context, and finds 
similar results to 
prior research. Also 
finds knowledge 
related multiples 
outperform 
traditional 
multiples. 
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CHAPTER 3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the prior research for multiples in general and 
identified the gaps in the literature that provide the rationale for the thesis’ research 
questions. This chapter develops hypotheses to address the research questions 
relating to the valuation accuracy of multiples for companies involved in mergers 
and acquisitions, and the subsequent effect on the price-to-intrinsic value ratio (P/V) 
(the misvaluation proxy). 
 
3.2 Valuation Accuracy of Multiples (RQ1 & 2) 
The appealing characteristics of multiples may possibly explain their general use in 
practice. First, an investor is able to efficiently gain an understanding of the relative 
value between a set of equity securities when multiples are used. The calculations of 
these multiples are generally simple and require widely available information such as 
current share price, and historical (trailing) multiples or forecasted (forward) 
multiples based on company financial data. Second, due to the simplicity and 
widespread use of multiples, they are widely understood by market participants 
(McCusker & Chang, 2007). Third, valuations based on multiples do not incorporate 
arbitrary steady state assumptions which are involved in calculating terminal values, 
which Sawyer and Joo (2004) state can account for more than 50 percent of the total 
firm valuation.  
 
However, multiples are not without their weaknesses. In the merger and acquisition 
context, if a target is totally unrelated to the rest of the industry in terms of its risk, 
size and growth potential, valuing a company based on multiples would lead to 
spurious calculations of value. In addition, generally if the whole industry is 
over/under valued, this will be reflected in the valuation of the target firm. 
Furthermore in the case of loss-making firms, multiples are meaningless when using 
historical earnings, as they result in negative valuations.  
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Schreiner (2007) note that different valuation methods imply competition, in which 
only efficient methods of valuation will subsist into the future. Efficiency within the 
context of valuation can be determined by the benefits of a valuation method 
exceeding the costs of such a measure, with its cost benefit trade-off being required 
to compare favourably against alternative methods of valuation, such as the 
discounted cash flow model (Penman, 2004). Due to the simplistic nature of 
calculating multiples, it can be classed as a “cheap” method of valuation. However, 
in order to compete with more complex and theoretically sound valuation methods, 
such as discounted cash flows and the residual income model, it requires a certain 
level of valuation accuracy. Hence, the first research question is: 
RQ1: How accurate are various multiple-based valuation methods in valuing 
listed target and acquirer firms in Australia? 
When calculating multiples for target and acquirers, independent experts and 
investment advisers are faced with the decision to determine which appropriate value 
driver to use. Thus, the next research question relates to the relative valuation 
accuracy among the various multiples: 
RQ2: Which of the various multiple-based valuation methods are more 
accurate in valuing target and acquirer firms involved in takeovers in 
Australia? 
The discussion below will be used in formulating hypotheses about the general 
ranking of value driver accuracy (to address RQ2). A caution concerning the prior 
studies should be noted beforehand. The general ranking of the valuation accuracy of 
value drivers in multiples in previous studies may or may not be observed in this 
current study, due to different settings being involved (the takeover transaction) and 
institutional differences. Previous studies have examined the valuation accuracy of 
various value drivers for equity and entity multiple in general, rather than specifically 
for takeover firms. 
 
Several studies (including Kim & Ritter, 1999; Lie & Lie, 2002; Liu, Nissim, & 
Thomas, 2002; Schreiner & Spremann, 2007) have documented the value-relevant 
information contained in forward earnings as opposed to historical data. Liu et al. 
(2002) suggest this forecasted earnings should be used as long as they are available. 
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This value relevance of information contained in forecasted earnings generally 
results (as per previous studies) in low valuation errors. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H1a: Value drivers based on forecasted earnings have lower valuation errors 
than those based on historical value drivers. 
In terms of valuation accuracy ranking of various historical value drivers, it is 
anticipated that those income statement items closer to bottom line earnings will 
perform better than those further up the income statement (for example Sales). This 
is due to sales, gross income and EBIT(DA) by their very nature excluding valuable 
information from the income statement (expenses), thus not fully reflecting 
profitability (Schreiner & Spremann, 2007). Both Liu et al. (2002), Herrmann and 
Richter (2003), and Schreiner and Spremann (2007) generally find this to be the case 
for both equity and entity multiples (the latter based on the value of debt and equity). 
Previous studies find extreme underperformance of multiples based on Sales which 
exceeds multiples based on net cash flow from operations (NCFO), book value (BV) 
and other earnings measures (Liu et al., 2002; Schreiner & Spremann, 2007). Though 
a general ranking of historical value drivers has been observed in previous studies, 
the issue of the most accurate value driver is still a subject of debate. Schreiner and 
Spremann (2007) find earnings before tax (EBT) had a higher valuation accuracy 
than bottom line earnings due to differences in tax rates across European countries. 
This is not expected to be an issue in Australia, due to a national corporate tax rate of 
30 percent levied on Australian resident companies. It is also interesting to note that 
both Lie and Lie (2002) and Baker and Ruback (1999) find EBITDA has higher 
valuation accuracy than EBIT, in contrast to other studies. From a theoretical point of 
view, a vital weakness with using EBITDA in multiples is that it ignores the real 
costs of taxation and capital expenditure that affect value (Suozzo, Cooper, 
Sutherland, & Deng, 2001). Thus, prior literature is still inconclusive regarding the 
best historical value driver. Therefore based on the above discussion, this study’s 
next hypothesis is: 
H1b: Value drivers closer to bottom line earnings (Net Income) have lower 
valuation errors than those closer to the Trading Revenue income statement 
line item.  
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Theoretically, in comparing earnings to cash flow as a value driver, it is argued that 
earnings should be the more representative value driver because earnings reflect 
value changes regardless of when the cash flow occurs. This includes the situation 
regarding obligations to pay future employee entitlements (such as long service 
leave), recognised as a current expense; however, a company’s cash flow remains 
unchanged until such entitlements are paid. Another example involves purchase of 
inventory for cash, which affects cash flow in the period purchased. However, this 
transaction is only recognised as an expense, and affects value, when the inventory is 
sold. Thus, earnings incorporate future cash flows that are value-relevant, whilst also 
ignoring current-period cash flows that are not relevant to value (Liu et al., 2007). 
However, earnings are not without their limitations. Many practitioners argue 
accruals involve discretion, and may be used to manipulate earnings. Accounting 
method choice can also impact on earnings. For example, the depreciation of assets is 
often claimed to be accounted for on an ad hoc basis (Liu et al., 2002), rather than 
truly reflecting the actual decline in value of non-current assets and the assets 
replacement value. This study’s last hypothesis regarding valuation accuracy of 
multiples is thus: 
H1c: Value Drivers based on Earnings (excluding Trading Revenue) have 
lower valuation errors than those based on net cash flow from operations 
(NCFO).  
 
3.3 Misvaluation of Takeover Firms Using Various Multiples to Estimate 
Market Capitalisation (P) in P/V Ratios (RQ3) 
As discussed in Chapter 2, many reasons have been given for the long-run 
underperformance of acquirers, including: performance extrapolation (including 
managerial hubris), method of payment, market fixation of EPS, and measurement 
and research design issues, or a combination of any or all of these reasons. As 
accounting-based multiples are commonly employed in corporate valuations in the 
takeover context (for both the acquirer and the target), it raises the question as to 
which of these multiples are more likely to lead to overpayment and thus long-run 
underperformance of the acquirer. Thus, the third research question is: 
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RQ3: Which of the various multiple-based valuation methods is associated 
with greater misvaluation (as measured by higher estimations of Price-to-
Intrinsic Value)? 
 
Mathematically it can be shown that certain estimates of market capitalisation 
derived from multiples will lead to particular results for valuation errors (scaled by 
market capitalisation) as well as price-to-value (P/V) ratios, the latter being a 
measure of over/under valuation. Four scenarios will be investigated: first, the 
investigation of where estimated market capitalisation closely resembles the firm’s 
actual market capitalisation; second, those instances where estimations of market 
capitalisation are quite large and exceed actual market capitalisation; third, those 
circumstances where estimation of market capitalisation are close to zero; and fourth,  
further insights when Intrinsic Value is the value driver. 
 
The formula below, taken from Liu et al. (2002), is used for calculating valuation 
errors
5
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First, estimations of market capitalisation that very closely resemble actual market 
capitalisation, will result in low valuation errors (or valuation errors of zero), and 
P/V calculations that closely resemble the P/V ratio when using actual market 
capitalisation. Taking an ideal case of the estimated market capitalisation (
tic x ,

 ) 
equalling actual market capitalisation (pit), the latter can be substituted for the former 
into the formula for calculating valuation errors (Equation 3.1). 
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Using the example in Chapter 1, if the median multiple for the 10 Australian listed 
companies was 11.39 instead of 20.99 (that is, WMC Resources ratio of market 
capitalisation to Net Profit before abnormal items was approximately the same for 
                                                 
5
 For more information on how this is derived, see section 4.3.1 in this thesis. 
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the rest of the firms in the industry), when valuing WMC Resources using multiples, 
the estimated market capitalisation would be $8,380,842,699. The valuation error 
would be as below: 
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Thus, on average it could be said that the comparable multiple using this value driver 
is effective in estimating the value of target firm. 
 
Similarly, if the above substitution is also performed for estimating P/V ratios for 
various value drivers, the P/V ratio for that value driver will closely resemble the 
actual P/V ratio that uses market capitalisation. Thus, if actual P/V using market 
capitalisation suggests over/under misvaluation, using multiples that have very close 
estimations of market capitalisation (low valuation errors) will also reflect the same 
over/under misvaluation. Using the numbers from the WMC Resources example: 
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,000$5,109,100
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64.164.1         (3.8) 
Thus, both the actual P/V and the estimated P/V (using multiples) for this example 
display possible overvaluation of the firm compared to WMC Resources Intrinsic 
Value. 
 
Second, estimations of market capitalisation that are quite large and exceed actual 
market capitalisation, will result in large negative valuation errors, and high 
estimations of P/V ratios. In the example below, the estimation of market 
capitalisation ( tic x ,

 ) is assumed to be three times actual market capitalisation. 
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Continuing the example of WMC Resources, if investment bankers used the median 
multiple of the 10 comparable firms as per Chapter 1, the following valuation error 
would be observed: 
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The larger estimation of valuation relative to actual market capitalisation, the more 
negative the valuation error. Algebraically, substituting estimated market 
capitalisation for a value α times actual market capitalisation, (where α is a positive 
value greater than one), the following outcome would result:   
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where (1-α) is negative due to the restriction α is positive and greater than one.  
 
In contrast, these large positive estimations of market capitalisation will result in 
higher P/V ratios, relative to smaller estimations of market capitalisation, holding the 
Intrinsic Value constant (V), due to the large size of the numerator of P/V ratios. It 
should be noted that when calculating valuation errors or P/V for a target or acquirer 
for a particular takeover transaction, the denominator (market capitalisation or 
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Intrinsic Value) is held constant for each of the multiples, thus reflecting the 
influence of the estimation of market capitalisation by each of the different multiples. 
 
Therefore these calculations are more likely to result in a P/V suggesting 
overvaluation (holding all other things constant) as indicated in the continuation of  
the WMC Resources example below.  
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Thus, the larger the estimated market capitalisation relative to the actual market 
capitalisation, the higher the possible misvaluation (contrast the Actual P/V for 
WMC Resources (1.64), with a possibly greater overvaluation of 3.02 above). 
 
Third, estimations of market capitalisation close to zero result in valuation errors 
close to the value one (1), as well as low P/V calculations, holding Intrinsic Value 
constant (V). 
 
In the extreme case of estimated market capitalisation equalling to zero, substituting 
into the valuation error formula, the following would be observed. 
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Thus, with WMC Resources, if the comparable median multiple was 2, the following 
valuation error would be observed: 
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Opposite to the last scenario considered for P/V calculations, the smaller the 
estimation of market capitalisation, the smaller the P/V ratio (closer to 
undervaluation than overvaluation).  
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The above P/V of 0.29 is far lower than both the two prior examples of 1.64 and 3.02 
respectively. 
 
Fourth, and lastly, regardless of valuation accuracy for the Intrinsic Value multiple, 
the P/V calculation will demonstrate the misvaluation inherent in the comparable 
median multiple (ie where xi,t = Vi,t). 
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In hypothesising the performance of the P/V ratios based on various different 
multiples, the conclusions below are drawn from mathematical logic. Multiples with 
low valuation errors will also result in P/V ratios resembling those when actual 
market capitalisation is used, and thus reflecting the over/undervaluation of the ratio 
of actual market capitalisation to Intrinsic Value (P/V). Multiples with large negative 
valuations errors will also result in high positive P/V ratios (suggesting possible 
overvaluation). Lastly, multiples with valuation errors close to the value one (1) will 
also result in low P/V ratios (suggesting possible undervaluation, or minimal 
overvaluation), holding all other things constant. One last note: though the above 
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holds mathematically for each estimate individually, it does not automatically follow 
that the mean or median value exhibited in valuation errors will also be the mean or 
median value for P/V estimations. The above deductions do however give a guide to 
the likely rankings of P/V estimations. 
 
Liu et al. (2002), Lie and Lie (2002), Kim and Ritter (1999) and Schreiner and 
Spremann (2007) all document low valuation errors for multiples using forecasted 
earnings in general settings involving large samples. They do not specifically 
investigate takeover firms. Different models are used amongst these studies for the 
calculation of valuation errors, with low valuation errors in any of these models still 
suggesting the same conclusions. That is, valuation error models that either calculate 
a raw or absolute valuation error scaled by market capitalisations will still suggest 
that estimated value (market capitalisation) is close to that of actual value (market 
capitalisation). Thus, if the P/V ratios using actual market capitalisation suggest 
overvaluation or undervaluation so will those estimations based on multiples with 
low valuation errors. 
 
For takeover transactions, it has also been observed that both acquirers and targets 
are usually overvalued (based on the misvaluation proxy of the ratio of actual market 
capitalisation to Intrinsic Value), with acquirers generally being more overvalued 
than targets. Specifically, both Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) and 
Brown, Dong and Gallery (2005) document acquirers being more overvalued relative 
to their targets, especially among takeovers that have shares as the form of 
consideration and in merger bids, consistent with the model described by Shleifer 
and Vishny (2003). 
 
Thus, based on the prior literature, it is hypothesised that:   
H2a: Estimations of P/V ratios using Forecasted Earnings Multiples are 
close to P/V ratios based on actual market capitalisation. 
 
Liu et al. (2002) find the most negative mean valuation errors using the median of 
comparable firms from the same industry for multiples based on Cash Flow from 
operations, Sales, BV and EBITDA. Schreiner and Spremann (2007) also find these 
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multiples produce high absolute valuation errors. However as they do not disclose 
the result before taking absolute errors, it is difficult to determine whether the poor 
performance is a result of a very high or very low estimation of market capitalisation. 
Assuming that Schreiner and Spremann’s (2007) findings reflect those of Liu et al. 
(2002) it is hypothesised that:  
H2b: Estimations of P/V ratios based on bottom line earnings (net income) 
are lower than those based on Trading Revenue, NCFO, BV and EBITDA 
multiples.  
 
Finally Liu et al. (2002) find that the multiple with Intrinsic Value as the value driver 
results have the highest positive median valuation error. Thus, it is hypothesised that 
multiples based on Intrinsic Value will also result in low estimations of the P/V ratio. 
H2c: Estimations of P/V ratios based on Intrinsic Value multiples are lower 
than those based on earnings or cash flow-based multiples. 
 
Note also, as mentioned above, this estimation of P/V ratio based on Intrinsic Value 
will reflect the median misvaluation of the industry comparables.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter hypotheses were developed based on prior literature to address the 
research questions. In terms of valuation accuracy, these hypotheses predict that 
value drivers based on forecasted earnings will have lower valuation errors than 
those based on historical value drivers (H1a); that value drivers closer to bottom line 
earnings (Net income) have lower valuation errors than those closer to the Trading 
Revenue income statement line (H1b); and that value drivers based on earnings 
(excluding Trading Revenue) have lower valuation errors than those based on net 
cash flow from operations (NCFO) (H1c). In terms of misvaluation, these hypotheses 
predict that estimations of P/V ratios using forecasted earnings multiples are closer to 
P/V ratios based on actual market capitalisation (H2a); that estimations of P/V ratios 
based on bottom line earnings (net income) are lower than those based on Trading 
Revenue, NCFO, BV and EBITDA multiples (H2b); and that Estimations of P/V 
ratios based on Intrinsic Value multiples are lower than those based on earnings or 
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cash flow based multiples. The next chapter presents the research design that will be 
used to test the hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research design used to test the research hypotheses 
developed in the previous chapter. Initially, the sampling procedure and data sources 
will be described. The research design that follows will be split into two main 
sections. The first will describe the methods used to test the valuation accuracy of 
multiples (research questions 1-2 and hypotheses H1a-c), based on valuation 
analysis. The second will describe the methodology employed to estimate 
misvaluation of firms based on using multiples to estimate a price to Intrinsic Value 
(P/V) measure (research question 3 and hypotheses H2a-c). Lastly, the potential 
limitations of the research design will be discussed. 
  
4.2 Sampling Procedure and Data Sources 
The sample used in this study consists of takeover transactions completed between 1 
January 1990 and 31 December 2005. The observations are primarily drawn from the 
Connect 4 database. Financial statement data is obtained from the Morningstar 
FinAnalysis database. Industry classifications were obtained from the Share Price 
and Price Relative (SPPR) database maintained by the Australian Business School. 
Missing market capitalisations from FinAnalysis have also been sourced from the 
SPPR. Analyst forecasts of future earnings are sourced from the Thomson Reuters’ 
I/B/E/S database. Sensitivity analysis in Chapter 6 includes the actual market 
capitalisation one, two and three years after the takeover announcement date, thus 
using market capitalisation up to 2008. 
 
The following criteria are used in the sample selection process for takeovers: (1) both 
the target and the acquirer must be Australian firms; (2) the acquirer must be listed 
on the ASX, or be a subsidiary of a listed company; and (3) the target must be listed 
on the ASX. A full summary of the sample selection procedures is presented in Table 
4.1. The requirement that the target and acquirer be Australian is to ensure the 
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availability and comparability of necessary data. Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 
(2002) find that the returns to the acquiring firm depend on the organisational form 
of the acquired asset, that is, whether the target is a private firm, public firm or 
subsidiary. Thus, to ensure homogeneity of the sample and availability of data, it is 
required that all targets must be listed.  
 
As a subsidiary taking over a firm is in essence the same as if the parent performed 
the takeover, this study includes firms where the acquirer is a listed firm or a 
subsidiary of a listed firm. However, similar to Brown, Dong and Gallery (2005), this 
study does not investigate targets that are subsidiaries of unlisted firms due to the 
identification difficulties. These target firms are possibly subject to discretionary use 
of accounting information by the parent company in order for them to achieve a 
higher sale price for the target.  
 
Following on from Frankel and Lee (1998) and Brown et al. (2005) for calculations 
of P/V, firms with negative book value (BV) are also dropped from the sample. This 
is due to the inability of interpreting return-on-equity (ROE) for these firms in 
economic terms (Frankel & Lee, 1998). 
 
Similar to Liu, Nissim and Thomas (2002), and Schreiner and Spremann (2007), for 
the main part of this study, it is required that both the acquirer and its corresponding 
target have positive values for each of the value drivers examined (the value drivers 
required will be listed in the next section). This allows comparison amongst value 
drivers. For historical values, these value drivers will be derived from data obtained 
from the most recently issued financial statements within the last 18 months prior to 
the takeover to allow for firms who change reporting dates. Similar to Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) and Brown et al. (2005), it is also required 
that there is at least 30 days before the announcement of the takeover takes place to 
ensure that the information is available to the public at the time of the announcement. 
I/B/E/S forecasts used are those at least 30 days before the announcement of the 
takeover takes place, a practice also followed by Brown et al. (2005). To ensure the 
analyst forecasts are not subject to staleness, each I/B/E/S forecast used is the median 
or mean of at least three different analysts. 
 
47 
 
Table 4.1 
Sample Size Selection 
 
 Acquirer  Target  
Takeovers  867  867  
Less Missing Financial Information  -406  -222  
  461  645  
Less Missing Analyst Forecasts  -236  -424  
  225  221  
Less Negative Value Drivers  -54  -71  
  171  150  
Less Insufficient Comparable Firms  -24  -21  
Sample Size  147  129  
 
Details regarding the calculation of the Intrinsic Value (based on the Residual 
Income Model) are detailed below, as well as in Appendix A. It should be noted that 
similar to I/B/E/S forecasts, the Intrinsic Value is calculated at least 30 days before 
the announcement takes place. Requiring at least 30 days before the announcement 
for both the I/B/E/S forecasts and Intrinsic Value reduces any possible pre-run up of 
share price that the firm may have encountered, which thus could affect valuations. 
 
Liu et al. (2002) and Schreiner and Spremann (2007) require that all comparable 
firms have positive values for all value drivers. This study however does not require 
comparables to meet this stringent requirement, for two reasons. First, this 
effectively biases the comparable firms to only include profitable firms, as firms with 
negative values for any driver (for example net profit after tax (NPAT) after 
abnormals or NCFO) would be excluded from their study. Second, it is unlikely that 
an investment banker, or those involved in valuing a company using multiples would 
simply exclude a firm on the basis of one value driver being negative, unless the 
value driver is the specific one used for their valuation. Liu et al. (2002) document 
when this requirement is relaxed so that each comparable must have a positive value 
for only Sales and forecasted Earnings, that the relative performances of value 
drivers are still observed. However, the dispersion of valuation error increases for 
each firm. Thus, the valuation errors for this study are likely to be larger than 
encountered in a positive value restriction context. 
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4.3 Valuation Accuracy of Multiples 
In this section the model used to test the valuation accuracy of multiples will be 
described to address RQ1. This will be followed by the identification of value 
drivers, followed by the description of the basis of selecting comparable firms. These 
components will provide the basis for addressing RQ2 and testing the related 
hypotheses (1a-c) with respect to which of the various multiple-based valuation 
methods are more accurate in valuing target and acquirer firms involved in takeovers 
in Australia. 
 
4.3.1 Valuation Accuracy Model 
The first stage of analysis involves an investigation of the accuracy of various 
multiples to estimate a firm’s market capitalisation compared to the stock market 
capitalisation 30 days prior to the takeover announcement. Multiples are the ratio of 
a firm’s market capitalisation to a particular value driver6. The estimation of a firm’s 
market capitalisation is the firm’s value driver (for example EBITDA), multiplied by 
the median multiple of a firm from the same industry. Valuation analysis involves 
examining the difference between actual market capitalisation and the estimated 
market capitalisation based on multiples. Alford (1992) commented that the benefits 
of valuation analysis compared to regression analysis include that valuation analysis 
does not assume a linear model for multiples, as well as valuation analysis makes 
fewer distributional assumptions.  
 
In the first stage of the analysis, the traditional ratio representation is followed, by 
requiring that the estimated market capitalisation of a firm (p (pi,t)) is directly 
proportional to the value driver xi of the firm in the period before the transaction: 
 
pi,t = βc xi,t-1 + εi,t     (4.1) 
 
where βc is the multiple of the value driver, and εi,t is the valuation error. To improve 
efficiency, equation (4.1) is divided by the transaction value: 
 
                                                 
6
 Value drivers are explained in more detail below. 
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The valuation error (εi,t)  in equation (4.1) is unlikely to be independent of firm value, 
as larger values of firm value are likely to have higher absolute valuation errors 
(Schreiner, 2007). Baker and Ruback (1999) and Beatty, Riffe and Thompson (1999) 
find the valuation error (residual (εi)) is proportional to value. Thus, it is expected 
that estimations of the slope in equation (4.2) will provide more accurate estimates of 
the slope than equation (4.1) when using market capitalisation. 
 
Unlike Liu et al. (2002) and Schreiner and Spremann (2007), for estimation of the 
multiple ( c ), the restriction that expected scaled valuation errors E[εi/pi,t] is zero is 
not imposed
7
. By rearranging equation (4.2), the multiple c  can be estimated using 
the harmonic mean or median as an appropriate measure of central tendency. The 
estimate of c  is multiplied by the target firm’s value driver to obtain an estimation 
for the target firm equity value. As such, similar to Liu et al. (2002), the pricing 
errors are calculated as follows: 
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To evaluate the performance of various multiples, measures of dispersion for the 
pooled distribution of scaled valuation errors εi/pi,t (hereafter valuation errors) will be 
examined. The key performance measures are the median (both raw and in absolute 
terms) valuation errors; the dispersion of valuation errors (as measured by the 
standard deviation and inter-quartile range); as well as the fraction of absolute 
valuation errors below 15 percent of market values (transaction values). These 
measures will then allow comparability with previous studies, including Liu et al. 
(2002), Schreiner and Spremann (2007), Kaplan and Ruback (1995), Kim and Ritter 
(1999), and Lie and Lie (2002). 
 
                                                 
7
 It was noted in Liu et al. (2002), that when unbiased expected valuation errors were applied, relative 
rankings were left unadjusted. Sensitivity analysis in this study showed by restricting the study to 
unbiased valuation errors (where lower weights are in effect assigned to extreme valuation errors 
relative to unrestricted expected valuation errors), valuation errors and relative rankings were 
significantly affected. This may also be due in part to the study not applying the restriction of 
comparable firms requiring positive values for each value driver, thus also leading to higher valuation 
errors. 
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To reduce the effect of outliers, Liu et al. (2002) trim the top and bottom one percent 
of the valuation errors for each of the value drivers. However, due to the relatively 
small dataset used in this thesis, avoidance of data loss is desirable. Thus, this study 
employs winsorising, at the 2.5 percent and 97.5 percent levels in the tails of the 
distributions. 
 
4.3.2 Value Drivers 
The value drivers used are: Trading Revenue (or sales), EBITDA (earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation), EBIT (earnings before interest and tax), 
earnings before abnormal items, bottom line earnings, net cash flow from operations 
(NCFO), book value (BV), analyst forecasts of EPS for one year (FEPS1) and two 
years ahead (FEPS2) and Intrinsic Value based on the residual income model 
(Intrinsic Value).  
 
These drivers were chosen for two reasons. First, the majority of these value drivers 
have been investigated in prior multiples valuation accuracy literature, (Lie and Lie, 
2002; Liu et al., 2002; Schreiner and Spremann, 2007). Second, based an analysis of 
valuation method in a sample of Australian takeovers documents (in independent 
expert reports) from 1996 to 2005, of those reporting the use of multiples as their 
primary valuation method, 51.6 percent used EBITDA, followed by bottom line 
earnings (18.3 percent), EBIT (17 percent), with the remaining using measures of 
EBITA (EBIT before amortisation) and EBITD (EBIT before depreciation). (The 
relevant Morningstar FinAnalysis items are included in Appendix B.) 
 
4.3.3 Comparable Firms 
For each target/acquirer, a minimum of five comparable firms are selected based on 
industry membership. Alford (1992) comments that comparable firms in the same 
industry are generally selected due to their assumed similar risks and earnings. They 
also often use similar accounting methods. In their study, Bhojraj, Lee and Oler 
(2003) find that GICS classifications are significantly better than the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) codes and the Fama and French (1997) industry grouping at explaining 
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stock returns co-movements and cross sectional variations in valuation multiples. 
The SPPR database records the industry classification for the listed Australian 
companies. Two issues arise in industry classification of firms. First, by selecting 
industry membership based on the most current industry grouping, firms that have 
changed industry are misclassified for the period of time in the previous industry. 
Second, GICS was introduced in Australia in September 2002, with classification 
information available in July 2001. Thus, firms that delisted before July 2001 are 
without GICS classification (a potential problem, especially as target firms are a 
major component of delisted firms), thus creating survivorship bias. To overcome 
these issues, monthly industry classifications are sourced from SPPR. Industry 
classifications before July 2001 are based on the previous ASX Industry 
Classification, with industry classifications from July 2001 based on the more recent 
GICS classification. 
 
4.4 Estimation Procedure for Misvaluation Proxy (P/V) 
In this section, the procedure for testing which of the various multiple-based 
valuation methods is associated with greater misvaluation (as measured by higher 
estimations of Price-to-Intrinsic Value) are described. Both Dong et al. (2006) and 
Brown et al. (2005) define misvaluation as the difference between current market 
price and a measure of non-market-based fundamental value. It also reflects the 
discrepancy between the investors’ predictions concerning the future earnings 
potential of the firm, and the firm’s share price (Dong, 2003). Both of these studies 
use the residual income model (RIM) as a measure of fundamental value, with the 
ratio of residual income value to price (P/V or its inverse V/P) as the proxy for 
market misvaluation. As this study examines the effect of multiple valuation method 
on misvaluation, estimated market capitalisation is calculated using comparable 
multiples rather than a firm’s current market capitalisation.  
 
As previously indicated, to eliminate the run-up effect that is often observed prior to 
major corporate events, the estimated price used in P/V calculations are computed, 
wherever possible, using comparable firms market capitalisation 30 days before the 
takeover announcement (Brown et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2006). Dong et al. (2006) 
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also remark that this ensures information required for calculating V/P is available 
before the takeover announcement.  
 
Several studies document strong support for P/V as a superior measure of 
misvaluation to various other measures including price to book value (P/B) ratio (Ali, 
Hwang, & Trombley, 2003; Frankel & Lee, 1998; Lee, Myers, & Swaminathan, 
1999). Dong et al. (2006) ascribe the superiority of P/V to its insensitivity to various 
accounting treatments and its ability to capture forward looking information that is 
reflected in analysts’ earnings forecasts. Dong et al. (2006) however also note that 
the P/V measure is affected by analysts’ forecasts biases that are correlated with 
widespread market misvaluation. Despite this weakness, they find that for their 
sample of U.S. takeover firms, P/V has significant explanatory power above P/B.  
 
The Intrinsic Value (V) is calculated using the residual income model, and has also 
been referred to as the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) valuation equation, the latter 
being coined by Bernard (1994). Recent uses of this model are most often based on 
the theoretical work by Ohlson (1990, 1995), Lehman (1993) and Feltham and 
Ohlson (1995). Earlier related work on the residual income value dates back as early 
as the 1930s, including the work of Preinreich (1938), Edwards and Bell (1961) and 
Peasnell (1982). Several approaches to empirically implement the residual income 
model include Penman and Sougiannis (1998), Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999), 
Frankel and Lee (1998), and more recently in takeover contexts (Brown et al., 2005; 
Dong et al., 2006), and in seasonal equity offerings (Brown, Gallery, & Goei, 2006). 
 
The residual income model uses a foundation of clean surplus accounting, that is, 
where all gains and losses that affect BV are included in earnings. Put differently, 
BV in period t+1 can be found by first adding earnings in period t+1 to BV in period 
t, then subtracting net dividends in period t+1 (Brown et al., 2005): 
BVt+1 = BVt + NIt+1 – Dt+1    (4.4) 
 
where:   BVt+1  = Book value in period t+1 
   NIt+1  = Net income (earnings) in period t+1 
   Dt+1  = Dividend paid in period t+1 
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Lee et al. (1999) and Ali et al. (2003) find that the number of periods in the expanded 
term residual income models is immaterial once it exceeds three periods and has the 
most predictive power in the analysis of Lee et al.’s (1999) study. Further 
descriptions of the calculation of the Intrinsic Value (V) are included in Appendix A. 
Similar to Dong et al. (2006), P/V ratios are winsorised to remove the influence of 
outliers. As previously explained in this thesis, P/V ratios are winsorised at 2.5 
percent and 97.5 percent in the tails of distributions. 
 
4.5 Limitation of the Research Design 
To enable comparison across a range of multiples, it has been necessary to restrict 
the target and acquirer companies evaluated to those with positive values for each of 
the value drivers. This unavoidably biases the sample, and hence application of 
results to profitable targets and acquirers. However, it is also understandable that 
firms with poor performance in the past (negative value drivers) are unlikely to be 
valued based on multiples, to avoid negative valuations. In order to ensure available 
data, a further restriction is that the targets and acquirers be listed companies, thus 
possibly creating results that may or may not be generalisable to unlisted firms.  
 
As mentioned above, consistent with the studies of Dong et al. (2006) and Brown et 
al. (2005) to mitigate any effect of the takeover on share price, the value of market 
capitalisation used to calculate P/V ratios are taken at least 30 days before the 
announcement of the takeover. However, as mentioned by Brown et al. (2005), this 
creates an arbitrary cut-off, as different takeovers may experience varying share price 
movements due to differences in the amount and timing of information leakages.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the sample, study period and data sources relevant to the 
study. It then described the methodology that is employed to address the research 
questions and to test the related hypotheses. This includes the use of valuation 
analysis (RQs 1 and 2, hypotheses 1a-c) to find the valuation accuracy of certain 
multiples, and the use of P/V ratios to test the overvaluation of these multiples (RQ3 
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and hypotheses 2a-c). The next two chapters report the results of the testing of the 
procedures documented above.  
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the testing of the hypotheses is conducted. First, the valuation 
accuracy hypotheses are tested using the pricing error model described in Chapter 4, 
with absolute median valuation error being used to rank the multiples in terms of 
accuracy. Second, the misvaluation hypotheses are tested using the ratio of estimated 
price (as calculated by the multiple) to Intrinsic Value (based on the residual income 
model), with higher values of P/V representing overvaluation.  
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Consistently throughout the thesis and where applicable, Panel A and B will display 
the results of acquirers and targets respectively. Table 5.1 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the acquirer (147) and target (129) firms.  Value drivers of both 
acquirers and targets are negatively skewed, with means higher than medians. The 
skewness implies that for both samples, there exists a proportion of firms which are 
far larger in terms of value drivers than the rest of the sample. It can also be noted 
that for each value driver, the mean, median, standard deviation and inter-quartile 
range are higher for acquirers than for targets. Thus, in general, acquirers are larger 
(in terms of value drivers) than targets. 
 
5.3 Valuation Accuracy of Multiples Results 
The following statistics that describe the distribution of the valuation errors are 
reported: two measures of central tendency (mean and median) and three measures of 
dispersion (the standard deviation, and two non-parametric measures: the inter-
quartile range; and the distribution of the middle 80 percent of the data, as calculated 
as the 10
th
 percentile subtracted from the 90
th
 percentile). Similar to Schreiner and 
Spremann (2007), the fraction of valuation errors within 15 percent of zero (zero 
representing no valuation error), and then within 25 percent of zero, are also 
included. Results are separated into three categories: historical, forecasted and 
Intrinsic Value drivers. Of the historical value drivers book value (BV), net cash flow 
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from operations (NCFO), and trading revenue are generally explored separately, with 
the remaining falling under the title historical earnings value drivers. 
 
Similar to Schreiner and Spremann (2007), ranking in the following section will be 
based mainly on absolute valuation error, specifically median absolute valuation 
error. The examination of valuation errors in signed form (that is, before absolute 
values) is presented as part of the analysis of price to Intrinsic Value (P/V) ratios. 
 
5.3.1 Valuation Accuracy of Multiples Based Valuations in General (RQ1) 
Research Question 1 asks how accurate are various multiple-based valuation 
methods in valuing listed acquirers and targets in Australia. Similar to Schreiner 
(2007) and given the non-normality evident, median absolute valuation errors will be 
used as the basis of determining the accuracy of such methods.  
 
The acquirer and target absolute valuation error results are listed in Table 5.2, Panel 
A and B. In general, signed valuation errors are negatively skewed (with medians 
greater than means), with absolute valuation error being positively skewed. For both 
targets and acquirers, all multiples (except the multiples based on BV and trading 
revenue) have median absolute valuation errors lower than 30 percent. These results 
are similar to Schreiner and Spremann (2007) for their European sample. Schreiner 
and Spremann find six corresponding multiples with median absolute valuation 
errors lower than 30 percent. Furthermore, this study finds seven acquirer and six 
target multiples with median absolute valuation errors within 25 percent of a firm’s 
market capitalisation. Median absolute valuation errors range from 16.0 percent to 
42.9 percent for acquirers and 19.0 to 46.9 for targets. This is comparable with 
Schreiner and Spremann’s (2007) range of 21.5 percent to 43.8 percent for 27 
multiples for their European sample. Thus, in answer to RQ1, valuations based on 
multiples generally produce estimates within 30 percent of actual market 
capitalisation, which is comparable with prior literature in other contexts.  
 
When comparing the results of acquirers to targets, acquirers have lower mean 
absolute valuation errors for all multiples examined, coupled with lower standard 
deviations for all bar FEPS2 and lower inter-quartile ranges for all bar EBITD and 
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NPAT before abnormals. Eight of the thirteen multiples also have lower median 
absolute valuation errors than their target counterpart. This may in part be due to 
acquirers having larger value drivers as mentioned above and consistent with Alford 
(1992) who documented higher valuation accuracy amongst larger firms as compared 
to smaller firms. 
 
In undocumented results, when acquirers are restricted to multiple bidders (52% of 
the sample), there is an improvement in the median absolute valuation errors range 
(from 14.2 percent to 38.4 percent), with all bar the multiple based on Intrinsic Value 
displaying lower median absolute valuation errors than the results in Table 5.2, Panel 
A. Thus it appears than the more frequent participants in mergers and acquisitions 
have greater valuation accuracy.    
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Table 5.1 
Distribution of Value Drivers 
Panel A: Acquirers           
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Trading Revenue 147 1574.7 348.1 4550.2 5.4 30.1 129.2 1188.0 1058.8 3125.4 
EBITDA 147 285.6 107.9 871.0 10.4 118.0 46.4 271.8 225.5 534.4 
EBITD 147 273.0 97.0 863.9 10.5 119.5 42.8 251.5 208.8 489.3 
EBITA 147 229.1 79.9 656.8 10.2 115.6 39.3 239.9 200.5 450.8 
EBIT 147 216.2 73.5 649.5 10.3 117.6 31.7 222.8 191.1 421.5 
EBT 147 190.2 69.2 596.8 10.5 119.5 29.2 187.5 158.3 357.7 
NPAT before abnormals 147 140.0 47.6 427.0 10.4 118.7 18.9 124.7 105.7 267.1 
NPAT after abnormals 147 139.5 47.7 435.4 10.2 115.3 17.0 123.5 106.5 274.6 
NCFO 147 208.9 83.2 661.9 10.2 114.7 27.9 181.5 153.6 388.1 
BV 147 1092.1 456.9 2157.9 7.0 65.4 188.1 1224.4 1036.3 2607.4 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
          Intrinsic Value 147 1871.7 584.7 5180.5 8.8 91.1 251.7 1632.0 1380.3 3816.6 
Forecast Value Driver 
          FEPS1 147 152.5 53.7 381.2 8.9 93.7 24.9 158.3 133.4 312.8 
FEPS2 147 180.6 58.4 486.9 8.3 78.7 28.7 165.9 137.2 323.9 
Other Measures           
Market Capitalisation 147 2226.3 751.6 5300.0 8.5 87.2 364.2 2460.3 2096.0 4203.6 
P/V 147 1.5559 1.2932 0.9125 3.4 21.7 1.0217 1.9420 0.9203 1.5743 
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Table 5.1 continued 
Distribution of Value Drivers 
Panel B: Targets           
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Trading Revenue 129 711.3 264.2 1172.9 2.7 7.2 77.7 697.0 619.3 2175.6 
EBITDA 129 149.8 61.4 243.1 3.4 12.8 33.5 143.9 110.4 311.1 
EBITD 129 138.0 56.5 220.8 3.4 13.4 29.7 137.2 107.5 275.6 
EBITA 129 119.8 49.4 196.0 3.9 18.3 28.9 130.9 102.0 241.4 
EBIT 129 107.8 45.2 179.4 4.2 22.3 25.7 116.3 90.6 216.4 
EBT 129 89.1 37.1 138.5 3.6 16.0 21.8 98.4 76.6 199.6 
NPAT before abnormals 129 72.3 31.2 120.9 3.8 16.1 16.4 70.3 53.9 127.3 
NPAT after abnormals 129 75.0 30.4 155.1 5.4 36.2 13.1 70.3 57.2 140.6 
NCFO 129 116.1 45.8 207.4 4.1 19.9 22.7 106.8 84.0 235.0 
BV 129 741.4 341.0 1264.7 3.4 11.7 122.1 672.5 550.4 1431.0 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
          Intrinsic Value 129 1009.9 437.3 1693.5 3.7 15.6 198.8 1022.0 823.1 2177.8 
Forecast Value Driver 
          FEPS1 129 93.6 34.3 197.6 4.6 22.8 17.4 79.2 61.8 143.2 
FEPS2 129 103.7 39.8 251.7 7.3 66.0 19.8 81.0 61.2 191.9 
Other Measures           
Market Capitalisation 129 1176.9 464.5 2037.0 3.7 16.5 204.2 1280.4 1076.2 2582.7 
P/V 129 1.2414 1.0911 0.7376 3.7 23.2 0.8610 1.4690 0.6080 1.1992 
Notes 
          Amounts in $ millions. 
FEPS is Forecast Earnings Per Share. The number following relates to the forecast period (FEPS1 is one year ahead Forecast Earnings Per 
Share). FEPS based on median analysts’ forecasts are selected.  
Other variables as described in Appendix C. 
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Table 5.2 
Absolute Valuation Errors 
Panel A: Acquirers       
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry       
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fraction 
<.15 
Fraction 
<.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 147 0.6272 0.4288 0.7519 2.5744 6.2230 0.2239 0.6722 0.4482 1.2566 0.1769 0.2789 
EBITDA 147 0.3040 0.2163 0.2865 1.9944 4.8249 0.1098 0.4348 0.3250 0.5781 0.3605 0.5374 
EBITD 147 0.3217 0.2504 0.3167 2.0570 5.1299 0.0961 0.4365 0.3404 0.6006 0.3605 0.4966 
EBITA 147 0.2924 0.2187 0.2340 1.2467 1.2474 0.1160 0.3947 0.2787 0.5409 0.3197 0.5442 
EBIT 147 0.3099 0.2186 0.2865 1.8252 3.5686 0.1138 0.3945 0.2807 0.5948 0.3197 0.5374 
EBT 147 0.3062 0.2316 0.3097 2.1958 5.1274 0.0974 0.3844 0.2870 0.5318 0.3537 0.5510 
NPAT before 
abnormals 147 0.2875 0.2386 0.2272 0.8877 0.0957 0.0976 0.4374 0.3398 0.5320 0.3605 0.5170 
NPAT after abnormals 147 0.3387 0.2832 0.2848 0.9984 0.3780 0.1013 0.4988 0.3975 0.6924 0.3333 0.4762 
NCFO 147 0.3931 0.2840 0.3488 1.5533 2.9209 0.1306 0.5681 0.4375 0.7945 0.2925 0.4490 
BV 147 0.3408 0.3043 0.2332 0.3812 -0.9258 0.1509 0.4993 0.3484 0.6411 0.2517 0.4082 
Intrinsic Value Driver             
Intrinsic Value 147 0.3040 0.2853 0.2221 0.5457 -0.5510 0.1198 0.4674 0.3475 0.5843 0.3129 0.4830 
Forecast Value Driver             
FEPS1 147 0.2734 0.1722 0.2965 2.4201 6.6229 0.0815 0.3583 0.2768 0.5094 0.4082 0.6463 
FEPS2 147 0.2568 0.1597 0.3233 3.1400 10.8936 0.0767 0.3110 0.2343 0.4236 0.4490 0.6667 
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Table 5.2 continued 
Absolute Valuation Errors 
Panel B: Targets       
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry       
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fraction 
<.15 
Fraction 
<.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 129 1.1902 0.4689 2.4433 3.7331 13.9160 0.1568 0.8350 0.6782 2.4399 0.2326 0.3566 
EBITDA 129 0.4827 0.2299 0.7913 3.1619 9.7492 0.1059 0.4964 0.3904 0.9687 0.3953 0.5194 
EBITD 129 0.4976 0.2379 0.8327 3.3126 10.9078 0.1063 0.4279 0.3215 0.9674 0.3721 0.5039 
EBITA 129 0.3975 0.2500 0.4928 2.5976 7.0124 0.1026 0.4795 0.3770 0.7448 0.3566 0.4961 
EBIT 129 0.4537 0.2393 0.6441 2.8438 7.9307 0.1329 0.4495 0.3166 0.9206 0.3178 0.5039 
EBT 129 0.4442 0.2513 0.7272 3.5294 12.8439 0.0943 0.4206 0.3263 0.7546 0.3643 0.4961 
NPAT before 
abnormals 129 0.3358 0.2281 0.3712 2.5655 7.7458 0.1178 0.4120 0.2942 0.6511 0.3256 0.5581 
NPAT after abnormals 129 0.3936 0.2634 0.3713 1.6137 2.5149 0.1332 0.5678 0.4347 0.7802 0.3101 0.4961 
NCFO 129 0.4605 0.2796 0.5398 2.7787 8.9922 0.1483 0.6177 0.4694 0.7958 0.2636 0.4574 
BV 129 0.6695 0.3131 1.1332 3.2015 10.0595 0.1412 0.5740 0.4328 1.3586 0.2713 0.4186 
Intrinsic Value Driver             
Intrinsic Value 129 0.8028 0.2593 2.0937 3.9064 14.0285 0.0890 0.4763 0.3874 0.7923 0.3721 0.4961 
Forecast Value Driver             
FEPS1 129 0.3810 0.1966 0.4647 2.4508 6.3934 0.1097 0.5057 0.3960 0.7329 0.3953 0.5814 
FEPS2 129 0.2945 0.1900 0.3135 2.2484 5.5308 0.1090 0.3438 0.2348 0.6560 0.4031 0.6047 
Notes             
FEPS is Forecast Earnings Per Share. The number following relates to the forecast period (FEPS1 is one year ahead Forecast Earnings Per Share).   
FEPS based on median analysts’ forecasts are selected. 
Other variables as described in Appendix C.         
Fraction <.15 and <.25 refers to the percentage (expressed as a decimal) of those valuation errors with an absolute value between 0 and 0.15,   
and 0 and 0.25 respectively.            
62 
5.3.2 Valuation Accuracy of Various Multiples Based Valuations (RQ2) 
Research question 2 (RQ2) asks which of the various multiple-based valuation 
methods are more accurate in valuing acquirer and target firms involved in takeovers 
in Australia. 
 
In terms of relative performance (when using the median absolute valuation error), 
the following general rankings are observed in Table 5.2, Panel A, for acquirers:  
1) Multiples based on forecast earnings 
2) Multiples based on historical earnings 
3) Multiples based on NCFO, Intrinsic Value, and BV 
4) Multiples based on Trading Revenue 
 
In terms of relative performance (when using the median), the following general 
rankings are observed in Table 5.2, Panel B, for targets:  
1) Multiples based on forecast earnings 
2) Multiples based on historical earnings and Intrinsic Value 
3) Multiples based on NCFO and BV 
4) Multiples based on Trading Revenue 
 
Hypothesis Tests (H1a-c)  
Hypothesis H1a predicts that forecasted value drivers have lower valuation errors 
than historical value drivers. Table 5.2, Panel A, reveals that for acquirers, multiples 
based on forecasted earnings have the lowest median and mean absolute valuation 
errors for all the multiples examined in this study, as well as the smallest inter-
quartile range. Specifically, the median absolute valuation errors for these two 
multiples are within 20 percent of actual market capitalisation (17.22 percent for 
FEPS1, and 15.97 percent for FEPS2). Similarly, in Table 5.2, Panel B, for targets, 
multiples based on forecasted earnings have the lowest median absolute valuation 
errors of the multiples examined for both FEPS1 and FEPS2 (19.66 percent and 
19.00 percent respectively), with multiples based on FEPS2 additionally having the 
lowest mean and inter-quartile range. For both acquirers and targets the median, 
mean and inter-quartile range all improve when the forecast horizon moves from one 
year ahead (FEPS1) to two years ahead (FEPS2). As mentioned by Liu et al. (2002), 
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the superiority of forecasted earnings over historical value drivers is intuitively 
appealing as the former should reflect future profitability better than the latter, with 
accuracy improving as the forecast horizon increases. Thus, similar to prior research, 
this thesis finds evidence that multiples based on forecasted value drivers have 
higher valuation accuracy than multiples based on historical value drivers as 
predicted (hypothesis H1a).  
 
Hypothesis H1b predicts that value drivers closer to bottom line profit will have 
lower valuation errors than those closer to the income statement line item trading 
revenue. From Table 5.2, the median absolute valuation errors for multiples based on 
historical earnings metrics range from 0.2163 (EBITDA) to 0.2832 (NPAT after 
abnormals) for acquirers, and 0.2281 (NPAT before abnormals) and 0.2634 (NPAT 
after abnormals) for targets. Contrary to expectations, for both acquirers and targets, 
lower valuation errors are not entirely exhibited by value drivers closer to bottom 
line profit than those closer to the income statement line item trading revenue. For 
both samples, the EBITDA multiple (0.2163 for acquirers and 0.2299 for targets) has 
a lower median absolute valuation error than NPAT after abnormals, as well as 
NPAT before abnormals for acquirers. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the 
NPAT before abnormals multiple for targets has the lowest median absolute 
valuation errors of the historical measures examined. 
 
Additionally, there are some trends evident for historical multiples. First, for 
acquirers with the exception of the EBITDA multiple, there is a gradual 
improvement from the income statement line item trading revenue to EBIT, with 
EBT, NPAT before abnormals and NPAT after abnormals progressively showing 
larger absolute median valuation errors. This tends to indicate that acquirer firms 
have similar EBIT multiples to that of their industry, with differing value relevance 
of interest, tax and abnormals reflected in either the firm’s or comparable firms’ 
market capitalisation. This pattern is also evident in the acquirers’ inter-quartile 
range, though arching around the EBITA multiple instead.  
 
Second, for both acquirers and targets the absolute median and mean valuation error, 
standard deviation and inter-quartile range are highest for the multiple based on 
Trading Revenue. Specifically, the multiple based on Trading Revenue for acquirers 
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and targets is the only multiple in the sample with absolute median valuation errors 
over 40 percent (46.89 percent and 42.88 percent respectively). Thus, as mentioned 
by Schreiner and Spremann (2007), multiples based on earnings include some degree 
of pertinent information about profitability that is not contained in Trading Revenue.  
 
Third, a lower absolute median valuation error is exhibited by the multiple derived 
from NPAT before abnormals, as opposed to after abnormals. This may in part be 
due to the transitory nature of abnormals, which differ from year to year and may or 
may not be specific to a particular firm. As mentioned above, NPAT after abnormals 
has highest median absolute valuation errors of the historical earnings multiples 
examined. Comparing this to Schreiner and Spremann’s (2007) U.S. and European 
sample, bottom line earnings in an Australian takeover context more closely 
represents that of the European sample (where bottom line earnings ranks between 
EBIT and EBITDA) than that of the U.S. (where bottom line earnings has the lowest 
median absolute valuation errors of the historical earnings multiples examined). As 
Schreiner and Spremann (2007) remarked, the performance advantage of the bottom 
line earnings multiple in the U.S. is due to the popularity of the P/E ratio to market 
participants, noting also that Europe has varying company tax rates across its sample. 
As Australia has a standard tax rate for companies, the poor performance of bottom 
line earnings in Australia takeovers could be justified by the adverse effect of 
abnormals on valuation accuracy. 
 
Fourth, similar to both Lie and Lie (2002) and Baker and Ruback (1999) this thesis 
finds that multiples based on EBITDA for both acquirers and targets have higher 
valuation accuracy than EBIT based on the median absolute valuation error.  
 
Hypothesis H1c predicts that earnings value drivers (excluding trading revenue) have 
lower errors than value drivers based on NCFO. Consistent with expectations, both 
for acquirers and targets the median absolute valuation errors for each of the 
historical earnings multiples are lower than the corresponding median absolute 
valuation errors for NCFO, the latter having a median absolute valuation error of 
0.2840 for acquirers and 0.2796 for targets. Additionally, the absolute mean 
valuation error, standard deviation and inter-quartile range are higher for acquirers 
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multiples based on NCFO than for all of the historical earnings multiples, with the 
inter-quartile range also applying for the targets sample.  
 
Schreiner and Spremann (2007) also observe a similar phenomenon in their study, in 
which their cash flow multiples have higher absolute median and mean valuation 
errors and inter-quartile ranges compared to multiples based on historical measures. 
Although Liu et al. (2002) focus on signed valuation errors as opposed to absolute 
values, they document the highest standard deviation and inter-quartile range for 
their cash flow multiple compared to the rest of their equity multiples calculated. 
Accordingly, Liu et al. (2002) suggest that the NCFO multiple may not include some 
value relevant information that is found in accrual accounting. As such, this study 
finds supporting evidence for Hypothesis H1c. 
 
For the remaining multiples, multiples based on BV for both acquirers and targets 
have the second highest median absolute valuation error (behind multiple based on 
Trading Revenue), with 0.3043 for acquirers and 0.3131 for targets respectively. 
Multiples based on the Intrinsic Value perform a little better than BV, with a median 
absolute valuation error of 0.2853 for acquirers and 0.2593 for targets. Even though 
the multiple based on the Intrinsic Value incorporates the use of analyst forecasts, it 
can be seen that all historical earnings multiples have lower absolute valuation errors 
than the multiple based on the Intrinsic Value, except for the multiple based on 
NPAT after abnormals for targets.  
 
5.3.3 Summary of Findings for Hypotheses H1a-c 
Similar to prior research, this thesis finds evidence for the superior valuation 
accuracy of forecast earnings over historical earnings (hypothesis H1a), with the 
absolute valuation accuracy improving as the forecast horizon increases. As also 
observed in previous research, multiples based on historical earnings contain value 
relevant information that is not contained in the multiple based on NCFO, and as 
such, the former outperforms the latter in terms of absolute valuation accuracy 
(hypothesis H1c). However, there is mixed evidence for hypothesis (H1b). Although 
all historical earnings multiples are more accurate than the Trading Revenue 
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multiple, the EBITDA multiple displays a lower median absolute valuation errors 
than the NPAT after abnormals multiple. 
 
5.4 Misvaluation Results (RQ3) 
For each of the misvaluation hypotheses, an examination of the signed valuation 
errors is considered for both acquirers and targets, followed by the evaluation of 
estimations of P/V ratios in relation to the relevant hypothesis. Signed valuation 
errors for acquirers and targets are shown in Table 5.3, Panel A and B respectively, 
(that is before absolute values are taken). P/V estimations for acquirers and targets 
are listed in Table 5.4, Panel A and B respectively. Before doing so, it is pertinent to 
note the median (mean) actual P/V (that is, actual market capitalisation of the firm 
(actual P) divided by the intrinsic valuation of the firm using the residual income 
model (V)) for acquirers is 1.2932 (1.5559) and 1.0911 (1.2414) for targets (Table 
5.1, Panel A and B respectively). This result implies that, as expected, acquirers are 
more overvalued than targets.  
 
Research question 3 (RQ3) enquires which of the various multiple-based valuation 
methods is associated with greater misvaluation (as measured by high estimations of 
median P/V ratios). 
 
For acquirers, the following ranking is observed (from most to least over-valuation) 
in Table 5.4, Panel A: 
1) Multiples based on forecast earnings 
2) Multiples based on historical earnings and NCFO 
3) Multiples based on Trading Revenue and Intrinsic Value 
4) Multiples based on BV. 
 
For targets, the following ranking is observed (from most to least over-valuation) in 
Table 5.4, Panel B: 
1) Multiples based on Trading Revenue 
2) Multiples based on forecast earnings 
3) Multiples based on historical earnings and NCFO 
4) Multiples based on Intrinsic Value and BV. 
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5.4.1 Misvaluation Hypothesis Testing (Hypotheses H2a – H2c) 
Hypothesis H2a predicts that P/V estimates based on forecasted earnings multiples 
are closer to P/V ratios than those based on actual market capitalisation. The findings 
show in Table 5.3, Panel A, that acquirers have signed median valuation errors 
closest to zero for forecasted earnings multiples, which also corresponds with 
forecasted earnings multiples having the lowest absolute median valuation errors. 
Turning to acquirers P/V ratios in Table 5.4, Panel A, the P/V for multiples based on 
forecasted earnings (1.3288 (FEPS1) and 1.3082 (FEPS2)) are the closest P/Vs to 
actual P/V (1.2932) shown  in Table 5.1, Panel A, which is consistent with H2a. It 
can also be observed that as the forecast horizon increases from one year to two years 
ahead (FEPS1 to FEPS2), the closer the median P/V approaches actual P/V.  
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Table 5.3 
Signed Valuation Errors 
Panel A: Acquirers        
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
       
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fraction 
<.15 
Fraction 
<.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 147 -0.1248 0.1732 0.9725 -2.0576 3.9577 -0.2869 0.4666 0.7535 2.0270 0.1769 0.2789 
EBITDA 147 0.0407 0.0998 0.4165 -1.4295 3.0405 -0.1306 0.2974 0.4280 0.9225 0.3605 0.5374 
EBITD 147 0.0213 0.0943 0.4517 -1.5624 3.1101 -0.1009 0.2839 0.3848 0.9774 0.3605 0.4966 
EBITA 147 0.0463 0.1050 0.3724 -0.9368 0.9109 -0.1340 0.2875 0.4215 0.8765 0.3197 0.5442 
EBIT 147 0.0268 0.1199 0.4219 -1.3917 2.2692 -0.1097 0.2686 0.3783 0.9240 0.3197 0.5374 
EBT 147 -0.0024 0.0926 0.4363 -1.6539 3.0538 -0.1193 0.2830 0.4023 0.8737 0.3537 0.5510 
NPAT before 
abnormals 147 0.0498 0.0971 0.3638 -0.9437 0.4663 -0.0997 0.2920 0.3916 0.9804 0.3605 0.5170 
NPAT after abnormals 147 0.0867 0.1172 0.4348 -0.7481 0.8465 -0.0609 0.3529 0.4138 1.0712 0.3333 0.4762 
NCFO 147 0.0188 0.0902 0.5262 -1.0505 1.4887 -0.2175 0.3524 0.5698 1.3698 0.2925 0.4490 
BV 147 0.2212 0.2517 0.3493 -0.5208 0.0982 0.0274 0.4451 0.4178 0.8536 0.2517 0.4082 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
            Intrinsic Value 147 0.1436 0.1795 0.3487 -1.0324 1.0463 -0.0037 0.3808 0.3845 0.7533 0.3129 0.4830 
Forecast Value Driver 
            FEPS1 147 -0.0599 -0.0143 0.3994 -1.5426 3.4150 -0.1720 0.1713 0.3433 0.8435 0.4082 0.6463 
FEPS2 147 -0.0457 0.0415 0.4109 -2.3162 6.7537 -0.1532 0.1950 0.3482 0.7281 0.4490 0.6667 
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Table 5.3 continued 
Signed Valuation Errors 
Panel B: Targets 
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
      
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fraction 
<.15 
Fraction 
<.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 129 -0.8562 -0.1069 2.5803 -3.4738 12.4008 -0.6969 0.2626 0.9595 3.0996 0.2326 0.3566 
EBITDA 129 -0.2206 0.0346 0.9011 -2.7313 7.6263 -0.2278 0.2299 0.4576 1.4822 0.3953 0.5194 
EBITD 129 -0.2350 0.0411 0.9419 -2.8675 8.5614 -0.2630 0.2136 0.4766 1.4333 0.3721 0.5039 
EBITA 129 -0.1291 0.0225 0.6207 -1.9435 4.2304 -0.2732 0.2299 0.5032 1.1883 0.3566 0.4961 
EBIT 129 -0.1588 0.0458 0.7726 -2.3346 5.6211 -0.2277 0.2643 0.4920 1.3838 0.3178 0.5039 
EBT 129 -0.1624 0.0161 0.8373 -2.9882 9.8343 -0.2289 0.2669 0.4958 1.1986 0.3643 0.4961 
NPAT before 
abnormals 129 -0.0655 -0.0116 0.4971 -1.6367 4.0893 -0.2400 0.2193 0.4593 1.0697 0.3256 0.5581 
NPAT after abnormals 129 -0.0023 0.0171 0.5422 -0.9567 1.5399 -0.2036 0.3185 0.5222 1.2571 0.3101 0.4961 
NCFO 129 -0.1525 -0.0287 0.6940 -1.8409 4.8278 -0.3425 0.2106 0.5531 1.4202 0.2636 0.4574 
BV 129 -0.2903 0.0418 1.2849 -2.8251 8.0434 -0.2629 0.3734 0.6363 1.9464 0.2713 0.4186 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
            Intrinsic Value 129 -0.5051 0.0346 2.1854 -3.7903 13.3853 -0.2237 0.2787 0.5023 1.3024 0.3721 0.4961 
Forecast Value Driver 
            FEPS1 129 -0.1614 -0.0665 0.5797 -1.6381 3.8302 -0.3132 0.1207 0.4339 1.1462 0.3953 0.5814 
FEPS2 129 -0.0949 -0.0516 0.4202 -1.1270 2.8912 -0.2612 0.1422 0.4034 0.8397 0.4031 0.6047 
Notes 
            FEPS is Forecast Earnings Per Share. The number following relates to the forecast period (FEPS1 is one year ahead Forecast Earnings Per Share).  
 FEPS based on median analysts’ forecasts are selected. 
Other variables as described in Appendix C. 
        Fraction <.15 and <.25 refers to the percentage (expressed as a decimal) of those valuation errors with an absolute value between 0 and 0.15,  
 and 0 and 0.25 respectively. 
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Table 5.4 
Price to Intrinsic Value (P/V) Ratios 
Panel A: Acquirers      
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
     
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1
st
 
Quartile 
3
rd
 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Trading Revenue 147 1.7179 1.0322 1.8949 2.4510 5.7745 0.6493 1.8404 1.1911 3.7631 
EBITDA 147 1.4399 1.1432 1.0024 2.4578 6.7957 0.8241 1.7047 0.8806 1.6295 
EBITD 147 1.4334 1.1504 0.9053 1.9945 4.1933 0.8284 1.6839 0.8555 1.6898 
EBITA 147 1.4347 1.1164 0.9460 2.2487 5.1417 0.8544 1.5690 0.7145 1.8244 
EBIT 147 1.4482 1.1179 0.9612 2.4379 6.4799 0.8814 1.6483 0.7669 1.6940 
EBT 147 1.4580 1.1730 0.8675 2.0459 4.1003 0.9489 1.6158 0.6669 1.7483 
NPAT before abnormals 147 1.3644 1.1018 0.7014 1.6137 2.3054 0.9214 1.5658 0.6445 1.7057 
NPAT after abnormals 147 1.3019 1.0635 0.7595 1.3690 2.3613 0.8670 1.6035 0.7365 1.7072 
NCFO 147 1.4957 1.1299 1.1674 2.0093 4.4848 0.8165 1.7910 0.9744 2.1770 
BV 147 1.1145 0.9659 0.6543 1.5478 3.2029 0.7189 1.3999 0.6810 1.2938 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
          Intrinsic Value 147 1.1705 1.0111 0.4885 2.0116 4.2292 0.8892 1.3098 0.4206 0.8899 
Forecast Value Driver 
          FEPS1 147 1.5736 1.3288 0.8381 1.8066 3.4148 1.0386 1.8223 0.7837 1.7908 
FEPS2 147 1.5448 1.3082 0.7880 1.9747 4.6216 1.0092 1.7923 0.7831 1.6422 
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Table 5.4 continued 
Price to Intrinsic Value (P/V) ratios 
Panel B: Targets 
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
     
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Trading Revenue 129 2.1598 1.1980 3.5986 4.1979 17.9308 0.7885 2.0056 1.2171 3.0276 
EBITDA 129 1.3106 1.0611 0.7997 2.0605 4.3523 0.8630 1.4949 0.6319 1.4745 
EBITD 129 1.3397 1.0569 0.8653 1.9414 3.9090 0.8725 1.5349 0.6624 1.7044 
EBITA 129 1.2286 1.0919 0.6211 1.3085 2.3484 0.8602 1.5444 0.6842 1.2625 
EBIT 129 1.2661 1.0190 0.7929 1.9743 4.4693 0.8648 1.5514 0.6867 1.2211 
EBT 129 1.3538 1.0609 1.0884 2.7991 8.7440 0.8250 1.4528 0.6277 1.4490 
NPAT before abnormals 129 1.2331 1.0981 0.7241 1.7523 4.1277 0.8464 1.4303 0.5839 1.3706 
NPAT after abnormals 129 1.1853 1.0394 0.8327 1.5389 2.5838 0.7856 1.3664 0.5808 1.6610 
NCFO 129 1.3548 1.0751 0.9786 1.9160 3.8602 0.8034 1.5765 0.7731 1.8737 
BV 129 1.4847 0.9816 1.9102 4.1880 18.1345 0.7850 1.4470 0.6620 1.5331 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
          Intrinsic Value 129 1.5297 0.9954 2.2566 4.7439 21.5031 0.8996 1.2642 0.3646 0.8591 
Forecast Value Driver 
          FEPS1 129 1.4122 1.1488 0.9856 2.2123 5.6236 0.8860 1.5845 0.6985 1.7292 
FEPS2 129 1.3074 1.1165 0.6998 1.4048 2.1909 0.8976 1.6746 0.7770 1.5497 
Notes 
          FEPS is Forecast Earnings Per Share. The number following relates to the forecast period (FEPS1 is one year ahead Forecast Earnings Per 
Share).  
FEPS based on median analysts’ forecasts are selected. 
Other variables as described in Appendix C. 
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This latter point is consistent with the previously discussed observation that absolute 
median valuation errors for forecasted earnings converge closer to zero as the 
forecast horizon increases. The high median P/V ratios for forecasted earnings may 
also be influenced by the negative mean valuation errors reported in Table 5.3, Panel 
A.  
 
In contrast for targets, the case for multiples based on forecasted earnings for targets 
is not evident. Even though multiples based on forecasted earnings have the lowest 
absolute median valuation errors (Table 5.2, Panel B), a closer inspection of their 
median signed valuation errors in Table 5.3, Panel B, reveals the ranking of the 
forecasted earnings multiples as the second and third multiple furthest away from 
zero (-0.0665 (FEPS1) and -0.0516 (FEPS2)). Thus, it is no surprise that in Table 
5.4, Panel B, that many of the multiples based on historical earnings have closer 
median P/Vs to the median actual P/V of 1.0911. The negative nature of the signed 
median and mean valuation errors of multiples based on forecasted earnings in Table 
5.3, Panel B, are therefore also associated with the second and third most overvalued 
P/Vs in Table 5.4, Panel B (1.1488 (FEPS1) and 1.1165 (FEPS2)). Thus, H2a is 
supported for acquirers but not for targets.  
 
Note also, for both acquirers and targets, P/V estimates based on forecasted earnings 
multiples (along with Trading Revenue for targets) are the most over-valued of all 
the value drivers examined, even more than that of actual P/V. In the context of 
mergers and acquisitions, using forecasted earnings multiples to value an acquirer or 
target, will lead, on average, to higher over-valuations of the firm to the value 
observed on the stock market at the time of the takeover announcement. This over-
valuation is far more predominant in acquirers than in targets (note the median 
absolute valuation error of FEPS1 of 1.3288 of acquirers to that of 1.1488 for target 
firms). 
  
Hypothesis H2b predicts that multiples based on bottom line earnings will have 
lower estimates of P/V than those based on Trading Revenue, NCFO, BV and 
EBITDA. Contrary to expectation, the acquirer multiple based on Trading Revenue 
has the third highest median signed valuation error (Table 5.3, Panel A). Noting that 
a high positive median signed valuation error is associated with lower estimations of 
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P/V ratio, it is not surprising to see the acquirer multiple based on Trading Revenue 
has the third lowest P/V ratio of the ones examined in this thesis (Table 5.4, Panel 
A), that is, the third least overvalued value driver. In contrast, the target multiple 
based on Trading Revenue has the most negative signed median valuation error of 
the multiples examined (Table 5.3, Panel B), and, consistent with expectations, has 
the most overvalued median P/V ratio (Table 5.4, Panel B).  
 
In Table 5.3, Panel A, NCFO has the third lowest acquirer median signed valuation 
error (0.0902), and the most accurate of all historical value drivers based on median 
signed valuation error. This would normally be associated with a less overvalued P/V 
ratio, or alternatively, one close to that exhibited by the acquirers P/V (as 
documented in Table 5.1, Panel A). However, in Table 5.4, Panel A, the median P/V 
ratio based on the multiple for NCFO (1.1299) is the sixth most overvalued of the 
P/V ratios examined, falling roughly half way of the measures examined. This does 
show some signs of overvaluation, but as shown in Table 5.4, Panel A, there are 
three other historical value drivers that display higher degrees of overvaluation 
(EBT, EBITD and EBITDA). This ambiguous result may in part be tied to the 
multiple based on NCFO having the second largest standard deviation and 
interquartile range for both the signed valuation errors and P/V ratios. For targets, 
Table 5.3, Panel B, shows the median signed valuation for the multiple for NCFO (-
0.0287) is the fourth most negative. Thus, it is no surprise that there are five more 
multiples with median P/V ratios with greater overvaluation.  
 
For the BV multiple, Table 5.3, Panel A, shows that for acquirers the multiple has the 
most positive median signed valuation error (0.2517). This is normally associated 
with a low P/V ratio, and thus, opposite to expectations (H2b), the acquirer multiple 
for BV has the least overvalued P/V (0.9659) of all the P/V ratios examined (Table 4, 
Panel A). Similarly for targets, Table 5.3, Panel B, shows the BV multiple has the 
second most positive median signed valuation error (0.418), following EBIT. Once 
again, this is then associated with the least overvalued P/V (0.9816) as shown in 
Table 5.4, Panel B. 
 
For the EBITDA multiple, Table 5.3, Panel A, shows that for acquirers the multiple 
(0.0998) has six multiples with lower median signed valuation errors. Therefore, it is 
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no surprise (but contrary to prior expectations) that it ranks as the fifth most 
overvalued of the P/V ratios examined in Table 5.4, Panel A. Similarly for targets, 
Table 5.3, Panel B reveals that the EBITDA multiple (0.0346) has eight other 
multiples with lower median signed valuation errors and ranks as the seventh most 
overvalued of the P/V ratios examined (Table 5.4, Panel B).  
 
Hypothesis H2c predicts that multiples based on Intrinsic Value will have lower 
estimations of P/V than those based on earnings or cash flow. For acquirers, Table 
5.3, Panel A, shows the multiple based on Intrinsic Value has the second most 
positive median (0.1795) and mean (0.1436) signed valuation error (after BV). 
Therefore, consistent with expectation, Table 5.4, Panel A, shows the multiple based 
on Intrinsic Value has the second lowest median (1.0111) and mean (1.1705) P/V 
ratio (after BV). Likewise for targets, while Table 5.3, Panel A, shows there are three 
multiples (EBIT, BV, and EBITD) with more positive median signed valuation 
errors, the multiple based on Intrinsic Value has the second least overvalued P/V 
ratio (0.9954) in Table 5.4, Panel B, once again following BV.  
 
5.4.2 Summary of findings for Hypotheses H2a-c 
Mixed evidence is found for the hypothesis (H2a) that estimations of P/V using 
multiples based on forecasted earnings are close to P/V based on actual market 
capitalisation. While both acquirers and targets have the lowest median absolute 
valuation errors (Table 5.2), upon further investigation, only acquirers have the 
closest signed median valuation errors to zero for multiples based on forecasted 
earnings (Table 5.3, Panel A), whereas there are a number of multiples for targets 
that have signed median valuation errors closer to zero than the multiples generated 
from forecasted earnings (Table 5.3, Panel B). Continuing with targets, it would 
seem the relatively overvalued P/Vs based on multiples that use forecast earnings are 
due more to the negative nature of the median signed valuation errors than the 
closeness of the absolute valuation errors to zero. 
 
For hypothesis 2b, the target multiple based on Trading Revenue supports the 
hypothesis for higher overvaluation relative to bottom line earnings, with the 
multiple based on NCFO and EBITDA showing some evidence of overvaluation for 
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both acquirers and targets. The acquirer Trading Revenue and both acquirer and 
target BV multiples show evidence contrary to expectations, with high positive 
median valuation errors, as well as very low overvaluation ranks. 
 
Lastly, as observed for the multiple based on BV, the multiple based on the Intrinsic 
Value tends to have low values of the P/V ratio (suggesting the lower overvaluation), 
consistent with hypothesis H2c of this thesis. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the major findings in this chapter are: first, the majority of computed 
multiples examined exhibit valuation errors within 30 percent of stock market values. 
Second, and consistent with expectations, from a valuation accuracy point of view 
the results provide support for the superiority of multiples based on forecasted 
earnings in valuing targets and acquirers engaged in takeover transactions. Although 
a gradual improvement in estimating stock market values is not entirely evident 
when moving down the Income Statement, historical-earnings multiples perform 
better than multiples based on Trading Revenue or NCFO. Third, while multiples 
based on forecasted earnings have the highest valuation accuracy they, along with 
Trading Revenue multiples for targets, produce the most overvalued valuations for 
acquirers and targets. Consistent with predictions, greater overvaluation is exhibited 
for multiples based on Trading Revenue for targets, and NCFO and EBITDA for 
both acquirers and targets. Finally, as expected, multiples based Intrinsic Value 
(along with BV) are associated with the least overvaluation. 
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Table 5.5 
Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Research 
Question 
Hypotheses A/T Main Results Sensitivity Analyses 
    Historical Value 
Drivers 
Matched 
Acquirers and 
Targets 
One Year 
Ahead Market 
Capitalisation 
Two Year 
Ahead Market 
Capitalisation 
Three Year 
Ahead Market 
Capitalisation 
1. How 
accurate are 
various 
multiple-based 
valuation 
methods in 
valuing listed 
target and 
acquirer firms 
in Australia? 
 A All within 30% 
except Trading 
Revenue and BV 
 
All within 30% 
except Trading 
Revenue, BV and 
NCFO 
 
All within 30% 
except Trading 
Revenue 
All within 45% 
except Trading 
Revenue 
All within 50% 
except Trading 
Revenue and 
NCFO 
All within 55% 
except Trading 
Revenue and 
NCFO 
T All within 30% 
except Trading 
Revenue and BV 
All within 40% 
except Trading 
Revenue and 
NCFO. Only 
NPAT before 
abnormals within 
30% 
All within 30% 
except Trading 
Revenue 
N/A N/A N/A 
2. Which of 
the various 
multiple-based 
valuation 
methods are 
more accurate 
in valuing 
target and 
acquirer firms 
involved in 
takeovers in 
Australia? 
2. Which of  
H1a: Value drivers based on forecasted earnings have lower valuation errors than those based on historical value drivers. 
 A Supported N/A Supported Supported FEPS lower than 
all except EBT 
 
Supported 
T Supported N/A Supported for 
FEPS2 only 
N/A N/A N/A 
H1b: Value drivers closer to bottom line earnings (Net Income) have lower valuation errors than those closer to the Trading Revenue 
income statement line item. 
 A Not supported 
 
Not supported Not supported Not supported Not supported Not supported 
T Not supported Not supported Not supported N/A N/A N/A 
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Table 5.5 continued 
Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Research 
Question 
Hypotheses A/T Main Results Sensitivity Analyses 
    Historical Value 
Drivers 
Matched 
Acquirers and 
Targets 
One Year 
Ahead Market 
Capitalisation 
Two Year 
Ahead Market 
Capitalisation 
Three Year 
Ahead Market 
Capitalisation 
 H1c: Value Drivers based on Earnings (excluding Trading Revenue) have lower valuation errors than those based on net cash flow from 
operations (NCFO). 
 A Supported Supported NCFO higher 
than all except 
for EBITD 
 
Supported Supported Supported 
T Supported 
 
Supported Supported N/A N/A N/A 
3. Which of 
the various 
multiple-based 
valuation 
methods is 
associated 
with greater 
misvaluation 
(as measured 
by higher 
estimations of 
Price-to-
Intrinsic 
Value)? 
H2a: Estimations of P/V ratios using Forecasted Earnings Multiples are close to P/V ratios based on actual market capitalisation. 
 A Supported 
 
N/A Supported    
T Not supported 
 
N/A Not supported    
H2b: Estimations of P/V ratios based on bottom line earnings (net income) are lower than those based on: 
Trading 
Revenue 
A Not supported Not supported Supported    
T Supported 
 
Supported Supported    
NCFO 
 
A Supported Not supported Supported    
T Supported 
 
Supported Supported    
BV 
 
A Not supported Not supported Not supported    
T Not supported 
 
Supported Not supported    
EBITDA 
 
A Supported Supported Supported    
T Supported Supported Supported    
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Table 5.5 continued 
Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Research 
Question 
Hypotheses A/T Main Results Sensitivity Analyses 
    Historical Value 
Drivers 
Matched 
Acquirers and 
Targets 
One Year 
Ahead Market 
Capitalisation 
Two Year 
Ahead Market 
Capitalisation 
Three Year 
Ahead Market 
Capitalisation 
3. Which of 
the various 
multiple-based 
valuation 
methods is  
H2c: Estimations of P/V ratios based on Intrinsic Value multiples are lower than those based on: 
Earnings A Supported N/A Supported    
 T Supported 
 
N/A Supported    
Cash-flow A Supported N/A Supported    
 T Supported N/A Supported    
Note: A/T – Acquirer/Target 
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CHAPTER 6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
To test the robustness of the results in Chapter 5, all the prior comparative tests of the 
multiples are conducted under three alternative conditions. First, as Australia’s stock 
market only covers approximately two percent of the world market, only those firms 
which are large and well established are covered by I/B/E/S analysts, leading to 
potential survivorship bias. As such, to test the sensitivity of including I/B/E/S 
followed firms, the requirement that a firm requires analyst forecasts is relaxed. 
Second, acquirers are specifically matched with their targets, thus allowing 
comparison between an acquirer and its respective target. Third, rather than using a 
benchmark based on the actual market capitalisation, market capitalisation one, two 
and three years ahead from the adjusted announcement date, are used in the valuation 
analysis tests, thus seeing how accurate the estimated valuations are compared to 
future stock market values. 
 
6.2 Historical Value Driver Results 
The first section of the sensitivity analysis involves removing the restriction of the 
need of a firm to have I/B/E/S analyst forecasts, and thus excludes the value drivers 
of forecasted earnings per share (FEPS) one and two year ahead, as well as Intrinsic 
Value. This resulted in the number of acquirers increasing from 147 to 230, and 
likewise the targets from 129 to 269. Similar to the tests in Chapter 5, the absolute 
valuation accuracy of multiples is examined, followed by the price to Intrinsic Value 
(P/V) ratios. The absolute valuation errors are included in Table D.1 (tables for this 
chapter are found in Appendix D). Once again where applicable, Panel A and B of 
the tables refers to acquirers and targets respectively. Signed valuation errors are 
included in Table D.2, with P/V ratios in Table D.3. 
 
80 
6.2.1 Historical Absolute Valuation Accuracy of Multiples 
For acquirers and targets multiples, both the mean and median absolute valuation 
error is higher in every case where the requirement for analyst forecasts is relaxed.  
Similar to the original samples in Chapter 5, the mean absolute valuation errors are 
also greater than their equivalent medians.  
 
The rankings of both the acquirer and target historical multiples based on median 
absolute valuation error (Table D.1, Panel A and B) (thus, excluding multiples based 
on forecasted earnings) are similar to that observed in the original sample in Chapter 
5, and are as follows:  
1) Multiples based on historical earnings 
2) Multiples based on NCFO and BV 
3) Multiples based on Trading Revenue 
 
Research Question 1 (RQ1) asks how accurate are the various multiple-based 
valuation methods in valuing listed targets and acquirers in Australia. For acquirers, 
comparing the results in of Panel A in Table 5.2 (including analyst forecasts) and 
Table D.1 (excluding analyst forecasts), Table 5.2 shows that all except two 
multiples (Trading Revenue and BV) have median absolute valuation errors lower 
than 30 percent. The multiple based on NCFO (0.3390) can be added to this list when 
excluding the requirement for analyst forecasts. Contrast this with targets (Table D.1, 
Panel B), where not one of the multiples has a median absolute valuation error lower 
than 30 percent when the requirement for analyst forecasts is removed, compared 
with all multiples except Trading Revenue and BV in Table 5.2, Panel B. These 
additional firms are generally smaller and less profitable. Thus, in general, valuation 
accuracy decreases when the requirement for analyst forecasts requirement is 
relaxed.  
 
Suggesting that the additional firms (which are generally smaller and less profitable) 
have a greater impact on targets as opposed to acquirers, when analyst forecasts are 
not required, all acquirers historical multiples have lower median and mean absolute 
valuation errors, standard deviations and inter-quartile ranges, once again consistent 
with Alford’s (1990) observation of higher valuation accuracy for larger firms. 
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Research Question 2 (RQ2) asks which of the various multiple-based valuation 
methods are more accurate in valuing target and acquirer firms involved in takeovers 
in Australia. In the case of acquirers when relaxing the analyst forecast requirement, 
the multiple based on NPAT before abnormals has the lowest median absolute 
valuation error (0.2651), followed by the lowest historical earnings measure in Panel 
A of Table 5.2 – the multiple based on EBITDA (0.2727). Targets also have the 
multiple based on NPAT before abnormals as the lowest median absolute valuation 
error (0.2960) in Panel B of Table D.1, which was also the lowest of the historical 
earnings value drivers in Panel B of Table 5.2. 
 
Hypothesis H1b predicts that value drivers closer to bottom line profit will have 
lower valuation errors than those closer to the income statement line item trading 
revenue. Similar to the original sample, there is mixed evidence. Although the 
EBITDA multiple has lower median absolute valuation errors than the NPAT before 
abnormals multiple for both acquirer and targets, as mentioned above, the NPAT 
before abnormals multiple has the lowest median absolute valuation errors for both 
acquirers and targets when analyst forecasts are not required.  
 
Improving on the acquirers in the original sample, with the exception of the EBITDA 
multiple, when the analyst forecasts requirement is relaxed, there is a gradual 
improvement from the income statement line item trading revenue to NPAT before 
abnormals, with the inter-quartile range improving as you approach EBT from both 
trading revenue and NPAT after abnormals. Contrary to the original sample, the 
EBIT multiple also has a lower absolute median than EBITDA for targets. 
 
Hypothesis H1c predicts that earnings value drivers (excluding trading revenue) have 
lower errors than value drivers based on NCFO. This is observed for both acquirers 
and targets for absolute median and mean valuation errors, standard deviation and the 
inter-quartile range.  
 
6.2.2 P/V ratios of Historical Value Drivers 
Research Question 3 (RQ3) enquires which of the various multiple-based valuation 
methods is associated with greater misvaluation (as measured by higher estimations 
82 
of median Price-to-Intrinsic Value, P/V). The ranking observed (from most to least 
over-valuation) is consistent to the original sample for both acquirers and targets for 
the historical value drivers, and is as follows: 
 
 
 
Acquirers: 
1) Multiples based on historical earnings and NCFO 
2) Multiples based on Trading Revenue 
3) Multiples based on BV. 
Targets 
1) Multiples based on Trading Revenue 
2) Multiples based on historical earnings and NCFO 
3) Multiples based on BV. 
 
For Target P/V ratios, Table D.3, Panel B, shows there is a decrease in overvaluation 
as one moves conceptually down the profit and loss statement from Trading Revenue 
to EBT for median P/V ratios, and continuing conceptually down to NPAT after 
abnormals for mean P/V ratios. For targets where analyst forecasts are not required, 
this suggests that the closer the multiple is to Trading Revenue in the Income 
Statement, the more overvaluation is to be observed in the valuation of the firm.  
Similarly, the multiples based on EBT (0.9670), NPAT after abnormals (0.9776) and 
NPAT before abnormals (0.9912) all have lower median P/V ratios than the multiple 
based on BV and EBIT, the two least overvalued historical value drivers when 
analyst forecasts are required. Interestingly, this result for these three multiples 
would undervalue the target if used for valuation in these circumstances. 
 
Hypothesis H2b predicts that multiples based on bottom line earnings will have 
lower estimates of P/V than those based on Trading Revenue, NCFO, BV and 
EBITDA. The only difference from the original sample results for acquirers (Table 
D.3, Panel A) is the NCFO multiple has a lower P/V ratio than all the historical 
earnings P/V ratios (and hence bottom line earnings). Hence, this result is contrary to 
the prediction in this study and prior research.  Also, with the removal of the 
requirement of analyst forecasts, the NCFO-based P/V multiple becomes less over-
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valued, whereas the NPAT after abnormals-based P/V multiple demonstrates higher 
over-valuation. For targets, the only difference between samples (i.e. Panel B of 
Table D.3 and 5.4) is evidence that the P/V ratio calculated using the NPAT after 
abnormals multiple is lower than when the BV multiple is used.  
 
6.3 Matched Acquirer and Target Results  
The next section of sensitivity analysis tests investigate a restriction on the sample, in 
which only those acquirers and their matched targets which meet all the requirements 
in Chapter 4 will be examined. This allows for direct comparison with an acquirer 
and its matched target. Absolute valuation errors results for matched acquirers and 
targets are presented in Table D.4. Signed valuation errors for matched acquirers and 
targets are presented in Table D.5. This is followed by P/V ratios for matched 
acquirers and targets in Table D.6. 
 
It is interesting to note as the sample size drops considerably to 56 for both matched 
acquirers and targets, the valuation accuracy of the mean and median absolute 
valuation errors improves. This may be due to the restriction that both the acquirer 
and target now need to have analyst forecasts, and thus, the subsample will primarily 
comprise profitable targets being taken over by profitable acquirers. For acquirers, 
the greatest improvement in valuation accuracy (as measured by median absolute 
valuation accuracy) are the multiples based on Intrinsic Value (0.095 improvement), 
NPAT before and after abnormals (0.081 and 0.080 improvement), and EBT (0.069 
improvement). For targets, once again, the biggest improvement in valuation 
accuracy is the multiple based on Intrinsic Value (0.088 improvement), followed by 
EBITA (0.084 improvement), EBT (0.079 improvement) and EBIT (0.064 
improvement). These results are a slight improving on the original sample as both the 
acquirers and targets have median absolute valuation errors within 30 percent of 
stock market values for all multiples except Trading Revenue. 
 
Comparing acquirers to targets absolute valuation errors, the major difference 
between the original sample and when acquirers and targets are matched are that the 
median absolute valuation error for the multiples based on NPAT before and after 
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abnormals and NCFO are lower than their target counterpart, whereas the multiples 
based on EBITA, EBIT and BV are now higher than their target counterpart.   
 
6.3.1 Matched Acquirers and Targets Absolute Valuation Errors 
In answering RQ2, very similar rankings are observed for matched acquirers and 
targets, as to that obtained in the original sample. Forecasted earnings multiples still 
have lower valuation errors than historical multiples as observed in the original 
sample (and as hypothesised in H1a). However, despite the multiple based on FEPS2 
having the lowest mean (0.2070) and median (0.1546) absolute valuation error, three 
earnings multiples (EBITA, EBT and EBIT) and the multiple based on the Intrinsic 
Value have lower median absolute valuation errors than the multiple based on FEPS1 
for targets.  
 
Although the EBITDA multiple has lower valuation errors than the NPAT after 
abnormals multiple for both acquirers and targets (hypothesis H1b), with the 
exception of the multiple based on EBITD there is an observed increase in valuation 
accuracy as one moves conceptually from Trading Revenue (0.3990) to NPAT 
before abnormals (0.1573) for acquirers. This once again provided mixed evidence 
for hypothesis H1b. 
 
The only difference for hypothesis H1c between the matched acquirers and targets, 
and the original sample is that the EBITD multiple has a slightly higher median 
absolute valuation error (0.2521) than that of NCFO (0.2515) for targets. 
 
6.3.2 Matched Acquirers and Targets P/V Ratios 
It is important to note the actual P/V for both targets and acquirers when they are 
matched. For acquirers, the median P/V for the firms is 1.1571, with a mean of 
1.3537 (not tabulated). In the case of targets, the median P/V for the firms is 1.0087, 
with a mean of 1.2184 (not tabulated). These demonstrate lower over-valuation than 
that observed in the original sample. However, similarly to the original sample and 
the model proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), this thesis finds more over-
valued acquirers’ takeover slightly less over-valued targets.  
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In answering RQ3, the ranking observed (from most to least over-valuation) is 
relatively consistent to the original sample for both acquirers and targets, with the 
exception of the NCFO multiple for targets. This multiple displays the most over-
valuation (as measured by the median P/V ratio, 1.2031) of the multiples examined 
when the sample is reduced to targets being matched with their respective acquirer, 
an increase of 0.1280 from the original sample. 
 
Hypothesis H2a relates to the closeness of P/V ratios using multiples based on 
forecasted earnings to actual P/V (where actual market capitalisation is used as P).  
The results for the matched acquirers and target are consistent with those for the 
original sample, with acquirer forecasted earnings multiples having the closest 
median P/V ratios to actual P/V (supporting H2a). Also consistent with the original 
sample, many multiplies (especially BV) are closer to the actual P/V ratio than 
forecasted earnings (in particular FEPS1) for targets.  
 
For hypotheses H2b, the only observed difference between the matched acquirers 
and targets, and the original sample is the support for bottom-line earnings (net 
income) multiple for acquirers exhibiting a lower median P/V ratio than that for 
Trading Revenue. The median P/V ratio for the NPAT after abnormals multiple 
decreased 0.0435 when it is required that both the acquirer and target be valued using 
multiples (Table D.6, Panel A). 
 
Similar to the original sample, estimations of P/V ratios based on Intrinsic Value 
multiples are lower than those based on earnings and cash-flow for both acquirers 
and targets (hypothesis H2c). 
 
6.4 Future Market Capitalisation Results 
In this third set of sensitivity tests (and with the aid of hindsight), the absolute 
valuation accuracy of multiples is compared to one, two and three year ahead market 
capitalisation values, rather than current market capitalisation as used in the original 
sample. In other words, this tests how accurate the valuation using a comparable 
multiple is to the value of firm as exhibited on the stock market one, two and three 
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years after the announcement date. Targets are not considered because, unless an 
acquirer is unsuccessful, in the target becomes part of the acquirer. As expected, the 
number of firms examined also decreases as the time horizon for market 
capitalisation increases. Reasons for this include the acquirer becoming a target itself 
or merging with another company. Thus, the original sample size of 147 for acquirers 
falls to 146, 137 and 125 as the time horizon increases from one, two and three years 
respectively. Results for one, two and three year ahead market capitalisation are in 
Tables D.7, D.8 and D.9 respectively. 
 
Some pertinent trends are observed across the different cases. First, as the market 
capitalisation time horizon increases, so do the size of the mean and median absolute 
valuation errors. This is to be expected because as time increases so do the number of 
influences on a share price, thus making historical information and prior analyst 
forecasts increasingly less value relevant. Conversely, as time passes, the range 
between the median absolute valuation errors for the multiples examined diminishes 
from 0.2691 when using current stock market valuations as a benchmark, to 0.1573 
using one year ahead stock market valuation, 0.1428 two years ahead, and finally 
0.1272 for three years ahead stock market values. Thus the supremacy of a multiple 
to value a company becomes increasingly blurred over time. 
 
Another interesting observation is that in every case of different market 
capitalisation, using current market capitalisation as the estimate for the market 
capitalisation results in lower mean and median absolute valuation errors than all of 
the multiples examined. Thus, more relevant information is intrinsically encapsulated 
in a firm’s current market capitalisation than is held jointly in the industry forecasted 
earnings multiple and a firm’s forecasted earnings. 
 
6.4.1 Future Market Capitalisation Valuation Accuracy 
In answer to RQ1, when using median absolute valuation errors, all multiples (except 
the Trading Revenue multiple) have valuations on average within 45% of the stock 
market value exhibited one year ahead from the takeover announcement. As time 
moves on to the following year (two years from announcement), the valuations are 
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within 50% on average, and within 55% the year after (three years), both excluding 
the Trading Revenue and NCFO multiple. 
 
In answering RQ2, very similar rankings are observed to that in the original sample 
for each of the future market capitalisation cases. The main difference in ranking 
relates to H1a using two year ahead market capitalisation (Table D.8), where the 
EBT multiple has a lower median absolute valuation error (0.4317) than that 
observed for either FEPS1 (0.4521) and FEPS2 (0.4384). As the range of median 
absolute valuation errors across the multiples decreases, so does the extent of 
supremacy of forecasted earnings multiples. This tends to suggest that forecasted 
earnings multiples predictive power focuses on current and one year ahead 
valuations. Holding all other things constant, this also suggests the EBT multiple has 
just as much accuracy on average at predicting stock market value two year ahead as 
does the FEPS2 multiple. Nevertheless, the other two years (one year ahead (Table 
D.7) and three years ahead results (Table D.9)) support hypothesis H1a.  
 
For each year, the EBITDA multiple has a lower median absolute valuation error 
than NPAT after abnormals, though the EBT multiple (closer to bottom line earnings 
than to Trading Revenue) has a lower median absolute valuation error than EBITDA, 
and has the lowest of all median absolute valuation errors of the historical value 
drivers for one and two year ahead market capitalisation. Thus, similar to the original 
sample, mixed findings are exhibited for hypothesis H1b, and thus it is not entirely 
supported.  
 
Once again, all three years exhibit historical earnings value drivers with lower 
median absolute valuation errors than NCFO (supporting hypothesis H1c), though 
the difference is sometimes not too dissimilar.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results in Chapter 5 are predominantly robust to the alternative 
conditions examined in this chapter, namely: increasing of the sample size by 
removing the requirement for analysts’ forecasts; reducing the sample size by 
investigating acquirers and targets where both meet the requirements to have 
88 
sufficient information and comparable firms; and using one, two and three ahead 
stock market values as a benchmark for valuation analysis.  
 
Nevertheless, additional insights include the following: first, target firms’ valuation 
accuracy decreases with the inclusion of firms that are not followed by analyst 
forecasts (generally smaller and less profitable firms). Second, the valuation 
accuracy of an acquirer multiple diminishes over time when using one, two and three 
year ahead market capitalisation as a benchmark. Specifically, the supremacy of 
forecasted earnings multiples diminishes significantly when using two year ahead 
market capitalisation as a benchmark, with the EBT multiple displaying the same 
amount of valuation accuracy. This suggests the predictive power of forecasted 
earnings is most prevalent for current and one year ahead stock market capitalisation. 
Similarly, the range of valuation accuracies between the multiples declines as the 
benchmark projects into the future. Third, the stock market price at the time of the 
takeover announcement has higher valuation accuracy against one, two and three 
year ahead market capitalisation than all multiples examined, including forecasted 
earnings.   
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Summary  
Chapter 1 outlined the main motivations for this study, which include the prominent 
nature of takeovers (including their size in dollars); the persistent yet disputed long-
run underperformance of the acquirer after mergers and acquisitions; the widespread 
use of multiples in valuation practice; the various choices and resultant impacts in 
and on multiples; the lack of research in multiples used for takeover valuations; and 
the institutional differences that exist across countries that may contribute to 
differences in valuation approaches and post-acquisition performance. 
 
Chapter 2 identified and reviewed the prior literature. A notable finding in the prior 
literature was that the combined entities underperform for up to five years following 
a takeover (for example, see Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Brown, Dong, & 
Gallery, 2005; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). Apart from possible measurement 
issues, many reasons have been suggested for this long-run underperformance, 
including overconfidence of managers (over extrapolation or managerial hubris) 
(Rau & Vermaelen 1998; Roll 1986); method of payment (Travlos, 1987); and 
management and market fixation on earnings-per-share (EPS) myopia (Lys & 
Vincent, 1995). These reasons provide further justification for examining valuation 
multiples in the takeover context.  
 
Chapter 2 then reviewed studies on the use and valuation accuracy of multiples. 
These included studies investigating the accuracy of such multiple models against the 
accuracy of the discounted cash flow measure (Kaplan and Ruback, 1995; Finnerty 
and Emery, 2004; and Gilson et al. 2000); and the valuation accuracy of various 
multiples in general equity applications (Liu et al. 2002; Lie and Lie, 2002; and 
Schreiner & Spremann, 2007). Additionally, the literature review examined what is 
being valued (Finnerty & Emery, 2004; Kaplan & Ruback, 1995), the choice of value 
driver (Liu, Nissim, & Thomas, 2002; Schreiner & Spremann, 2007), the application 
of trailing or forward values (Kim & Ritter, 1999, Lie & Lie, 2002), and the selection 
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of the set of comparable firms (Alford, 1992; Bhojraj & Lee, 2002) and their 
influence on the valuation accuracy of a particular multiple.  
 
From this review an obvious gap emerged: apart from a study on highly leveraged 
buyouts, there has been no known research conducted on the application of multiples 
in the takeover context despite their frequent use and possible contribution to 
misvaluation in this context. Therefore, this study aimed to examine the main value 
drivers in valuing both targets as well as acquirers, to study the valuation accuracy of 
multiples within the relatively unexplored setting of Australia; and to research the 
association between valuation accuracy and misvaluation (as measured by P/V ratio) 
of various multiples. 
 
As a result of the gap identified in the prior literature,  research questions and 
hypotheses were developed in Chapter 3 relating to the valuation accuracy of 
multiples for companies involved in mergers and acquisitions, and the subsequent 
effect on the price-to-intrinsic value ratio (P/V) (the misvaluation proxy). Three 
research questions were established: 
1. How accurate are various multiple-based valuation methods in valuing firms 
involved in mergers and acquisitions? 
2. Which of the various multiple-based valuation methods are more accurate in 
valuing target and acquirers involved in takeovers? 
3. Which of the various multiple-based valuation methods is associated with 
greater misvaluation (as measured by higher estimations of Price-to-Intrinsic 
Value)?  
 
Hypotheses were then developed based on prior literature to address the research 
questions. In terms of valuation accuracy, these hypotheses predicted that value 
drivers based on forecasted earnings will have lower valuation errors than those 
based on historical value drivers (H1a); that value drivers closer to bottom line 
earnings (Net income) have lower valuation errors than those closer to the Trading 
Revenue income statement line (H1b); and that value drivers based on earnings 
(excluding Trading Revenue) have lower valuation errors than those based on net 
cash flow from operations (NCFO) (H1c). In terms of misvaluation, these hypotheses 
predicted that estimations of P/V ratios using forecasted earnings multiples are closer 
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to P/V ratios based on actual market capitalisation (H2a); that estimations of P/V 
ratios based on bottom line earnings (net income) are lower than those based on 
Trading Revenue, NCFO, BV and EBITDA multiples (H2b); and that estimations of 
P/V ratios based on Intrinsic Value multiples are lower than those based on earnings 
or cash flow based multiples.  
 
In Chapter 4 the research design used to test the research hypotheses was presented. 
Using a sample of Australian listed firms comprising 147 acquirers and 129 targets 
involved in takeovers announcements from 1 January 1990 to 31 December 2005 
procedures based on prior multiples-based research were developed. Valuation 
analysis would be used to investigate how accurate various multiple-based valuation 
methods are in valuing firms involved in mergers and acquisitions, as well as to 
determine which of the various multiple-based valuation methods are the most 
accurate. This would be followed by calculating a P/V ratio, where price is estimated 
using the various value drivers, and Intrinsic Value calculated from a residual income 
model. P/V ratios are then used to ascertain which multiple-based valuation methods 
are associated with greater misvaluation, with higher P/V ratios suggesting greater 
over-valuation. 
 
In Chapter 5, the hypotheses were tested. The major findings were: first, the majority 
of computed multiples examined exhibit valuation errors within 30 percent of stock 
market values. Second, and consistent with expectations, from a valuation accuracy 
point of view the results provide support for the superiority of multiples based on 
forecasted earnings in valuing targets and acquirers engaged in takeover transactions. 
Although a gradual improvement in estimating stock market values is not entirely 
evident when moving down the Income Statement, historical earnings multiples 
perform better than multiples based on Trading Revenue or NCFO. Third, while 
multiples based on forecasted earnings have the highest valuation accuracy they, 
along with Trading Revenue multiples for targets, produce the most overvalued 
valuations for acquirers and targets. Consistent with predictions, greater 
overvaluation is exhibited for multiples based on Trading Revenue for targets, and 
NCFO and EBITDA for both acquirers and targets. Finally, as expected, multiples 
based Intrinsic Value (along with BV) are associated with the least overvaluation. 
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These findings are predominantly robust to the alternative conditions examined in the 
sensitivity analysis in Chapter 6, namely: increasing of the sample size by removing 
the requirement for analysts’ forecasts; reducing the sample size by investigating 
acquirers and targets where both meet the requirements to have sufficient 
information and comparable firms; and using one, two and three ahead stock market 
values as a benchmark for valuation analysis. Nevertheless, three notable insights 
from the sensitivity analyses were observed. First, target firms’ valuation accuracy 
decreases with the inclusion of firms that are not followed by analyst forecasts 
(generally smaller and less profitable firms); Second, the valuation accuracy of an 
acquirer multiple diminishes over time when using one, two and three year ahead 
market capitalisation as a benchmark. Specifically, the supremacy of forecasted 
earnings multiples diminishes significantly when using two year ahead market 
capitalisation as a benchmark, with the EBT multiple displaying the same amount of 
valuation accuracy. This result suggests the predictive power of forecasted earnings 
is most prevalent for current and one year ahead stock market capitalisation. 
Similarly, the range of valuation accuracy between the multiples declines as the 
benchmark projects into the future. Third, the stock market price at the time of the 
takeover announcement has higher valuation accuracy against one, two and three 
year ahead market capitalisation than all multiples examined, including forecasted 
earnings.   
 
7.2 Discussion of Findings 
Inherently, there seems to be a trade-off between valuation accuracy and 
overvaluation for firms involved in mergers and acquisitions. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, mergers and acquisitions more predominantly occur during soaring (hot) 
equity markets and times of rapid credit expansion, referred to as takeover waves 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2008).  
 
Several studies finds combined entities underperform for up to five years following a 
takeover (for example, see Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Brown, Dong, & 
Gallery, 2005; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). Brown et. al. (2005) find long-run 
returns are over one- two- and three-year periods following the announcement are 
positively related to the acquirers’ misvaluation, as measured by V/P.  This 
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misvaluation has also been tied to the method of payment for the acquisition (Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh, 2006; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Travlos, 1987), 
where more over-valued acquirers use their stock as currency to buy less over-valued 
targets (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Similarly, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and 
Viswanathan (2005) find more acquisitions occur when an industry is overvalued, 
with the majority of these acquisitions undertaken by acquirers with the highest 
overvaluation. This is also consistent with both Schleifer and Vishney (2003) and 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) models of mergers and acquisitions where 
acquirers of overvalued firms take advantage of windows of opportunities presented 
by market inefficiencies. This disparity between price and intrinsic value, more 
especially evident during takeover waves, explains the reasons for the tradeoff 
between valuation accuracy and misvaluation.  
 
Multiples are frequently used to value acquirer and targets in mergers and 
acquisitions. One of the main findings of this study is because forecasted earnings 
multiples has predominantly the lowest valuation errors of all multiples examined (as 
demonstrated in this study, as well in previous studies, for example, see Kim and 
Ritter, 1999; Liu et. al., 2002), the resultant valuation will on average display the 
same amount (if not greater) over-valuation exhibited by stock market 
capitalisations. This increases the likelihood of over-paying for a target, and hence 
not realising anticipated gains from merger and acquisition on the side of the 
acquirer. This study also finds Trading Revenue, EBITDA and NCFO multiples will 
over-value the firm to various degrees. 
 
7.3 Limitations of Study 
Due to the stringent nature of including forecasted earnings as a value driver for 
comparability with other studies, similar to Liu et al. (2002) and Schreiner and 
Spremann (2007) this study has excluded many low and medium capitalised 
companies, though part of the sensitivity analysis sought to address this.  
 
To enable comparison across a range of multiples, it has been necessary to restrict 
the target and acquirer companies evaluated to those with positive values for each of 
the value drivers. This unavoidably biases the sample, and hence application of 
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results to profitable targets and acquirers. However, it is also understandable that 
firms with poor performance in the past (negative value drivers) are unlikely to be 
valued based on multiples, to avoid negative valuations. In order to ensure available 
data, a further restriction is that the targets and acquirers be listed companies, thus, 
possibly creating results that may or may not be generalisable to unlisted firms.  
 
As mentioned above, consistent with the studies of Dong et al. (2006) and Brown et 
al. (2005) to mitigate any effect of the takeover on share price, the value of market 
capitalisation used to calculate P/V ratios are taken at least 30 days before the 
announcement of the takeover. However as mentioned by Brown et al. (2005), this 
creates an arbitrary cut-off, as different takeovers in the sample may experience 
different levels of price adjustments due to differences in degrees of information 
leakages.  
 
7.4 Future Research 
Areas for future research include the valuation accuracy for various multiples for 
small market capitalisation stocks as opposed to their larger counterparts, as well as 
for emerging markets. Due to increased globalisation and foreign takeover bids, 
future research could also investigate company and transaction multiples for takeover 
companies across countries. Such research could involve using a combination of 
domestic and international companies as comparable firms in the calculation of a 
firm’s value. Future studies could examine the justification for adjustments to 
multiples in practice, as well as theoretically investigating the ideal adjustments to 
reflect appropriate valuation. These include adjustments for the characteristics 
specific to a merger and acquisition setting, including the inclusion of the control 
premium to the target valuation, similar to the adjusted company valuation method in 
Finnerty and Emery (2004), or adjusting the multiple for potential synergies. Future 
research could also examine whether there is evidence that sorting firms on 
valuations based on different multiples leads to a greater (or lower) return subsequent 
to the business combination, and how this compares to firms not involved in mergers 
and acquisitions. As long as multiples continue to play such a prominent role in 
company valuation, there will be an ongoing demand for research into their accuracy 
and effectiveness.    
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7.5 Contribution 
This study contributes to the valuation accuracy literature for a much discussed and 
studied group of firms, those involved in mergers and acquisitions. Although 
valuation accuracy has been explored in general settings (Liu et al. 2002), this study 
examines a cross section of equity multiples for both acquirers and targets. 
Consistent with prior literature (Kim and Ritter, 1999; Liu et. all, 2002), this thesis 
also finds the supremacy of forecasted earnings from a valuation accuracy point of 
view, as well as historical earnings multiples performing better than multiples based 
on Trading Revenue or NCFO. 
 
However the greater contribution to prior literature is the link between two bodies of 
literature, namely valuation accuracy of common multiples and company 
misvaluation in takeovers contexts. Specifically, the finding that the best performing 
multiple (forecasted earnings) appears to display the same, if not greater, over-
valuation than that observed on the stock market at the time of takeover 
announcement. Given the dominance of the multiples in takeovers valuations, this 
valuation approach is likely to be contributing to the persistent underperformance of 
acquirers. As this study highlights the relative differences in valuation accuracy of 
multiplies, if multiples are used, both their valuation accuracy and misvaluation 
should be carefully considered in determining which multiple to apply. 
 
From a practitioner perspective, the study’s findings are potentially instructive to a 
wide range of interested parties, including investment bankers, current and future 
shareholders, management of acquirers and targets, analyst, creditors and regulators. 
First, it is anticipated this study will assist investment bankers in their valuation of 
takeovers, by providing useful research about the valuation accuracy and 
misvaluation of various multiples.  
 
Similarly, the findings are potentially useful to other market participants who rely on 
this information to make decisions in takeovers contests. These include current and 
future shareholders and investors of both the target and the bidder, who use 
information provided in independent expert reports (or fairness opinions in the U.S.) 
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to make decisions. Current shareholders in the target are likely to benefit from more 
correct valuation methods that will assist in making more informed decisions about 
whether to accept or reject an offer from a bidder, or alternatively understand better 
the potential misvaluation implications of a certain multiple choice in valuation 
documents. Likewise acquirers would benefit from more correct valuation methods 
with appropriate value drivers including the decision of whether to continue to 
pursue the acquisition, or withdraw the offer, with their shareholders being more able 
to determine whether the future acquisition will add value to the bidder company. 
Future shareholders of the combined (merged) entity will potentially benefit from 
using the study’s findings in choosing among alternative valuation models in 
independent expert reports in making decisions about current and future share price.  
 
Analysts are also likely to benefit, as the study’s findings could assist them in their 
predictions about the combined entity’s share price by being better informed about 
information contained in valuation methods. Indeed, even creditors could benefit 
from the findings in their decisions concerning the combined entities potential to 
repay any additional money borrowed by the combined entity to fund the acquisition. 
Lastly, regulators could also find the study’s findings useful in their determination of 
appropriate valuation methods required in independent expert reports. Thus, it is 
anticipated investment bankers, shareholders, investors, analysts, creditors and 
regulators could potentially benefit from more accurate multiple valuation methods 
from this thesis’ findings. 
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APPENDIX A 
RESIDUAL INCOME VALUE (V) PARAMETER CALCULATION 
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where Vt = Residual Model at time t 
 BVt = Book value at time t 
 FROEt = Forecasted ROE at time t 
 re = Cost of Equity 
 
Current Book Value (BV) 
The BV of the firm is obtained from the Morningstar FinAnalysis database. To 
ensure that BV does not include items that are more characteristic of liability than 
equity, BV is calculated as total shareholder’s equity (FinAnalysis Financial Item # 
7010) less convertible equity (FinAnalysis Financial Item # 7015) and preference 
shares (FinAnalysis Financial Item # 201). The BV at the end of the previous 
financial year prior to the takeover is used in calculations. 
 
Dividend payout ratio (k) 
The dividend payout ratio is the portion of net income that is distributed in the form 
of dividends each year. Firm specific estimates of k are obtained by either (1) 
dividing the ordinary dividends (that is, excluding any special dividends) in the most 
recent year (FinAnalysis Financial Item # 8060 multiplied by FinAnalysis Financial 
Item # 9500) by reported net profit after tax (NPAT) after abnormals (FinAnalysis 
Financial Item # 8036), or (2) dividing ordinary dividends per share by reported 
NPAT per share (FinAnalysis Financial Item # 8050), depending on the data 
availability. Both of these methods yield similar results. Similar to Frankel and Lee 
(1998), Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) and Brown, Dong and 
Gallery (2005), dividends are divided by six percent of total assets to estimate a 
payout ratio for those firms with negative earnings. Brown et al. (2005) also observe 
that the average return on assets for their Australian sample was 6.8 percent. The 
equation for k is as follows: 
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where DPSt = Dividends per share during period t 
 EPSt = Reported NPAT after abnormals (earnings) 
per share in period t 
 
Future BV required in the residual income value equation can then be calculated 
using current BV, estimated k and ROE, as per the following formula: 
BVt+1 = BVt [1 + (1-k)ROEt]   (A.3) 
 
Future return on equity (ROE) forecasts 
This study employs two alternative methods of deriving a forecast of future return on 
equity (ROE) forecasts. First, this study uses prior period ROE and assumes that 
ROE will remain the same in all future periods. This is consistent with the reasoning 
that the best earnings estimate for the next period is the current period’s earnings. 
Fairfield, Sweeney and Yohn (1996) find evidence of this, with their results showing 
a 66 percent positive correlation between the current year’s ROE and next year’s 
ROE. Under the first method, ROE is derived by dividing earnings (Aspect Huntley 
Financial Item # 8036) by BV. 
 
Similar to Frankel and Lee (1998), Ali, Trombley and Hwang (2003) and Brown et 
al. (2005), report NPAT after abnormals are employed as the earnings item. Once 
again, where firms have negative earnings for the period, ROE calculations use 
earnings estimate based on six percent of assets, similar to Brown et al. (2005). BV is 
based on the average BV in the firm’s financial reports in the two years prior to the 
takeover transaction, or in other words, opening and closing BV corresponding to the 
earnings figure used. Using average BV reduces the chance of an extremely low 
denominator in ROE calculations. 
 
The second method of deriving future ROE is based on analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
I/B/E/S provides monthly analysts’ forecasts for earnings per share (FEPS) for one 
(FEPS1), two (FEPS2), and three years (FEPS3) ahead. The median forecast made in 
the month corresponding to at least 30 days prior to the transaction is used in this 
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study (the same month as observations are drawn for the cost of capital and also 
market capitalisation, or share price). All sample firms are required to have at least 
one year ahead FEPS1 forecast for use of this method. Also, to ensure forecasts are 
not stale, this study requires forecast earnings per share (FEPS) to be based on the 
forecasts of at least three analysts. FROEt is calculated by dividing FEPSt by its 
corresponding prior period average BV per share. FROE, along with the firm’s 
dividend payout ratio (k), and prior period’s BV are then used in calculating future 
BV.  
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BVt+1 = BVt [1 + FROEt (1 – k)]  (A.5) 
 
where FROEt = Forecast ROE for period t 
 FEPSt = Forecast EPS for period t 
 BV = Book value per share 
 K = Dividend payout ratio 
 
In cases where there are missing FEPS2 and FEPS3, forecast ROE is calculated on 
the assumption that the prior period’s FROE will persist into the future (similar to the 
assumption of ROE in the first method). 
 
Comparable with Frankel and Lee (1998, this study limits ROEs and FROEs equal to 
or less than 100 percent. However, rather than unnecessarily eliminating such firms 
exceeding this limit as does the previous study, winsorising is used to reduce such 
calculations to 100 percent. 
 
Cost of equity capital 
A firm’s cost of equity (Re) reflects the minimum return that is necessary to 
compensate investors for investing in that firm, given the level of risk involved. The 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is used by this study to calculate a firm specific 
risk profile.  
 
re = rf + β(rm –  rf)       (A.6) 
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where re = Firm’s cost of capital 
 rf = Risk free rate of interest 
 Β = Firm specific OLS Beta estimates 
 rm = Market return 
 
The risk free rate is proxied by the 10 year Treasury Bond.  Similar to Brown et al. 
(2005), this study uses six percent as the market premium (rm –  rf). Officer (1994) 
documented six percent as the long-term market premium in Australia. Historical 
market index returns such as the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index also are subject 
to vast volatility, including the bull market of the 1980s which caused the stock 
market to triple over the decade, followed by the bearish market in the 1990s that had 
significantly lower returns. 
 
Monthly Firm specific Beta estimates (β) are calculated using Ordinary Least 
Squares calculation, using monthly return data for the last four years. Similar to 
Dong et al. (2006), the last two years of monthly returns are used where there is not 
enough data. Average industry betas are also used where neither of the two previous 
situations are met.  
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where  Β = Firm specific OLS Beta estimates 
  X = Firm monthly return 
 x  = Average Firm monthly return 
  Y = Market monthly return 
 y  = Average Market monthly return 
 
To avoid unrealistic cost of equity calculations, Firm specific Beta estimates (β) and 
average industry betas are capped between 0 and 3. Further, similar to Dong et al. 
(2006) cost of capital estimates are also capped within the range of 3-30 percent.  
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This study assumes that residual income will be equal to zero for those firms with 
diminishing residual income model calculations (most often observed when ROE or 
FROE is less than cost of capital (Re)). It is reasonable to expect the cost of capital is 
achieved by a firm in order to survive, or alternatively that it is difficult to expect 
firms will generate negative residual income for an indefinite period. This is also 
confirmed in general by firm’s earnings tending to mean revert to its cost of capital 
(Brown, Gallery, and Goei, 2006). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B.1 
Morningstar FinAnalysis Financial Items Description 
Item Number Description 
201 Preference Shares 
5090 Total Assets 
7010 Total Shareholders’ Equity 
7015 Convertible Equity (balance sheet) 
7070 Trading Revenue 
7090 Total Revenue (excluding interest revenue) 
8000 EBITDA 
8003 Depreciation 
8005 Total Amortisation 
8012 EBIT 
8014 Interest Revenue 
8020 Reported NPAT before abnormals 
8036 Reported NPAT after abnormals 
8050 Reported EPS after abnormals 
8060 DPS – ordinary excluding special dividends 
9100 Net cash flow from operations 
9500 Total Shares Outstanding 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C.1 
Description of Multiples 
Value Driver Description 
Historical Value Drivers  
Total Revenue Total Revenue 
Trading Revenue Trading Revenue 
EBITDA 
Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortisation 
EBITD Earnings before interest, tax and depreciation 
EBITA Earnings before interest, tax and amortisation 
EBIT Earnings before interest and tax 
EBT Earnings before tax 
NPAT before abnormals Net profit after tax before abnormals 
NPAT after abnormals Net profit after tax after abnormals 
NCFO Net cash flows from operations 
BV Book value 
Intrinsic Value Driver  
Intrinsic Value Based on the model in Appendix A 
Forecast Value Driver  
FEPS1 Forecasted earnings one period ahead 
FEPS2 Forecasted earnings two periods ahead 
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APPENDIX D 
ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
Table D.1 
Absolute Valuation Errors for Historical Value Drivers 
Panel A: Acquirers       
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
      
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fraction 
<.15 
Fraction 
<.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 230 0.8197 0.4723 1.1926 3.2929 11.3585 0.2535 0.7498 0.4962 1.7086 0.1522 0.2522 
EBITDA 230 0.3803 0.2727 0.3531 1.6921 3.1100 0.1226 0.5357 0.4131 0.6887 0.3043 0.4565 
EBITD 230 0.3834 0.2938 0.3638 1.8468 3.8429 0.1194 0.5337 0.4143 0.6706 0.3087 0.4391 
EBITA 230 0.3990 0.2967 0.4102 2.4411 7.1333 0.1319 0.5089 0.3770 0.6584 0.2783 0.4435 
EBIT 230 0.3979 0.2870 0.4296 2.7954 9.1663 0.1440 0.5030 0.3590 0.6408 0.2652 0.4435 
EBT 230 0.3898 0.2789 0.4294 2.4269 6.2282 0.1238 0.4761 0.3522 0.7117 0.3087 0.4696 
NPAT before 
abnormals 230 0.3550 0.2651 0.3502 2.0298 4.8408 0.1089 0.4825 0.3736 0.6293 0.3348 0.4783 
NPAT after abnormals 230 0.4118 0.2960 0.4097 1.8988 4.1356 0.1061 0.5562 0.4501 0.8622 0.3130 0.4304 
NCFO 230 0.4787 0.3390 0.4550 1.7634 3.4243 0.1474 0.6643 0.5169 0.8822 0.2565 0.3913 
BV 230 0.3542 0.3257 0.2362 0.4060 -0.9012 0.1538 0.5166 0.3628 0.6850 0.2478 0.3957 
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Table D.1 continued 
Absolute Valuation Errors for Historical Value Drivers 
Panel B: Targets       
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
      
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fraction 
<.15 
Fraction 
<.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 269 2.9598 0.5887 8.0764 4.2366 17.5233 0.2412 1.4972 1.2560 4.9384 0.1636 0.2602 
EBITDA 269 0.6162 0.3399 0.8501 2.7447 7.5530 0.1338 0.6887 0.5549 1.3055 0.2862 0.4015 
EBITD 269 0.5674 0.3597 0.7005 2.6192 7.1951 0.1449 0.6643 0.5195 1.1110 0.2639 0.3866 
EBITA 269 0.5334 0.3537 0.6069 2.2570 5.4103 0.1397 0.6843 0.5445 1.0553 0.2788 0.3978 
EBIT 269 0.5232 0.3066 0.6233 2.3395 5.5540 0.1422 0.6533 0.5111 1.0664 0.2714 0.4201 
EBT 269 0.5202 0.3076 0.6864 2.9726 9.9224 0.1281 0.6313 0.5033 1.0934 0.2751 0.4089 
NPAT before 
abnormals 269 0.4471 0.2960 0.4665 2.0492 4.4858 0.1470 0.6043 0.4574 0.8124 0.2602 0.4424 
NPAT after abnormals 269 0.4757 0.3675 0.4358 1.7714 3.2236 0.1553 0.6301 0.4748 0.8588 0.2416 0.3978 
NCFO 269 0.7143 0.4387 0.9089 2.3899 5.2360 0.1882 0.7860 0.5978 1.6457 0.1933 0.3271 
BV 269 0.9820 0.3820 2.2149 4.3904 19.5925 0.2108 0.7137 0.5028 1.7282 0.1970 0.3346 
Notes 
            This table excludes the requirement for analysts’ forecasts, thus excluding FEPS1 and FEPS2, and Intrinsic Value. 
Variables as described in Appendix C. 
Fraction <.15 and <.25 refers to the percentage (expressed as a decimal) of those valuation errors with an absolute value between 0 and 0.15,  
 and 0 and 0.25 respectively. 
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Table D.2 
Signed Valuation Errors for Historical Value Drivers 
Panel A: Acquirers       
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
      
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fraction 
<.15 
Fraction 
<.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 230 -0.3241 0.1444 1.4112 -2.6689 7.7800 -0.4713 0.4672 0.9385 2.5006 0.1522 0.2522 
EBITDA 230 -0.0119 0.0797 0.5194 -1.2270 1.5619 -0.1927 0.3251 0.5178 1.2449 0.3043 0.4565 
EBITD 230 -0.0185 0.0844 0.5288 -1.3348 1.8955 -0.1996 0.3300 0.5296 1.2757 0.3087 0.4391 
EBITA 230 -0.0461 0.0745 0.5710 -1.6428 3.4621 -0.2618 0.3093 0.5711 1.2253 0.2783 0.4435 
EBIT 230 -0.0476 0.0813 0.5842 -1.9074 4.7051 -0.2111 0.2960 0.5071 1.1701 0.2652 0.4435 
EBT 230 -0.0824 0.0538 0.5746 -1.7513 3.2986 -0.2474 0.2920 0.5395 1.2380 0.3087 0.4696 
NPAT before 
abnormals 230 -0.0281 0.0691 0.4984 -1.4387 2.3795 -0.1575 0.2839 0.4414 1.1547 0.3348 0.4783 
NPAT after abnormals 230 -0.0240 0.0788 0.5811 -1.3323 2.2188 -0.2259 0.3142 0.5401 1.3107 0.3130 0.4304 
NCFO 230 -0.0566 0.0650 0.6587 -1.2291 1.5133 -0.2867 0.4036 0.6903 1.5947 0.2565 0.3913 
BV 230 0.1704 0.2235 0.3907 -0.5196 -0.1626 -0.0651 0.4391 0.5042 1.0698 0.2478 0.3957 
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Table D.2 continued 
Signed Valuation Errors for Historical Value Drivers 
Panel B: Targets       
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
      
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fraction 
<.15 
Fraction 
<.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 269 -2.6356 -0.2365 8.1883 -4.1690 17.0905 -1.4972 0.2626 1.7598 5.6426 0.1636 0.2602 
EBITDA 269 -0.3288 -0.0510 0.9977 -2.1799 5.0603 -0.5355 0.2299 0.7654 1.8794 0.2862 0.4015 
EBITD 269 -0.2468 -0.0224 0.8676 -1.9110 4.1618 -0.4860 0.2751 0.7610 1.7144 0.2639 0.3866 
EBITA 269 -0.2093 -0.0080 0.7811 -1.5735 2.7762 -0.4725 0.2794 0.7519 1.6807 0.2788 0.3978 
EBIT 269 -0.1635 0.0382 0.7978 -1.7432 3.2288 -0.3293 0.3041 0.6334 1.7398 0.2714 0.4201 
EBT 269 -0.1449 0.0161 0.8495 -2.2512 6.2936 -0.2982 0.3094 0.6076 1.7815 0.2751 0.4089 
NPAT before 
abnormals 269 -0.0682 0.0158 0.6431 -1.3935 2.3874 -0.2721 0.3189 0.5910 1.4625 0.2602 0.4424 
NPAT after abnormals 269 -0.0295 0.0791 0.6451 -1.1622 1.5021 -0.2758 0.4357 0.7115 1.5198 0.2416 0.3978 
NCFO 269 -0.3612 -0.0681 1.0987 -1.8473 3.2254 -0.6110 0.3080 0.9190 2.3152 0.1933 0.3271 
BV 269 -0.6306 -0.0293 2.3398 -4.0925 17.5521 -0.5454 0.3223 0.8678 2.3330 0.1970 0.3346 
Notes 
            This table excludes the requirement for analysts’ forecasts, thus excluding FEPS1 and FEPS2, and Intrinsic Value. 
Variables as described in Appendix C. 
Fraction <.15 and <.25 refers to the percentage (expressed as a decimal) of those valuation errors with an absolute value between 0 and 0.15,  
 and 0 and 0.25 respectively. 
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Table D.3 
Price to Intrinsic Value (P/V) Ratios for Historical Value Drivers 
Panel A: Acquirers      
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
     
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 75%-25% 90%-10% 
Historical Value Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Trading Revenue 230 1.6705 1.0624 1.8027 2.4847 6.3085 0.6461 1.9057 1.2596 3.3531 
EBITDA 230 1.3203 1.1023 0.7599 1.4415 2.3620 0.7966 1.6215 0.8249 1.6344 
EBITD 230 1.3196 1.1316 0.7597 1.4901 2.4310 0.7988 1.6755 0.8767 1.5884 
EBITA 230 1.3580 1.1281 0.8004 1.5605 2.5820 0.8369 1.6520 0.8150 1.8154 
EBIT 230 1.3315 1.1228 0.7362 1.4640 2.2638 0.8760 1.6230 0.7470 1.6913 
EBT 230 1.3905 1.1771 0.7875 1.8129 3.5622 0.9345 1.6283 0.6939 1.5644 
NPAT before abnormals 230 1.3078 1.1101 0.6383 1.1314 0.7912 0.9089 1.5762 0.6673 1.6372 
NPAT after abnormals 230 1.2554 1.0955 0.6506 0.9978 1.2646 0.8711 1.5740 0.7029 1.5565 
NCFO 230 1.3783 1.0852 0.9723 1.5542 2.4739 0.7786 1.7556 0.9770 2.2660 
BV 230 1.0678 0.9797 0.5691 0.8867 0.9572 0.6764 1.3895 0.7131 1.3060 
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Table D.3 continued 
Price to Intrinsic Value (P/V) Ratios for Historical Value Drivers 
Panel B: Targets      
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
     
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 75%-25% 90%-10% 
Historical Value Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Trading Revenue 269 3.3539 1.3308 6.4605 3.3181 10.2491 0.7885 2.2689 1.4804 5.2956 
EBITDA 269 1.3360 1.0914 0.9350 2.0215 4.1869 0.8234 1.5100 0.6867 1.6657 
EBITD 269 1.2581 1.0621 0.7961 1.6294 2.9749 0.8232 1.4204 0.5972 1.6459 
EBITA 269 1.2206 1.0543 0.7228 1.4678 2.4207 0.8088 1.5044 0.6956 1.4657 
EBIT 269 1.1715 1.0045 0.7165 1.6114 2.9689 0.8104 1.4164 0.6060 1.4157 
EBT 269 1.1472 0.9670 0.7852 1.8482 4.0491 0.7046 1.3629 0.6584 1.4941 
NPAT before abnormals 269 1.0852 0.9912 0.6261 1.3804 2.8519 0.6984 1.3108 0.6124 1.3686 
NPAT after abnormals 269 1.0681 0.9776 0.6642 1.2386 2.0650 0.6468 1.3259 0.6790 1.4742 
NCFO 269 1.4330 1.1000 1.1904 2.0241 4.4861 0.6997 1.6833 0.9836 2.6039 
BV 269 1.6300 1.0423 2.3084 3.9823 15.6788 0.7894 1.5328 0.7434 1.6113 
Notes 
This table excludes the requirement for analysts’ forecasts, thus excluding FEPS1 and FEPS2, and Intrinsic Value. 
Variables as described in Appendix C. 
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Table D.4 
Matched Absolute Valuation Errors 
Panel A: Acquirers       
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
      
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fraction 
<.15 
Fraction 
<.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 56 0.5522 0.3990 0.6360 2.5498 6.6713 0.1816 0.6029 0.4213 1.0318 0.2321 0.3214 
EBITDA 56 0.2516 0.2004 0.2044 1.3823 2.1008 0.1082 0.3393 0.2310 0.4976 0.3929 0.5893 
EBITD 56 0.2684 0.2521 0.2166 1.1725 1.3984 0.0923 0.3815 0.2892 0.5116 0.3929 0.5000 
EBITA 56 0.2343 0.1981 0.1650 0.7391 -0.2219 0.1034 0.3571 0.2537 0.4032 0.3750 0.6071 
EBIT 56 0.2453 0.1936 0.1807 0.6825 -0.4267 0.1091 0.3492 0.2402 0.5045 0.3571 0.5714 
EBT 56 0.2377 0.1629 0.2103 1.4487 1.9239 0.0866 0.3481 0.2615 0.4362 0.4464 0.6071 
NPAT before 
abnormals 56 0.1941 0.1573 0.1376 0.5939 -0.7861 0.0777 0.2868 0.2091 0.3705 0.4643 0.6964 
NPAT after abnormals 56 0.2527 0.2032 0.2165 1.1227 0.6935 0.0829 0.3542 0.2713 0.5242 0.4107 0.6250 
NCFO 56 0.3523 0.2515 0.3533 2.4993 7.8568 0.1179 0.5044 0.3865 0.6274 0.3393 0.4821 
BV 56 0.3222 0.2996 0.2254 0.8010 -0.1470 0.1587 0.4160 0.2573 0.6626 0.2143 0.4286 
Intrinsic Value Driver             
Intrinsic Value 56 0.2869 0.1908 0.2341 0.7732 -0.4302 0.0900 0.4688 0.3788 0.5833 0.3750 0.5536 
Forecast Value Driver             
FEPS1 56 0.2120 0.1360 0.2548 2.6075 7.1796 0.0602 0.2594 0.1992 0.3768 0.5357 0.7321 
FEPS2 56 0.1987 0.1267 0.2315 2.7103 7.8836 0.0688 0.2384 0.1696 0.3537 0.5179 0.7500 
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Table D.4 continued 
Matched Absolute Valuation Errors 
Panel B: Targets       
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
      
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fraction 
<.15 
Fraction 
<.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 56 0.8366 0.4547 1.1523 2.2911 5.0019 0.1528 0.7857 0.6329 2.2906 0.2321 0.3571 
EBITDA 56 0.3315 0.2042 0.5422 4.0294 17.1204 0.0678 0.3758 0.3080 0.4166 0.4107 0.6071 
EBITD 56 0.3534 0.2065 0.5717 3.8267 15.4425 0.0906 0.3924 0.3018 0.4761 0.4643 0.5714 
EBITA 56 0.2659 0.1663 0.2739 1.9647 4.4501 0.0716 0.3624 0.2908 0.5044 0.4464 0.5893 
EBIT 56 0.3651 0.1755 0.5692 3.1086 9.9580 0.0780 0.4058 0.3278 0.5888 0.4464 0.6250 
EBT 56 0.3792 0.1724 0.7852 4.5405 20.9648 0.0797 0.3350 0.2553 0.5093 0.4464 0.5714 
NPAT before 
abnormals 56 0.3241 0.2158 0.4885 3.9646 16.8292 0.1272 0.3015 0.1744 0.5154 0.3214 0.6071 
NPAT after abnormals 56 0.3238 0.2145 0.2705 1.0442 0.3713 0.1433 0.5603 0.4171 0.6561 0.3036 0.5357 
NCFO 56 0.4526 0.2697 0.6119 2.9984 10.2201 0.1161 0.5256 0.4095 0.8623 0.3036 0.4643 
BV 56 0.6080 0.2618 1.1469 3.5190 12.0794 0.0799 0.5674 0.4874 0.8896 0.3393 0.4821 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
            Intrinsic Value 56 0.4640 0.1716 1.0315 4.4837 20.5480 0.0817 0.4029 0.3212 0.6419 0.4643 0.6071 
Forecast Value Driver 
            FEPS1 56 0.2800 0.1758 0.2723 1.9279 3.6664 0.1159 0.3243 0.2084 0.5472 0.4107 0.6429 
FEPS2 56 0.2070 0.1546 0.1724 1.6502 3.1997 0.1029 0.2695 0.1666 0.3598 0.4821 0.7321 
Notes 
            FEPS is Forecast Earnings Per Share. The number following relates to the forecast period (FEPS1 is one year ahead Forecast Earnings Per Share).  
 FEPS based on median analysts’ forecasts are selected. 
Other variables as described in Appendix C. 
        Fraction <.15 and <.25 refers to the percentage (expressed as a decimal) of those valuation errors with an absolute value between 0 and 0.15,  
 and 0 and 0.25 respectively. 
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Table D.5 
Matched Signed Valuation Errors 
Panel A: Acquirers       
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
      
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fraction 
<.15 
Fraction 
<.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 56 -0.0967 0.1321 0.8399 -1.9926 3.9916 -0.2741 0.4646 0.7387 1.6946 0.2321 0.3214 
EBITDA 56 0.0412 0.0903 0.3233 -0.7604 1.1860 -0.1416 0.2341 0.3757 0.7502 0.3929 0.5893 
EBITD 56 0.0247 0.0626 0.3459 -0.7631 0.6852 -0.1300 0.2599 0.3899 0.8187 0.3929 0.5000 
EBITA 56 0.0389 0.0754 0.2857 -0.1856 -0.3377 -0.1572 0.2177 0.3749 0.7357 0.3750 0.6071 
EBIT 56 0.0317 0.0607 0.3048 -0.2815 -0.2850 -0.1440 0.2284 0.3724 0.7565 0.3571 0.5714 
EBT 56 -0.0052 0.0252 0.3190 -0.9817 1.0188 -0.1421 0.1953 0.3375 0.7312 0.4464 0.6071 
NPAT before 
abnormals 56 0.0506 0.0513 0.2338 -0.1366 -0.5067 -0.1102 0.2077 0.3179 0.5952 0.4643 0.6964 
NPAT after abnormals 56 0.0452 0.0602 0.3314 0.1207 0.4092 -0.1304 0.2057 0.3362 0.7979 0.4107 0.6250 
NCFO 56 -0.0073 0.1020 0.5011 -1.7030 4.0133 -0.1691 0.2868 0.4559 1.1521 0.3393 0.4821 
BV 56 0.2572 0.2707 0.2986 -0.0054 -0.1788 0.0887 0.4114 0.3227 0.8834 0.2143 0.4286 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
            Intrinsic Value 56 0.1166 0.1558 0.3533 -1.0264 1.2922 -0.0417 0.3708 0.4125 0.6866 0.3750 0.5536 
Forecast Value Driver 
            FEPS1 56 -0.0590 -0.0122 0.3274 -1.8732 4.2856 -0.1429 0.1281 0.2710 0.6254 0.5357 0.7321 
FEPS2 56 -0.0220 0.0237 0.3055 -1.9343 4.9739 -0.1167 0.1327 0.2494 0.5088 0.5179 0.7500 
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Table D.5 continued 
Matched Signed Valuation Errors 
Panel B: Targets       
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
      
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fraction 
<.15 
Fraction 
<.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 56 -0.5256 -0.0728 1.3263 -1.9086 3.4191 -0.7510 0.2884 1.0394 2.8650 0.2321 0.3571 
EBITDA 56 -0.1544 -0.0390 0.6177 -3.3037 12.7668 -0.2364 0.1451 0.3815 0.7670 0.4107 0.6071 
EBITD 56 -0.1786 -0.0261 0.6493 -3.1406 11.5453 -0.2888 0.1056 0.3944 0.8085 0.4643 0.5714 
EBITA 56 -0.0931 -0.0088 0.3717 -1.2557 1.8734 -0.2565 0.1198 0.3762 0.8622 0.4464 0.5893 
EBIT 56 -0.1746 -0.0010 0.6547 -2.5713 7.4802 -0.2456 0.1424 0.3880 0.8574 0.4464 0.6250 
EBT 56 -0.1842 0.0154 0.8535 -4.0883 17.9319 -0.2334 0.1571 0.3905 0.8641 0.4464 0.5714 
NPAT before 
abnormals 56 -0.1330 -0.0186 0.5724 -3.1061 11.6558 -0.2458 0.1830 0.4289 0.7968 0.3214 0.6071 
NPAT after abnormals 56 -0.0135 0.0077 0.4240 -0.4089 0.2196 -0.2137 0.2062 0.4199 1.1559 0.3036 0.5357 
NCFO 56 -0.2540 -0.0401 0.7193 -2.2828 6.6183 -0.3803 0.1598 0.5401 1.2180 0.3036 0.4643 
BV 56 -0.2766 0.0059 1.2704 -3.1809 10.3012 -0.2309 0.2596 0.4905 1.4200 0.3393 0.4821 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
            Intrinsic Value 56 -0.1555 0.0705 1.1219 -4.1623 18.3717 -0.0969 0.2071 0.3040 0.8768 0.4643 0.6071 
Forecast Value Driver 
            FEPS1 56 -0.1447 -0.1274 0.3642 -1.0776 1.3113 -0.2998 0.1008 0.4006 0.8006 0.4107 0.6429 
FEPS2 56 -0.0768 -0.0491 0.2595 -0.7653 0.4979 -0.2196 0.1304 0.3501 0.5962 0.4821 0.7321 
Notes 
            FEPS is Forecast Earnings Per Share. The number following relates to the forecast period (FEPS1 is one year ahead Forecast Earnings Per Share).  
 FEPS based on median analysts’ forecasts are selected. 
Other variables as described in Appendix C. 
        Fraction <.15 and <.25 refers to the percentage (expressed as a decimal) of those valuation errors with an absolute value between 0 and 0.15,  
 and 0 and 0.25 respectively. 
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Table D.6 
Matched Price to Intrinsic Value (P/V) Ratios 
Panel A: Acquirers      
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
     
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 75%-25% 90%-10% 
Historical Value Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Trading Revenue 56 1.4271 1.0289 1.3482 2.3676 5.4189 0.5758 1.5494 0.9736 2.0577 
EBITDA 56 1.2432 1.0649 0.5669 1.3377 1.1398 0.8609 1.4510 0.5900 1.4037 
EBITD 56 1.2736 1.0681 0.6281 1.4584 1.4590 0.8278 1.5604 0.7326 1.4693 
EBITA 56 1.2681 1.0957 0.6118 1.6972 2.8275 0.8621 1.4416 0.5795 1.2773 
EBIT 56 1.2976 1.0752 0.7080 2.0182 4.0858 0.8758 1.4435 0.5677 1.4526 
EBT 56 1.3715 1.1265 0.8318 2.1819 4.7435 0.9313 1.4752 0.5438 1.6174 
NPAT before abnormals 56 1.2533 1.0670 0.5622 1.2976 0.7916 0.9051 1.4123 0.5072 1.5252 
NPAT after abnormals 56 1.2322 1.0200 0.6479 0.9701 0.6787 0.8627 1.5597 0.6969 1.5928 
NCFO 56 1.3272 1.0698 0.8686 1.8733 3.2554 0.8599 1.5220 0.6621 1.5206 
BV 56 0.9284 0.8820 0.4280 0.4372 -0.2615 0.6313 1.2177 0.5864 1.0676 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
          Intrinsic Value 56 1.0390 0.9542 0.2750 1.0561 1.4072 0.8980 1.1381 0.2402 0.6024 
Forecast Value Driver 
          FEPS1 56 1.3893 1.1637 0.5457 0.7910 -0.5624 0.9776 1.7278 0.7502 1.3673 
FEPS2 56 1.3441 1.1856 0.5347 1.1849 0.6744 0.9689 1.5199 0.5511 1.2453 
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Table D.6 continued 
Matched Price to Intrinsic Value (P/V) Ratios 
Panel B: Targets      
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
     
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 75%-25% 90%-10% 
Historical Value Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Trading Revenue 56 1.7878 1.1648 1.9231 3.2644 11.8676 0.8287 1.8659 1.0371 2.5706 
EBITDA 56 1.2863 1.1113 0.5725 1.6542 2.9322 0.9101 1.4496 0.5395 1.2102 
EBITD 56 1.3245 1.1053 0.6030 1.2066 0.9606 0.9075 1.6909 0.7834 1.4192 
EBITA 56 1.2763 1.1082 0.5715 1.5289 2.7227 0.9115 1.5612 0.6498 1.2120 
EBIT 56 1.3591 1.0816 0.8040 2.0345 4.3895 0.8748 1.5971 0.7223 1.2766 
EBT 56 1.3620 1.0764 0.9040 2.9776 10.2050 0.8811 1.4274 0.5463 1.2547 
NPAT before abnormals 56 1.3521 1.1060 0.8624 2.8989 9.7785 0.9056 1.5391 0.6335 1.2008 
NPAT after abnormals 56 1.2147 1.0904 0.7386 1.5745 2.9188 0.8035 1.4666 0.6631 1.4483 
NCFO 56 1.4582 1.2031 0.9449 1.9629 3.8849 0.8748 1.6826 0.8078 1.7656 
BV 56 1.4744 0.9933 1.7824 4.0487 16.8796 0.8751 1.3634 0.4883 1.5202 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
          Intrinsic Value 56 1.2577 0.9504 1.2165 4.6608 21.9698 0.8963 1.1613 0.2650 0.7756 
Forecast Value Driver 
          FEPS1 56 1.3484 1.1222 0.6717 1.8407 3.4885 0.9054 1.5779 0.6725 1.3615 
FEPS2 56 1.2549 1.0645 0.4882 0.9284 -0.2608 0.8936 1.6677 0.7741 1.1207 
Notes 
          FEPS is Forecast Earnings Per Share. The number following relates to the forecast period (FEPS1 is one year ahead Forecast Earnings Per Share).  
FEPS based on median analysts’ forecasts are selected. 
Other variables as described in Appendix C. 
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Table D.7 
Acquirers Absolute Valuation Errors Using One Year Ahead Market Capitalisation 
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
      
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fractio
n <.15 
Fractio
n <.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 146 0.6569 0.5040 0.7985 3.1100 9.6632 0.2396 0.7116 0.4720 0.7847 0.1370 0.2603 
EBITDA 146 0.4349 0.4039 0.2630 0.8250 0.7543 0.2254 0.5926 0.3672 0.6118 0.1233 0.3014 
EBITD 146 0.4498 0.4174 0.2856 1.3542 2.8491 0.2554 0.6008 0.3455 0.6231 0.1164 0.2466 
EBITA 146 0.4256 0.3908 0.2877 0.8679 0.9700 0.2187 0.5790 0.3603 0.6763 0.1644 0.3014 
EBIT 146 0.4407 0.4043 0.2961 1.0822 1.3867 0.2220 0.5818 0.3597 0.6622 0.1575 0.2945 
EBT 146 0.4520 0.3814 0.3619 1.9318 4.4216 0.2075 0.5846 0.3771 0.6550 0.1507 0.3356 
NPAT before 
abnormals 146 0.4185 0.3866 0.2682 0.7504 0.6093 0.2375 0.5947 0.3573 0.6661 0.1849 0.2671 
NPAT after abnormals 146 0.4649 0.4217 0.3043 1.2179 2.3713 0.2539 0.6265 0.3725 0.7324 0.1507 0.2466 
NCFO 146 0.4939 0.4291 0.3788 1.3303 1.9383 0.1858 0.6479 0.4621 0.7474 0.1986 0.2945 
BV 146 0.4550 0.4465 0.2407 0.0522 -1.0714 0.2653 0.6434 0.3780 0.6429 0.1096 0.2397 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
            Intrinsic Value 146 0.4314 0.4029 0.3080 2.0021 6.7837 0.2201 0.5736 0.3534 0.5796 0.1438 0.2945 
Forecast Value Driver 
            FEPS1 146 0.4189 0.3807 0.3560 2.2266 6.8041 0.1767 0.5500 0.3733 0.6570 0.1986 0.3288 
FEPS2 146 0.4067 0.3467 0.2893 1.5553 3.2554 0.2111 0.5424 0.3313 0.5670 0.1712 0.3219 
Share Price 
            Current Share Price 146 0.2851 0.2467 0.1993 0.8070 0.1333 0.1264 0.4232 0.2968 0.4929 0.3425 0.5137 
Notes 
            FEPS is Forecast Earnings Per Share. The number following relates to the forecast period (FEPS1 is one year ahead Forecast Earnings Per Share). 
FEPS based on median analysts’ forecasts are selected. Other variables as described in Appendix C. 
 Fraction <.15 and <.25 refers to the percentage (expressed as a decimal) of those valuation errors with an absolute value between 0 and 0.15,  
 and 0 and 0.25 respectively. 
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Table D.8 
Acquirers Absolute Valuation Errors Using Two Year Ahead Market Capitalisation 
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
      
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fractio
n <.15 
Fractio
n <.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 137 0.8776 0.5745 1.5537 4.3804 18.9924 0.3233 0.7600 0.4367 0.7973 0.1022 0.1898 
EBITDA 137 0.5577 0.4522 0.4979 2.5801 6.9064 0.3133 0.6216 0.3083 0.6564 0.1095 0.2044 
EBITD 137 0.5750 0.4858 0.5562 2.7580 7.8582 0.2812 0.6127 0.3315 0.6506 0.0876 0.1971 
EBITA 137 0.5500 0.4646 0.5232 2.9976 10.2920 0.2724 0.6505 0.3780 0.6817 0.1387 0.2117 
EBIT 137 0.5761 0.4864 0.5933 3.2804 12.1728 0.2613 0.6327 0.3714 0.6742 0.1314 0.2190 
EBT 137 0.5822 0.4317 0.6549 3.3920 12.7132 0.2675 0.6635 0.3959 0.6674 0.1241 0.2336 
NPAT before 
abnormals 137 0.5277 0.4567 0.5053 3.2089 12.0944 0.2691 0.6167 0.3476 0.6601 0.1314 0.2409 
NPAT after abnormals 137 0.5826 0.4871 0.5958 3.2883 12.1004 0.2628 0.6605 0.3977 0.7736 0.1095 0.2263 
NCFO 137 0.6439 0.5022 0.6660 2.9805 10.1782 0.3114 0.7092 0.3978 1.1047 0.1387 0.1971 
BV 137 0.5309 0.4817 0.3170 1.1917 2.5100 0.3004 0.6932 0.3928 0.7104 0.1022 0.1606 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
            Intrinsic Value 137 0.6587 0.4582 1.2468 5.2451 27.3416 0.2763 0.6264 0.3501 0.7208 0.1460 0.2409 
Forecast Value Driver 
            FEPS1 137 0.7203 0.4521 1.3087 4.8212 23.7512 0.2677 0.6395 0.3718 0.8278 0.1460 0.2336 
FEPS2 137 0.6795 0.4384 1.1229 4.6794 22.4039 0.2982 0.6339 0.3357 0.6645 0.0803 0.2044 
Share Price 
            Current Share Price 137 0.4517 0.3592 0.4073 2.2897 6.2199 0.2110 0.5480 0.3370 0.6578 0.1752 0.3066 
Notes 
            FEPS is Forecast Earnings Per Share. The number following relates to the forecast period (FEPS1 is one year ahead Forecast Earnings Per Share). 
FEPS based on median analysts’ forecasts are selected. Other variables as described in Appendix C. 
 Fraction <.15 and <.25 refers to the percentage (expressed as a decimal) of those valuation errors with an absolute value between 0 and 0.15,  
 and 0 and 0.25 respectively. 
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Table D.9 
Acquirers Absolute Valuation Errors Using Three Year Ahead Market Capitalisation 
Multiples based on median of comparable firms from the same industry 
      
Value Driver N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
75%-
25% 
90%-
10% 
Fractio
n <.15 
Fractio
n <.25 
Historical Value 
Drivers 6 2 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 
Trading Revenue 125 0.8101 0.6116 0.9208 3.3192 11.1213 0.3831 0.7910 0.4079 0.7468 0.0320 0.1360 
EBITDA 125 0.5851 0.5219 0.5201 3.3198 12.9560 0.3526 0.6813 0.3287 0.6507 0.0880 0.1760 
EBITD 125 0.5924 0.4966 0.5452 3.2119 11.8613 0.3010 0.6981 0.3971 0.6664 0.0960 0.1840 
EBITA 125 0.5867 0.5184 0.5489 3.4683 13.5688 0.2864 0.6776 0.3912 0.6526 0.0800 0.1920 
EBIT 125 0.5849 0.5087 0.5454 3.1983 12.0700 0.2908 0.6743 0.3835 0.6768 0.0960 0.2080 
EBT 125 0.5990 0.5067 0.5485 3.1763 11.6467 0.3321 0.6760 0.3439 0.6132 0.0640 0.2080 
NPAT before 
abnormals 125 0.5739 0.5046 0.4829 3.3812 14.0404 0.3386 0.6851 0.3464 0.6347 0.0960 0.1440 
NPAT after abnormals 125 0.5851 0.5498 0.4362 2.4080 7.9798 0.3474 0.7090 0.3616 0.7538 0.1280 0.1520 
NCFO 125 0.6452 0.5823 0.5388 2.6069 8.0515 0.3417 0.7181 0.3764 0.7495 0.0960 0.1520 
BV 125 0.5872 0.5463 0.3597 1.6821 4.4806 0.3720 0.7372 0.3652 0.6844 0.0640 0.1440 
Intrinsic Value Driver 
            Intrinsic Value 125 0.6571 0.5237 0.8674 4.2874 18.5089 0.3096 0.6942 0.3846 0.6829 0.0800 0.1840 
Forecast Value Driver 
            FEPS1 125 0.9166 0.4850 2.2117 5.1648 25.8370 0.2898 0.6833 0.3935 1.0140 0.1120 0.1920 
FEPS2 125 0.9114 0.4844 2.2514 5.1870 25.9862 0.3131 0.6526 0.3394 0.6904 0.0960 0.2000 
Share Price 
            Current Share Price 125 0.5228 0.4184 0.5576 3.2988 11.9695 0.2467 0.6111 0.3644 0.6525 0.1600 0.2640 
Notes 
            FEPS is Forecast Earnings Per Share. The number following relates to the forecast period (FEPS1 is one year ahead Forecast Earnings Per Share). 
FEPS based on median analysts’ forecasts are selected. Other variables as described in Appendix C. 
 Fraction <.15 and <.25 refers to the percentage (expressed as a decimal) of those valuation errors with an absolute value between 0 and 0.15,  
 and 0 and 0.25 respectively. 
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